Michael Pugliese wrote:
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> The Cuban Revolution
> A Critical Perspective
> by Sam Dolgoff
> The Character of the Cuban Revolution
>
> A Non-Social Revolution
>
> The myth, induced by the revolutionary euphoria of the pro-Castro left,
> that a genuine social-revolution took place in Cuba, is based on a number
> of major fallacies. Among them is the idea that a social revolution can
> take place in a small semi-developed island, a country with a population of
> about eight million, totally dependent for the uninterrupted flow of vital
> supplies upon either of the great super-powers, Russia or the U.S. They
> assume falsely that these voracious powers will not take advantage of
> Cuba's situation to promote their own selfish interests. There can be no
> more convincing evidence of this tragic impossibility than Castro's
> sycophantic attitude toward his benefactor, the Soviet Union, going so far
> as to applaud Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, a crime
> certainly on a par with the military coup in Chile, which Castro rightfully
> condemned. To assume, furthermore, that the Cuban social revolution can be
> miraculously achieved without simultaneous uprisings in Latin America and
> elsewhere, is both naive and irresponsible.
>
> Nationalization Versus Socialism
>
> To equate nationalization of the economy and social services instituted
> from above by the decree "revolutionary government" or a caudillo, with
> true socialism is a dangerous illusion. Nationalization and similar
> measures, under the name of "welfareism," are common. They are widespread,
> and in many cases deep-going programs, instituted by democratic "welfare"
> states or "benevolent" dictators as an antidote to revolution, and are by
> no means equtvalent to socialism.
>
> Russia and Cuba: Two Revolutions Compared
>
> Another fallacy about the nature of the Cuban Revolution can perhaps be
> best illustrated by contrasting the early stages of the Russian Revolution
> of 1917 with the Cuban events. Analogies between the Russian and Cuban
> Revolutions--like analogies in general--fail to take into account certain
> important differences:
>
> Czarism was OVERTHROWN by the spontaneous revolts of the peasant and
> proletarian masses only after a prolonged and bloody civil war.
>
> In Cuba, the Batista regime COLLAPSED WITHOUT A STRUGGLE for lack of
> popular support. There were no peasant revolts. No general strikes. Theodor
> Draper (and many other observers) argues persuasively that since there were
> at least "500,000 agricultural workers in Cuba" there could not have been
> many peasants in a . . . guerrilla force that never amounted to more than a
> thousand. . . there was nothing comparable in Cuba to the classic peasant
> revolution led by Zapata in Mexico in 1910. . . there was no national
> peasant uprising. Outside the immediate vicinity of the guerrilla forces,
> revolutionary activity, in the country as a whole, was largely a middle
> class phenomenon, with some working class support, but without working
> class organizations...(Castroism: Theory and Practice; New York, 1965, p.
> 74-75) [This takes on added significance when we consider that the unions
> comprised ONE MILLION out of a total population of about six million when
> the Revolution began, Jan. 1, 1959.] In Russia, the masses made the social
> revolution BEFORE the establishment of the Bolshevik government. Lenin
> climbed to power by voicing the demands of, and legalizing the social
> revolutionary DEEDS of the workers and peasants: "All Power to the
> Soviets," "The Land to the Peasants," "The Factories to the Workers," etc.
> In Cuba, Castro, for fear of losing popular support, carefully avoided a
> social-revolutionary platform--assuming that he had one. Unlike Lenin, he
> came to power because he promised to put into effect the bourgeois-
> democratic program.
>
> History is full of unexpected twists and turns. Ironically enough, these
> two different revolutions had similar results: Both Lenin and Castro
> betrayed their respective revolutions, instituted totalitarian regimes and
> ruled by decree from above.
>
> The well-known anarcho-syndicalist writer and activist, Augustin Souchy,
> makes a cogent comparison between the Spanish Revolution (1936-1939) and
> the Cuban Revolution (both of which he personally witnessed): . . . while
> in Spain, the confiscation of the land and the organization of thc
> collectives was initiated and carried through, by the peasants themselves;
> in Cuba, social-economic transformation was initiated, not by the people,
> but by Castro and his comrades-in-arms. It is this distinction that
> accounts for the different development of the two revolutions; Spain, mass
> revolution from the bottom up; Cuba, revolution from the top down by decree
> . . . (see Cuba. An Eyewitness Report, below) Which brings to mind the
> celebrated phrase of the "Apostle" of Cuban independence Jose Marti: "To
> Change the Master Is Not To Be Free."
