Musharraf must go Benazir Bhutto Thursday May 30, 2002 The Guardian
India and Pakistan are moving inexorably towards war, and once again the international community is involved in firefighting a potential nuclear conflict.
The chance of such a war was predicted by the American CIA chief in March. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, George Tenet said: "If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counterattack."
For the last six months, Indian and Pakistani soldiers have stood eyeball to eyeball at the line of control. Now India has expelled Pakistan's high commissioner and the Indian prime minister has called for a "decisive fight" against Pakistan. The drums of war are beating.
The international community has high stakes in the region. Pakistan is now a key US ally and the last thing the US needs is the war against terror deflected by war between India and Pakistan. But if the militants wanted to deflect attention from the heat of allied forces against al-Qaida in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, they have succeeded.
The international community made a critical error when it concluded that a military dictator could defuse tension between India and Pakistan or hold back the tidal wave of extremism that is now engulfing the region.
The tenure of General Pervez Musharraf, the great white hope in the fight against terrorism, has been marked by the rise of extremism, militancy, terrorism and regional tension. He missed the opportunity at Agra in 2000 to sign a confidence-building treaty with New Delhi. He carries the baggage of being the architect of the Kargil conflict that nearly led to an Indo-Pak war in 1999. His "lone ranger" politics pits him against domestic political forces. Given this history, it's unlikely that he can halt the march to war.
There is one way that war can be prevented, and that is regime change in Islamabad. This would offer the possibility of halting hostilities to permit a new government to make a fresh start. The voices of the international community as well as the Pakistani armed forces are critical: they will determine whether Musharraf resigns to defuse the crisis or clings to power in a show of nuclear brinksmanship.
In 1971, the senior officers of the Pakistan army went to then military dictator, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, forcing him to resign after Islamabad suffered a military defeat in an earlier war between the two countries. Yahya Khan's resignation paved the way for the formation of a new government. That government signed the Simla Agreement in 1972, holding peace in place until both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices in 1998. Since then the two countries have thrice come to the brink of war.
Clearly a new, post- nuclear explosions treaty is needed. Reports indicate that the Pakistani generals do speak up. They will question a two-front war at a time when their men are stretched out both at the eastern and western borders.
The view of Pakistan's important and powerful ally, America, is pivotal, too. New Delhi will reflect before starting a military action that lacks the support of the US. But it enjoys far greater freedom of action than Islamabad did during the Kargil fighting. Then President Clinton could dictate to a debt-laden Islamabad held hostage by the International Monetary Fund. President Bush might find it difficult to dictate to New Delhi: its economy is largely independent.
But Bush does have one weapon that can deter New Delhi. That is the threat of international mediation for the Kashmir cause. New Delhi is opposed to such intervention.
A military setback means trouble for Musharraf. Far better for him and the region that he agrees to regime change to prevent the start of armed hostilities that could trigger a nuclear nightmare.
And far better for New Delhi to accept such a regime change as face-saving than allow a limited war that could spill out of control.
New Delhi should consider that Islamabad could do well in a war that is limited in area and time. Its military is well equipped.
During his testimony before the Senate committee last March, the CIA chief said the decision to turn Islamabad in to an ally in the wake of the September 11 attacks "was a fundamental political shift with inherent risk". Those risks are now all too evident.
© 2002, Global Viewpoint, Los Angeles Times Syndicate International. Benazir Bhutto is the former prime minister of Pakistan and leads the largest opposition party, the People's party.