Summary
Russia's foreign minister begins a trip to China May 31, following recent deals between Russia, the United States and NATO. These agreements emphasize the shift in relations between Moscow and Beijing, which will force China to try and undermine Moscow's relations with Washington.
Analysis
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov began a three-day visit to China May 31, during which he will meet with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and Defense Minister Chi Haotian. The visit comes shortly after Moscow signed a new deal to create a NATO-Russia council -- giving it equal footing on security issues with the alliance's 19 other members -- and formed a strategic arms reduction agreement with the United States.
Ivanov began his visit, his first to China as defense minister, by updating Jiang on these recent moves and reiterating Russia's continued commitment to its strategic partnership with China. Despite the friendly tone, Ivanov's visit comes at a time of shifting relations between Moscow and Beijing.
Just a few years ago, Russia and China were forging a strategic partnership aimed at balancing the increasingly unchallenged U.S. global influence. Russia was the weak partner in the relationship, having little of value for Washington and unable to stand up to the United States on its own. Thus Moscow agreed to play a junior role to its rapacious neighbor, and Beijing saw its fortunes rise not only in relation to the United States but also in the former Soviet states in Central Asia.
The situation has shifted considerably since Sept. 11, with Moscow firmly orienting its future toward the West. Being a junior partner to Washington -- however historically painful that may be -- offers more security for Russia than ties with China. For one thing, the United States remains geographically distant, while China's rising population is encroaching increasingly on Russia's sparsely populated Far East region.
Ivanov's trip to China only reinforces Beijing's weakness in the regional and global strategic balance since Sept. 11. China has lost the ability to use Russia as a lever in negotiations with the United States, it is losing its tentative foothold in Central Asia due to the increasing Russian and U.S. presence in the region, and Moscow has even taken away China's position as the diplomatic gatekeeper of North Korea, something Beijing had used as a bargaining chip in relations with Washington, Seoul and Tokyo.
For Beijing, Russia's strengthened position is not a crisis, but it is a troubling prospect. Aside from undermining China's position in Central Asia and North Korea, Russia's new Western friendships leave Beijing concerned about another strategic threat -- missile defense. If Russia were to sign on with the United States and Europe to develop and deploy missile defense systems, China -- with its limited stash of ICBMs -- would lose the strategic advantage.
It is becoming imperative for China to find a replacement lever to regain its waning influence in surrounding regions and to firm up its strategic position vis-a-vis the United States. Beijing can try to act as a spoiler in Central Asia by pitting the United States against Russia, which still has concerns over the increasing post-Sept. 11 U.S. military presence in the resource-rich region. The other option is to reinvigorate ties with North Korea to the point where, as the Chinese government once said, they are "as close as lips and teeth."
Beijing will continue talking to Moscow, buying Russian weapons and putting a friendly face on relations. But at the same time, China has seen its fortunes wane as Moscow's have risen, and it will do whatever it can to undermine U.S.-Russia relations and regain the strategic high ground.