Question: The next CIS summit will take place in Kishinev in early October. The tenth jubilee in Moscow was solemnly celebrated but all observers agreed that the fact that all twelve leaders got together despite all the discord was what really counted. Does it mean perhaps that the idea of the CIS has outlived its usefulness?
Vyacheslav Igrunov: The CIS has always been what Kravchuk and Shushkevich called it, a divorce, ever since 1991. Countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were so stunned by the disintegration of the Soviet Union that they wanted their contacts with Russia to linger a while longer. Severance of economic contacts that followed made it clear that everyone was on their own, and even the countries that still wanted to work side by side with Russia felt mounting irritation. Only the 1998 default made it plain that only joint efforts would enable us to survive. By then, however, all countries on post-Soviet territory had already felt themselves independent, tasted freedom, and learned to do without Russia to a greater or lesser extent.
All the same, mutual need for integration remained. Mutual is the key word here. First unexpected, and then coveted, independence is becoming intolerable all too often these days.
Question: What do you mean?
Vyacheslav Igrunov: For example, it turned out that no one wanted certain countries without the Soviet Union. Take Kyrgyzstan, for instance, that godforsaken area of Central Asia where no investors bother to go. Were it not for the war in Afghanistan and the Taliban, it would have become a country at war with itself, something like a Central Asian Rwanda.
The war in Tajikistan would have continued even now were it not for Russia and its 201st Motorized Infantry Division. Neither is Uzbekistan in a better position with its dense population and substantial arsenals. It is desperately looking for allies now.
Georgia is in a state of semi-war too. Armenia faces economic problems, to say nothing of Nagorno-Karabakh, plus the internal lack of stability. Azerbaijan is more or less stable but has problems of its own - an authoritarian regime, a part of the territory lost. History teaches us that regimes like that usually crumble when the political leader steps down or is removed.
Moldova remains a divided country with serious political problems awaiting solution. Belarus can boast of an authoritarian regime and, to a certain extent, economic lawlessness. Ukraine demonstrates a civilized split nowadays, and the parliamentary elections show that it exists at the voter level. I won't even mention the problem of the Crimea.
Turkmenistan is the most problematic element of the CIS. The regime it has generated is the worst example of Soviet totalitarianism. Turkmenistan has natural gas reserves and controls a part of the Caspian Sea. At the same time, it is not always predictable. It doesn't care who it cooperates with. Money is all it wants. From this particular angle, it is not a desirable neighbor.
What I mean is that there is no stability in the CIS. All CIS countries have problems.
Question: Talking about integration, you emphasized the term "mutual". What are Russia's interests here? Does it have priorities?
Vyacheslav Igrunov: Putting it plainly, our interests in Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Moldova differ. Our interest in Moldova is ascribed to the fact that there are lots of pro-Moscow Russian-speakers there. From the economic and political points of view, we can easily do without Moldova. Not so Moldova itself. It cannot do without Russia, and that is where we can speak about Russia's responsibility.
As for Belarus, we need it in the military and political sense and as a gateway to Europe. There is the widespread opinion that Belarus costs us too much. As a matter of fact, professional skills of Belarussians are considerable, industry there is relatively modern, and the country can feed itself. The problem is that it lacks markets because all markets are in Russia and Russia is not very reliable as a partner. Essentially, Belarus will never be a burden.
Ukraine is a priority for several reasons at once. Firstly, after Russia this is the second largest CIS country as far as the population and economic potential are concerned. Secondly, there are lots of Russians in Ukraine and lots of Ukrainians in Russia. Finally, military-political stability on the post-Soviet territory is impossible unless Moscow and Kiev view themselves as a team and act like one. Ukraine will always be our most important neighbor, more important than Germany, France, Great Britain, and even the United States.
As far as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are concerned, economically they are a burden. That much is clear. They are Russia's most vulnerable spot. If we think in terms of strategies, in terms of 30 to 50 years, we must have stability in Central Asia.
Question: Nursultan Nazarbayev announced not so long ago that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan should merge to form a single country. What does it mean? A CIS Mark II without Russia?
Vyacheslav Igrunov: These countries have gradually come to understanding the impossibility of individual survival. I do not perceive any problems with consolidation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because they will not become self-sufficient even in this form. They will require Russia's support and Russian market all the same.
You probably remember the difficulties we had with Uzbekistan once. Vladimir Putin was formed to make a blitz visit there to prevent establishment of the GUUAM as an alternative to the Customs Union. The statement made by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan kills the whole idea.
Actually, we should be only too glad when someone succeeds in anything. Let us not be like the politicians who perceive a neighbor's political success as a threat to Russia.
Question: Georgia is the most problematic country of the CIS nowadays. Eduard Shevardnadze said that he would discuss the new principles of bilateral relations with Putin in Kishinev. What prospects do you see here?
Vyacheslav Igrunov: Tension in Georgia originated in the early 1990s. Moscow already inadequate, it did not understand what was happening and was therefore making advances to Georgian leaders, the former dissidents. That was how "democratic considerations" generated Dudayev, Landsbergis, Gamsakhurdia, and Snegur.
Essentially, Russia assisted in the defeat Tbilisi suffered in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. It was a kind of the April syndrome. Remember Tbilisi, paratroops using spades against protesters? Democrats took their own revenge on the military first, then the military took its revenge on Georgia. All this resulted in the situation where the new Georgian elite became thoroughly anti-Russian. And since Russia isn't solving the Abkhazian problem by force (I do not think that it should or can, for that matter), Tbilisi has turned to the West, to NATO, and the United States - viewing it as the force to counter Russia.
September 11 amended the overall balance and left Georgia thoroughly confused. It should be noted that most Georgians lean towards integration with Russia, but behavior of the Georgian establishment is such that Russia too behaves inadequately in response - introduces visa regimes, sets borders, proclaim a special regime emphasizing its sympathies with Abkhazians and Ossetians. I do not think we will have relations of trust with Georgia while Shevardnadze calls the tune in Tbilisi.
Question: You were quoted as saying once that integration should be based on European standards. What are they like?
Vyacheslav Igrunov: In the first place, it should be a free market. In the second, human rights should be respected. In the third, no country should put any other country under pressure and rapprochement should proceed at the rate that suits every country. Moreover, a balance of political components is a must. Difference in mentality, in the awareness of what the state should be like, always results in disintegration.
Question: Is the conclusion then that the CIS will inevitably split into European and Asian parts?
Vyacheslav Igrunov: I do not rule it out. If we regard the CIS as a single geopolitical formation, like West Europe for example, it will be difficult to combine authoritarian-clannish regimes with general European standards. Some other form of unification will have to be found. If the drift of Ukraine and Russia to Europe is successful, and these countries plus, say, Moldova and Belarus integrate into European structures 10-15 years from now, Asian countries will never be able to join this new geopolitical formation. Along with that, Russia needs a special sort of relations with Central Asia. Russia will help it retain stability and develop economically.
Half the world's population lives to the south of Russia, in Asia: split into warring states and ethnic groups. Environmental and demographic problems, social tension... That is why Europe needs Russia as a guarantor of stability; and Russia needs Europe because high living standards in Russia are possible only when it is an element of the post-industrial civilization of the West. (Translated by A. Ignatkin)
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