> > One minor point to note: there is a difference between jungle fighting
> > tactics (such as the Australians were familiar with, and such as the US
> > used in the Phillipines) and a (reputedly) successful counterinsurgency
> > strategy, which is what gave the British and French advisors such
> > prestige.
>
> And the classic distinction among and between ground forces is between
> "heavy" and "light" infantry, _not_ insurgency v. pitched battle
That's true, but that's precisely the point. The former is a tactical opposition, the latter is strategical opposition, and specifically the answer to one strategic question: what to do if the opposite force won't meet you?
The light infantry answer to that question is that it's not a real one. While flying columns are certainly a lot more effective against rural insurgency than a heavy armored column could possibly be, their use is an attempt to apply conventional strategy -- meet the enemy in pitched battle -- through improved tactics (increasing speed and mobility and decreasing force size).
A counterinsurgency strategy, in the full sense of an alternative strategy, always has some answer to the question of How do we hold ground? And how do we "pacify" the ground held? That's the key question for an occupation. Flying columns ignore that question. By definition they aren't designed to hold ground. They're designed to take the battle to the enemy and defeat him in the field. Pacification is then supposed to follow as a byproduct. The population is not part of the military equation.
> I don't think there can be any doubt that the most successful model of
> light infantry over the last century has been the small, independent,
> inserted reconnaissance/raiding force, which I would call the SAS-type
What follows is an interesting typology, and I don't think I disagree it with most of it. But I'm not sure I understand why Marines don't qualify as an SAS-type force, to the extent that it is best understood as a light infantry force. And to the extent it is best understood as a secretive special force, I'm not sure why the Green Berets and Seals shouldn't be considered forces of the same nature and effectiveness.
Delta force, by contrast, doesn't seem to have much to do with light infantry of the sort that has anything to do with counterinsurgency warfare. I thought they were for unconventional attacks on conventional targets and for use in hostage situations.
Michael