>
> Revolution the Latin American Way
>
> The Cuban Revolution draws its specific character from a variety of
> sources. While not a Latin American "palace revolution" which produced no
> deep seated social changes, it nevertheless relates to the tradition of
> miltarism and bogus paternalism of Latin American "Caudillismo," the "Man
> on Horseback." "Caudillismo"--"right" or "left," "revolutionary" or
> "reactionary"--is a chronic affliction in Latin America since the wars for
> independence initiated by Simon Bolivar in 1810. The "revolutionary
> caudillo" Juan Peron of Argentina, catapulted to power by "leftist" army
> officers, was deposed by "rightist" military officers. Maurice Halperin
> calls attention to the ". . . expropriation of vast properties in Peru in
> 1968 and in Bolivia in 1969 by the very generals who had destroyed Cuban
> supported guerrilla uprisings in their respective countries. . . " (The
> Rise and Fall of Fidel Castro; University of California, 1972, p. 118)
>
> The militarization of Cuban society by a revolutionary dictatorship headed
> by the "Caudillo" of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro follows, in
> general, the Latin American pattern. Like other revolutionary Latin
> American "Caudillos, " Castro would come to power only on the basis of
> programs designed to win the indispensable support of the masses. Edwin
> Lieuwen marshalls impressive evidence: . . . In Chile in 1924, Major Carlos
> Ibanez established a military dictatorship [that] was notably successful in
> combining authoritarian rule with policies aimed at meeting popular demands
> for greater social justice. Successful but short lived revolutions took
> place during 1936 under the leadership of radical young officers inspired
> by ideas of social reform and authoritarian nationalism. . In Bolivia a
> clique of radical young officers came to power. Major David Toro and
> Colonel German Busch successfully headed regimes that had social revolution
> as their goals. . . they catered to the downtrodden and pledged to build a
> new nation. Toro and Busch based their dictatorial regimes on attempts to
> win mass support ... (Arms and Politics in Latin America; New York, 1961,
> pgs. 60, 62, 78, 79)
>
> When in 1968, a "revolutionary" military Junta seized power in Peru, the
> new military government proclaimed the fundamental principle underlying all
> "radical" military regimes": . . . the final aim of the State, being the
> welfare of the nation; and the armed forces being the instrument which the
> State uses to impose its policies, therefore, . . . in order to arrive at
> collective prosperity, the armed forces have the mission to watch over the
> social welfare, the final aim of the State... (quoted, Modes of Political
> Change in Latin America, ed. Paul Sigmund, New York, 1970, p. 201) Dr.
> Carlos Delgado, Director of the Information Bureau of the Revolutionary
> Government of Peru, after stressing that the revolution was " . . .
> initiated from above" by decree, boasted that the dictatorship in "...the
> last four and a half years" accomplished more for the betterment of the
> people than in the "whole epoch of Republican rule." The revolution was
> hailed, boasted Delgado, even by the French Marxist thinker, Henri
> Lefebvre, as one of the most important historical events of the
> contemporary world..." (see Reconstruir, anarchist bi-monthly, Buenos
> Aires, Nov.-Dec. 1974)
>
> There is an umbilical connection between militarism and the State, fully
> compatible with, and indispensable to, all varieties of State "socialism"--
> or more accurately State Capitalism. George Pendle (and other observers)
> with respect to Peron's social and welfare programs initiated to woo mass
> support concludes that: ...Peron's National Institute of Social
> Security...converted Argentina to one of the most advanced countries in
> South America. . . it was not surprising that the majority of workers
> preferred Peron to their traditional leaders...they felt that Peron
> accomplished more for them in a few years than the Socialist Party achieved
> in decades...(Argentina; Oxford University Press, London, 1965, pas. 97,
> 99) . . . In Havana Premier Fidel Castro proclaimed three days of mourning
> and Cuban officials termed Peron's death a blow to all Latin America. .
> .(New York Times, July 2, 1974) This cynical proclamation was not made
> solely for tactical reasons, but in recognition of the affinity between the
> Casro and Peron regimes. As early as 1961, there were already informal
> contacts between Che Guevara and Angel Borlenghi "... a number two man in
> Peron's government and his Minister of the Interior for eight years ... Che
> told Borlenghi that there's no question about it that Peron was the most
> advanced embodiment of political and economic reform in Argentina ... and
> under Che's guidance a rapport was established between the Cuban Revolution
> and the Peronist movement ... Che has in his possession a letter from Peron
> expressing admiration for Castro and the Cuban Revolution and Che had
> raised the question of inviting Peron to settle in Havana . . . " (quoted
> by Halperin, from Ricardo Rojo's work, My Friend Che; ibid. p. 329-330)
> Herbert Matthews supplements Rojo's revelations:...the Argentine journalist
> Jorge Massetti who went into the Sierra Maestra in 1958, became friends
> with Guevara. He was trained for guerrilla warfare in the Sierra Maestra
> and in 1964 was killed in a guerrilla raid in Argentina . . . Massetti was
> credited with convincing Guevara that Peronism approximated his own ideas.
