"Spiked" on Yemen murders

[Shane Mage]

>From: sp!ked-central <spiked-central at spiked-online.com>
>
>Article8 November 2002Printer-friendly version
>
>Cowards' war in Yemen
>by David Chandler
>
>If you are a suspected al-Qaeda operative, summary 'justice' can 
>come like a bolt from the blue.
>
>On the morning of 4 November 2002, an unmanned Predator drone 
>operating from an altitude of up to 25,000 feet, picked up a 
>nondescript utility vehicle on a monitor and tracked it as it sped 
>along a highway towards the city of Marib in northern Yemen. CIA 
>operators of the unmanned aircraft, working from a ground station 
>hundreds of miles away, and basing their action on Yemeni 
>'intelligence', then aimed and guided a Hellfire missile to the 
>target. The missile blew up the vehicle, throwing debris and body 
>parts around the surrounding area.
>
>At no risk to life or limb the USA claims to have achieved a major 
>victory in the 'war against terror'. One of the occupants of the 
>vehicle is alleged to have been Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi has a 
>lengthy charge-sheet, including allegations that he was 'perhaps' 
>one of the top dozen or so figures in the worldwide al-Qaeda 
>network, was a former body guard of Osama bin Laden, was the senior 
>al-Qaeda operative in Yemen, one of the suspected planners behind 
>the terrorist attack on the US warship Cole two years ago, in which 
>17 American sailors died and also possibly behind the 7 October 2002 
>bombing of a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen.
>
>Yet for a figure of such alleged importance it seems strange that 
>the USA would act in the way it did. Blowing people up is not the 
>best way of making sure that the CIA did 'get their man'. There are 
>contradictory reports about the bombing. Some papers cite Yemeni 
>sources saying that the vehicle was destroyed and the other 
>passengers (except al-Harthi) were burned beyond recognition. This 
>was apparently confirmed by a passing tribesman who saw Harthi's 
>body in the car and identified him, stating with (surprising) 
>confidence that 'I know him like I know myself'.
>
>A different story was portrayed by CNN, quoting Walid Al-Saqqaf, 
>managing editor of the Yemen Times, as stating that al-Harthi could 
>only be identified by a mark on his leg, blown off in the blast. So 
>it seems possible that we, and the US special forces, may never know 
>if al-Harthi was actually in the vehicle.
>
>Their bodies were so badly burned as to be unrecognisable
>There is also room for suspicion as to whether the five other 
>occupants of the vehicle, swiftly declared to be 'low-level' 
>al-Qaeda operatives and guilty-as-charged, were identified at all - 
>considering that their bodies were so badly burned as to be 
>unrecognisable. It would seem unwise to rely solely on US 
>'intelligence' prior to the missile assault, considering the 
>numerous occasions in Afghanistan and Kosovo where this type of 
>identification information has proved to be the product of 
>manipulation, misunderstanding or wishful thinking.
>
>Of greater importance, even if the CIA vigilantes did get their man, 
>there is little way of knowing to what extent he was in fact 
>responsible for the crimes of which he was accused. Inevitably, 
>after the event the US government is talking up the benefits of 
>having the al-Qaeda suspect out of the picture. US defence Secretary 
>Donald Rumsfeld stated that putting al-Harthi 'out of business' was 
>a 'very good thing'. US President George W Bush greeted the news 
>asserting: 'The only way to treat them is [for] what they are - 
>international killers.'
>
>The summary execution without trial of terrorist suspects is not 
>only a flagrant breach of international law and accepted human 
>rights norms, it also does not help in building up information about 
>the actions and future plans of the al-Qaeda organisation. 
>Intelligence is widely accepted to be one of the weaker planks in 
>the 'war against terrorism', yet the US forces passed up a prime 
>opportunity to get information from one of the few leading al-Qaeda 
>suspects whose location was actually known. In fact, his movements 
>appear to have been tracked for a number of months.
>
>While the US talks tough in the UN Security Council and develops new 
>national security strategies based on unilateral powers of 
>pre-emptive war-making, the actions on the ground are those of a 
>power unwilling to commit itself - even when it is clearly in its 
>vital security interests. Summary justice delivered by CIA-operated 
>unmanned drones from 25,000 feet seems to illustrate the problems of 
>the USA's reluctance to take risks in the course of the 'war against 
>terror'.
>
>Relying on robotic technology to take out suspects, while the 
>operators sit in the safety of a US army compound hundreds of miles 
>away, smacks of cowardice rather than conviction.
>
>Anti-terrorist strategy is a far cry from the Wild West
>The reason for this unwillingness to confront the 'enemy' in person 
>appears to lie in concerns over US casualties. A few gun-toting 
>tribesmen are enough to deter the US special forces from entering 
>the poor villages in Yemen's Marib province where it is alleged 
>al-Qaeda suspects, such as al-Harthi, have sought sanctuary. US 
>instructors had trained Yemeni forces to fight the 'war against 
>terror' on their behalf, but this failed spectacularly in December 
>2001 when local tribesmen defeated them in a shoot-out, allowing 
>al-Qaeda suspects to escape. But US commanders' reluctance to put 
>their troops in harm's way is not specific to the Yemen.
>
>In Afghanistan, there was the same reliance on 'local forces' when 
>there was any risk of casualties. Despite the rhetoric about 
>'nation-building' and new Marshall Plans, the US has been reluctant 
>to enforce the writ of the internationally installed Karzai 
>government outside the capital Kabul. International policy 
>institutes negatively describe the Afghanistan mission as making a 
>'light-footprint' compared to the confident attempts at 
>state-building in the less risky environments of Kosovo or Bosnia 
>(1).
>
>For many commentators, the CIA attack in Yemen signals a more 
>aggressive phase in America's war against terrorism. The Guardian 
>editorialises that Bush is 'living his presidency like Tom Clancy's 
>Jack Ryan', with the entire world becoming a Wild West 
>shooting-range (2). But anti-terrorist strategy based on minimising 
>risks is a far cry from the confident superiority of the Wild West 
>hero. Rather than Jack Ryan, the nearest comparison would be the 
>feckless bounty-hunter who would prefer to shoot his quarry in the 
>back rather than face them off in a show-down.
>
>Even if al-Harthi was killed, and if the allegations made to justify 
>his murder were true, it is clear that the USA would have had much 
>more to gain by attempting to capture him alive. It is hard to see 
>how such a risk-adverse US approach can be maintained if the war 
>against terror is to proceed.
>
>If the CIA and US special forces are unwilling to take the risks 
>involved in capturing an al-Qaeda suspect travelling in a single 
>vehicle along an isolated road in the Yemeni desert, then Saddam 
>Hussein may have little to fear.
>
>David Chandler lectures in International Relations at Brunel 
>University. His books include From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and 
>International Intervention, published by Pluto Press (buy this book 
>from Amazon (UK) or Amazon (USA)) and Rethinking Human Rights: 
>Critical Approaches to International Politics (Palgrave-Macmillan, 
>forthcoming November 2002). Email david.chandler at brunel.ac.uk
>
>Read on:
>
>War against what?, by Brendan O'Neill
>
>(1) Tiptoeing through Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-building, 
>Simon Chesterman, New York: International Peace Academy, September 
>2002
>
>(2) 'Drones of Death', Editorial, Guardian, 6 November 2002