Kelley,
You asked what I thought of the passage from Kuhn in relation to Hawkes. That's pretty general. I think I can guess what you might be getting at (or maybe not). The quoteof Kuhn, suggests that there are two different aspects to a paradigm shift: a different way of thinking about a scientific problem or question starts as an intellectual proposition and then as it is pursued, there is an accompanying change in consensus on how to do that particular kind of science.
So then Hawkes might be suggesting that Gould through a paradigm shift in looking at evolutionary questions (cognitive), might lead others to effect at some later stage the way those questions and possible answers are to be sought out (normative).
Then there is the further idea of Kuhn's that scientific revolutions, or bursts of activity only appear now and then, while most of time there is stasis. In other words, scientific work itself can be historically characterized as a punctuated equilibrium. He went further to say that the standards or criteria themselves are changed in the process, and that prior shifts are not absorbed by later ones.
So Gould's idea of evolution by punctuated equilibrium is echoed in Kuhn's idea of scientific history as punctuated equilibrium.
Given the historical sequence of first Kuhn then Gould, it suggests that Gould was influenced by Kuhn---if not directly then indirectly as these sorts of ideas were in the air at the time and Kuhn's work wasn't the only source. In fact, just about everybody who has read history wonders how come there are long periods were nothing seems to go on, and then suddenly a couple of generations seem to overhaul everything (part of Carrol's point for which he took a lot of needless shit).
Since I haven't looked at Kuhn in years and could easily get Kuhn, Popper, and Feyerabend all mixed up in the various position they took, somebody else should do the honors. From, NYRB, 11/15/98, Steven Weinberg--a big league physicist--go up to his homepage from [http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/vl/notes/weinberg.html]:
``...Kuhn did not deny that there is progress in science, but he denied that it is progress toward anything. He often used the metaphor of biological evolution: scientific progress for him was like evolution as described by Darwin, a process driven from behind, rather than pulled toward some fixed goal to which it grows ever closer. For him, the natural selection of scientific theories is driven by problem solving. When during a period of normal science, it turns out that some problems can't be solved using existing theories, then new ideas proliferate, and the ideas that survive are those that do best at solving these problems. But according to Kuhn, just as there was nothing inevitable about mammals appearing in the Cretaceous period and out-surviving the dinosaurs when a comet hit the earth, so also there is nothing built into nature that made it inevitable that our science would evolve in the direction of Maxwell's equation or general relativity. Kuhn recognizes that Maxwell's and Einstein's theories are better than those that preceded them, in the same way that mammals turned out to be better than dinosaurs at surviving the effects of comet impacts, but when new problems arise they will be replaced by new theories that are better at solving those problems, and so on, with no overall improvement.
All this is wormwood to scientists like myself, who think the task of science is to bring us closer and closer to objective truth. But Kuhn's conclusions are delicious to those who take a more skeptical view of the pretentions of science. If scientific theories can only be judged within the context of a particular paradigm, then in this respect the scientific theories of any one paradigm are not privileged over other ways of looking at the world, such as shamanism or astrolgy or creationism. If the transition from one paradigm to another cannot be judged by any external standard, then perhaps it is culture rather than nature that dictates the content of scientific theories.
Kuhn himself was not always happy with those who invoked his work. In 1965 he complained that for the philosopher Paul Feyerabend to describe his arguments as a defense of irrationality in science seemed to him to be `not only absurd but vaguely obscene'... But even when we put aside the excesses of Kuhn's admirers, the radical part of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is radical enough. And I think it is quite wrong....''
As a sidenote which I think I've mentioned before, I took Feyerabend at UCB in `67-8. I didn't realize it at the time, but Feyerabend was doing philosophy right in front of us---his lectures were his philosophy, along with its notes, speculations, asides, diatribes. If you read any of his books, that is what he sounded like in person. I think he was working on themes that show up in `Against Method' published a few years later. His lectures were a little disconcerting since he lectured at a high level (for a student), as if you already knew the background. He was a great showman on stage. He was Austrian so he had a German accent, had post-polio paralysis of his legs and used Canadian crutches. So imagine a blond Peter Sellers as Dr. Strangelove on crutches, mechanically walking back and forth on a big stage, pausing for emphasis, then slamming the huge scribble covered blackboards with one of the crutches....
Feyerabend was more than just vaguely obscene, he was ludicrous and enjoyed it. He told us that taking a university course in philosophy or science or worse the philosophy of science was a religious experience, an initiation rite, long hours of work, great pain, suffering, and anxiety, culminating in a penetrating orgasmic climax, The Final, then followed by the post-coital depression of The Grade! He was having none of that, thank you. The final was oral (class laughter) or written on your choice of topics, the ten page reading list (many major works of western philosophy, science, and way over my head)---but it was optional and most people got A's if they did anything at all and B's or C's if they didn't. The administration was always on him about grades and looking for ways to get rid of him. Many of his classes were choked with fraternity types, but luckily they only showed up about once: the first day. That was fine with everybody, but the Dean of Faculty or Academic Affairs or whoever.
For those interested in a flavor of Feyerabend, Kuhn, Popper and others see under Science and Society at:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/index.htm
For just Kuhn:
http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/Kuhnsnap.html
Anyway Kelley, you should flesh out what you were trying to get at.
Chuck Grimes