Developing an All-Channel Network
: When is a network really an organizational network?
Netwar rests on the dynamics of networks. Yet, what does the term "network" mean? Discussions about networks are proliferating, and three usages are in play, with clear distinctions rarely drawn among them. One common usage refers to communications grids and circuits--as though networking were a technological phenomenon, such that placing a set of actors (military units, for example) atop a grid would make them a network. This is a limited usage; we have spoken about its pitfalls in this and earlier studies, and thus will not dwell upon it here. In two other prominent usages, the term refers either to social networks or to organizational networks (or to a conflation of both). But social and organizational networks are somewhat different organisms. This is what needs discussion here, because the difference is a significant issue for theory and practice, affecting how best to think about the dynamics of netwar. The field of network analysis, writ large, has been dominated by social network analysis, but organizational network analysis can be even more helpful for understanding the nature of netwar.
Our main point is that netwar (and also counternetwar) is principally an organizational dynamic, even though it requires appropriate social and technological dynamics to work well. But our deeper point is that there is still much work to be done to clarify the meaning of "network" and come up with better, easier methods of analysis for policymakers and strategists. Both the social and organizational schools can contribute to this--but in different ways, because they have different tendencies. (For elaboration, see Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, Ch. 10.)
What makes a network effective, besides organization? What holds a network together? What makes it function effectively? The answers involve much more than the organizational aspects mentioned above. While there is no standard methodology for analyzing network forms of organization, our familiarity with the theoretical literature and with the practices seen among netwar actors indicates that the design and performance of such networks depend on what happens across five levels of analysis (which are also levels of practice):
Organizational level--its organizational design Narrative level--the story being told Doctrinal level--the collaborative strategies and methods Technological level--the information systems Social level--the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust.
The strength of a network, perhaps especially the all-channel design, depends on its functioning well across all five levels. The strongest networks will be those in which the organizational design is sustained by a winning story and a well-defined doctrine, and in which all this is layered atop advanced communications systems and rests on strong personal and social ties at the base. Each level, and the overall design, may benefit from redundancy and diversity. Each level's characteristics are likely to affect those of the other levels.
These are not idle academic issues. Getting a network form "right"--like getting a hierarchical or market form "right"--can be a delicate enterprise. For practitioners trying to organize a new network or adjust one that already exists, various options may merit consideration--and their assessment should assure that all the organizational, narrative, doctrinal, technological and social levels are well-designed and integrated.
This applies to netwar and counternetwar actors across the spectrum. However, our discussion emphasizes evidence from social netwar actors, mainly activist NGOs, because they have been more open and expressive than have terrorist, criminal and other violent, secretive actors.
Identifying potent netwarriors
Netwar is the lower-intensity, societal-level counterpart to our earlier, mostly military concept of cyberwar. Netwar has a dual nature, like the two-faced Roman god Janus, in that it is composed of conflicts waged, on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals and ethnonationalist extremists; and by civil-society activists on the other. What distinguishes netwar as a form of conflict is the networked organizational structure of its practitioners--with many groups actually being leaderless--and the suppleness in their ability to come together quickly in swarming attacks. The concepts of cyberwar and netwar encompass a new spectrum of conflict that is emerging in the wake of the information revolution.
In studying major instances of netwar that have occurred over the past several years, we found, among other things, that netwar works very well. Whether the protagonists are civil-society activists or "uncivil-society" criminals and terrorists, their netwars have generally been successful. In part, the success of netwar may be explained by its very novelty--much as earlier periods of innovation in military affairs have seen new practices triumphant until an appropriate response is discovered. But there is more at work here: The network form of organization has re-enlivened old forms of licit and illicit activity, posing serious challenges to those--mainly the militaries, constabularies and governing officials of nation states--whose duty is to cope with the threats this new generation of largely nonstate actors poses.
Strategists and policymakers in Washington and elsewhere have already begun to discern the dark side of the netwar phenomenon, especially as manifested in terrorist and criminal organization. This growing awareness is quite evident in recent official studies of this burgeoning problem: Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999 (State Department, 2000), International Crime Threat Assessment (Interagency Working Group, 2000), and Global Trends 2015 (National Intelligence Council, 2000). But strategists and policymakers still have much work to do to harness the brighter, civil-society-building potential of networked nonstate actors. Thus, a fundamental challenge in the coming decade will be to focus on the opportunities that may arise from closer cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other nonstate actors.
In Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (RAND, 2001), from which this seminar was excerpted, we and our colleagues examine various types of netwar from the most violent to the most socially activist. In so doing, we find that, despite the variety, all networks that have been built for waging netwar may be analyzed in terms of a common analytic framework. There are five levels of theory and practice that matter: the technological, social, narrative, organizational and doctrinal levels. A netwar actor must get all five right to be fully effective.
While a network's level of technological sophistication does make a difference--and people do tend to think that netwar depends heavily on technology--the other levels have just as much, if not more, of an effect on the potential power of a given group. One key level is the social basis for cooperation among network members. When social ties are strong, building mutual trust and identity, a network's effectiveness is greatly enhanced. This can be seen most clearly in ethnically based terror, crime and insurgent groups in which clan ties bind together even the loosest, most dispersed organization.
In trying to confront or cope with a networked adversary, it is important to assess the opponent's strengths and weaknesses at the technological, social and narrative levels. Yet, the defining level of a netwar actor is its organizational design. Analysts must realize that the structures of networks may feature much variety--from simple chain or line networks, to less simple hub or start designs, to complex all-channel designs, any and all of which may be blended into sprawling multihub and spider's-web networks. To cope with a network, analysts must first learn what kind of network it is and then draw on the best methods for analysis. In the past, intelligence assessments of adversaries have tended to focus on their hierarchical leadership structures. This is insufficient for analyzing netwar actors--which, like some of today's terrorist networks, may well consist of various small, dispersed groups that are linked in odd ways and do not have a clear leadership structure.
The most potent netwarriors will not only be highly networked and have a capacity to swarm, they will also be held together by strong social ties, have secure communications technologies and project a common "story" about why they are together and what they need to do. These will be the most serious adversaries. But even those networks that are weak on some levels (e.g., technological) may pose stiff challenges to their nation-state adversaries. With this in mind, it is necessary to go beyond just diagnosing the nature of the networked nonstate opponent in a given conflict. It will become crucial for governments and their military and law enforcement establishments to begin networking themselves. Perhaps this will become the greatest challenge posed by the rise of netwar.