A big problem with the way the Soviet Union dealt with their military goods consumers was that they often denied access to front-line aspects (upgrade from the usually broken "version one" to the fully debugged "version three") and sophisticated training.
There was at least one significant tank battle in the Gulf War (Medina Ridge) where inferior equipment (T-72s) could have beaten a US tank brigade (they had positioning and surprise, practically jumped them), but the tactics used doomed the Iraqi unit.
After battle reports showed clearly that this group was executing Soviet tactics that had been countered on paper in the late 70s. 100% loss (186 tanks, 127 other vehicles), compared to 1 KIA on the US side (!!!); could have been MUCH different.
Another big factor was thermal imaging, underestimated by the Iraqis: they knew that running their engines would make them "hot" but were apparently not aware that just sticking your head out of a hatch was enough to give someone a target to hit out to 3500m.
So it's not just this tank or that tank, but the whole package.
> Does anyone wonder why, after being replaced by several versions of
> B1s and B2s, the US still calls out the B-52s for every aerial
> bombardment?
The B-1 and B-2 programs were _never_ designed to "replace" the B-52 in anything other than limited roles: The B-1 was to be a supersonic delivery vehicle for nukes; the B-2 is obviously has a limited-mission capability: being a stealth platform means it's one big compromise.
> Cripes, those planes were supposed to be obsolete in the 70s!
Today's B-52 is no more obsolete than the 747, or other upgraded systems like the E-6B TACAMO.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/e-6.htm
/jordan