falsifiability

Carrol Cox cbcox at ilstu.edu
Tue Jan 1 11:29:47 PST 2002


"A.J. Peticolas" wrote:
>
>
>Pragmatically, if we only hold falsifiable theories, we are
>always capable of making some correction in thoughts we hold
>and actions we are therefore doing. And the correction is on
>the basis of reasonable doubt and a rational basis, rather than
>an arbitrary change based on whim and "enlightenment". This
>openness to rational changes of course, it seems to me, is something
>we shuld care about a *lot*.

Are you arguing that corrigibility and falsifiability are coterminous? And this raises a further point. This whole discussion from the beginning has, I think, rather confused two different questions:

1) Is a proposition a proposition of science?

2) Is a proposition true?

You can't pursue question of "falsifiability" very far before you run into propositions which are _in principle_ falsifiable but which are not, for various reasons, testable _at this time_.

One very important category of propositions consists of propositions all of which are in principle falsifiable (and will in fact be eventually confirmed or rejected) but which cannot possibly be tested now: Propositions concerning (a) the probability of global warming and (b) propositions concerning the impact of global warming (if it continues) on human life. Are these propositions all irrational because their falsification or confirmation can only take place in the future?

Or consider the possibility of earthquakes in eastern United States. Very unlikely I believe but a real possibility at some point in the future. Is it rational or irrational to argue about building nuclear plants along possible future fault lines?

Or consider the fundamental proposition derived from the marxist tradition, Rosa Luxemburg's either/or, socialism or barbarianism. It is certainly falsifiable in principle -- and it is just as certainly _not_ falsifiable by any test which (pragmatically speaking) we can apply now.

Please note that this proposition denies any relevance to two other propositions: a) Socialism is possible and b) socialism is desirable. It merely (merely!) affirms that socialism is necessary, whether or not possible or desirable. (And thus we don't have to worry about proving or disproving the proposition that socialism is possible: any more than someone trapped in a blizzard, on foot, at 50 below temperature, needs to argue about whether it will be possible or not to walk the two miles between her and shelter.)

Carrol


>
> regards,
> Anne
> <petico at io.com>



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