[I would still like to know how chemical weapons and biological weapons came to be considered weapons of mass destruction. If one made a list of the number of dead caused by bombing raids, I very seriously doubt Halabja would make the top 1000. And biological weapons have so far killed not thousands or hundreds but ones. Some day in the future one could conceive that there might be such a thing as a biological weapon of mass destruction. But one could also conceive of death rays. So far, neither exists.]
[So if Iraq doesn't have nukes, it doesn't have any WMD. The only country in the middle east that has WMD is Israel.]
[The IISS dossier on Iraq that everyone is quoting is available online at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, www.iiss.org. It is not very extensive; all of its essential facts are listed below.]
[This FT article is available at http://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=020910000380&query=iiss&vsc_appI d=powerSearch&offset=0&resultsToShow=10&vsc_subjectConcept=&vsc_companyConce pt=&state=More&vsc_publicationGroups=FTFT&searchCat=-1]
[If you happen to have a hard copy version of the FT, it has some nice graphics and maps not available online detailing all the particular sites]
IRAQ: WEAPONS & DIPLOMACY: Production of nuclear weapons 'seems the furthest from Iraq's grasp,' says study
By Alexander Nicoll and Reuters: Agency Material Financial Times; Sep 10, 2002
Anyone giving half an ear to news reports quoting top US and British officials over the weekend might have concluded that Saddam Hussein was on the point of acquiring a nuclear weapon.
The same might be true of first reports of a new assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities published yesterday by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. The London Evening Standard's front page headline, for example, screamed "Saddam A-Bomb 'Within Months'".
In fact, the IISS concluded that of the three types of deadly weapons - nuclear, biological and chemical - "nuclear weapons seem the furthest from Iraq's grasp".
The institute notes that the International Atomic Energy Agency - the UN body cited, apparently mistakenly, by US and British officials for supposed new evidence - had been satisfied in 1998 that the main facilities needed to produce a nuclear bomb had been destroyed. Few would doubt Mr Hussein's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, and the IISS says it is possible Iraqi weapons experts could have made considerable progress in the design of a device and even in the production of its non-nuclear components.
*But a nuclear bomb cannot be produced without fissile material - plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Iraq cannot produce the former, and could only make the latter by building large facilities which could be detected by foreign surveillance* - as well as importing many components such as aluminium pipes which it was recently stopped from acquiring.
The IISS says: "Even worst-case assessments judge that Iraq will require several more years before it can develop [nuclear weapons] capability, assuming it can obtain access to substantial foreign materials and equipment."
However, it cautions against what it calls a "nuclear wildcard": "If, somehow, Iraq were able to acquire sufficient nuclear material from foreign sources, it could probably produce nuclear weapons on short order, perhaps in a matter of months." *So far, no country or group is known to have acquired significant amounts of fissile material on the black market.*
The IISS, in a sober assessment, is at pains not to make a case for or against proposals to escalate hostilities with Iraq. As a result, both advocates and opponents of military action will draw support for their arguments from the document.
It says Iraq's ability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruction is "severely diminished" by comparison with the period just before the 1991 Gulf war - since then, there has been extensive bombing by US and other aircraft, and destruction of weapons and facilities by UN inspectors.
But according to John Chipman, IISS director: "The retention of WMD capacities by Iraq is self-evidently the core objective of the regime, for it has sacrificed all other domestic and foreign policy goals to this singular aim". The report recounts Iraq's denials of weapons capacity, its strenuous attempts to deceive and hinder UN inspectors, and the many UN resolutions it has failed to obey. The IISS concludes that, if unchecked, Mr Hussein could continue rebuilding Iraq's capabilities: "It seems likely that the current Iraqi regime will eventually achieve its objectives."
If this bleak prediction gives pause for thought, so too does the forecast that if war breaks out, Iraq will almost certainly use its chemical and biological arsenal - something it could have done in the Gulf war, but chose not to, perhaps because of US warnings of extreme retaliation.
However, the effectiveness against opposing military forces would be limited, because of their enhanced abilities to defend themselves through protective suits, air defence and vaccination. But Iraq could deliver warheads containing biological agents to cities in Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. "Casualties in an unprotected population could run in the hundreds or even thousands," the IISS says.
Of the three weapons types, the IISS found the greatest difficulty in assessing Iraq's biological weapons capability. When Unscom inspectors left Iraq in 1998, it says, "Iraq possessed sufficient civilian facilities, equipment and materials to produce bulk biological weapons agent within weeks following a political decision to resume production."
It seems a "safe bet", the institute says, that Iraq either has resumed production, or will do so in the face of impending attack.
However, its ability to deliver biological weapons was previously "rudimentary and inefficient" - partly because the explosion of a weapon destroys most of the deadly biological agent. Iraq probably only has a dozen or so al-Hussein missiles - Soviet Scuds, themselves based on German second world war V2 rockets.
By contrast, Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal is "better known and less threatening". Iraq is unlikely to be able to inflict significant casualties on well-protected opposing forces, and is also unlikely to be able to cause large casualties in surrounding countries with missile warheads unless Iraq has improved fusing and warhead design.
Overall, the IISS says Iraq's capability poses a strategic dilemma. The potential effectiveness of UN weapons inspections "depends first and foremost on the extent of Iraq's willingness to co-operate. . . Even the most robust and comprehensive monitoring system will fail if Iraq expels the inspectors or feels free to restrict their access."
A war against Iraq could install a new government but at the risk of the use of deadly weapons and civilian casualties. "Either course of action carries risks," the IISS says. "Wait and the threat will grow. Strike and the threat may be used."