> Hilda Gadea--Guevara's first wife--wrote that for Ernesto Guevara, the fall
> of Peron Sept. 1955 was a heavy blow. Che and Massetti blamed it,...'on
> North American Imperialists'...(ibid. p. 258) [Carmelo Mesa-Lago notes the
> connection between State Socialism and militarism. Castro enthusiastically
> hailed] " . . . the Peruvian Social Revolution as a progressive military
> group playing a revolutionary role. . ." (Cuba in the 1970s: University of
> New Mexico Press, 1975, p. 11]) In an interview, Castro emphatically
> maintained that social revolution is compatible with military dictatorship,
> not only in Peru, but also in Portugal and Panama. [When the military junta
> in Peru] took power...the first thing they did was to implement agrarian
> reform which was MUCH MORE RADICAL than the agrarian reform we initiated in
> Cuba. It put a much lower limit on the size of properties; organized
> cooperatives, agricultural communities; . . . they also pushed in other
> fields--in the field of education, social development, industrialization. .
> . We must also see the example of Portugal where the military played a
> decisive role in political change. . .and are on their way to finding
> solutions. . . we have Peru and Panama--where the military are acting as
> catalysts in favor of the revolution. . . (Castro quoted by Frank and Kirby
> Jones, With Fidel; New York, 1975, p. 195-196) [The evidence sustains
> Donald Druze's conclusion that] . . . the programs of modern 'caudillos'
> embodies so many features of centralism and National Socialism, that it
> almost inevitably blends into communism...(Latin America: An interpretive
> History; New York, 1972, p. 570)
>
> Militarism flourishes in Cuba as in latin America. Castro projected
> militarism to a degree unequalled by his predecessor, Batista: total
> domination of social, econonmic and political life. In the Spring of 1959,
> a few months after the Revolution of January 1st, Castro, who appointed
> himself the "Lider Maximo" ("Caudillo") of the Revolution and Commander-in-
> Chief of the Armed Forces, promised to cut the size of the army in half and
> ultimately to disband and replace it by civilian militias and police. "The
> last thing I am," said Castro, "is a military man . . . ours is a country
> without generals and colonels. . . "
>
> Within a year after the disintegration of the Batista Army, Castro turned
> Cuba into a thoroughly militarized state, with the most formidable armed
> force of any in Latin America. For the first time in Cuban history,
> compulsory military service was instituted. Now, Cuba has adopted the
> traditional hierarchical ranking system of conventional armies. The Cuban
> army differs in no essential respect from the armies of both "capitalist"
> and "socialist" imperialist powers.
>
> "Communism" a la Castro
>
> Insofar as relations with the communists are concerned, Theodore Draper
> notes the striking resemblance between the policies of Batista and Castro:
> . . . Batista paid off the communists for their support, by among other
> things, permitting them to set up an official trade union federation, the
> Confederacidn de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) with Lazaro Pena as its
> Secretary-General. In 1961, Castro paid off the communists for their
> support, by, among other things, permitting Lazaro Pena to come back
> officially as Secretary General of the CTC...(ibid. p. 204) If we accept at
> face value Castro's conversion to "communism," his "communism" embodies the
> Latin American version of Stalinism, absolute personal dictatorship. But
> "Caudillos" are not primarily ideologues. They are, above all, political
> adventurers. In their lust for power, they are not guided by ethical
> considerations, as they claim. In this respect, there is no essential
> difference between capitalist states and "revolutionary socialist states."
> All dictators conceal their true visage behind the facade of a political
> party, paying lip service to goals supposedly popular with the masses.
> Castro became a "communist" because he considered that his survival in
> power depended on cementing cordial relations with his saviors, the
> "socialist" countries (former enemies) and by extension with Batista's
> former allies, the domestic "communists." To promote his ends, Castro
> established relations with Franco Spain and the Vatican. Nor did he
> hesitate to side with the Arab oil magnates--lords over their impoverished
> subjects--in the mid-east disputes, or to endorse the Russian invasion of
> Czecho-Slovakia.
>
> The Real Revolution Is Yet To Come
>
> Albert Camus observed: . . . the major event of the twentieth century has
> been the abandonment of the values of liberty on the part of the
> revolutionary movement, the weakening of Libertarian Socialism, vis-a-vis
> Caesarist and militaristic socialism. Since then, a great hope has
> disappeared from the world, to be replaced by a deep sense of emptiness in
> the hearts of all who yearn for freedom... (Neither victims Nor
> Executioners) Whether Castro is working out his own unique brand of "Cuban
> Socialism" is a relatively minor question. Even if Castro had no connection
> with the communist movement, his mania for personal power would lead
> inevitably to the establishment of an "independent" totalitarian regime.
> What is decisive is that the Cuban Revolution follows the pattern
> established in this century by the aborted Russian Revolution of 1917. This
> pattern is the counter-revolution of the State.
>
> To Chapter 4
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