> > And the classic distinction among and between ground forces is between
> > "heavy" and "light" infantry, _not_ insurgency v. pitched battle
>
> That's true, but that's precisely the point. The former is a tactical
> opposition, the latter is strategical opposition, and specifically the
> answer to one strategic question: what to do if the opposite force won't
> meet you?
That's the $64 billion question. Guerillas/militia are the lightest infantry of all, which is why they can cause so many problems for an infrastructure-heavy regular army.
> The light infantry answer to that question is that it's not a real one.
> While flying columns are certainly a lot more effective against rural
> insurgency than a heavy armored column could possibly be, their use is an
> attempt to apply conventional strategy -- meet the enemy in pitched battle
> -- through improved tactics (increasing speed and mobility and decreasing
> force size).
Flying columns are, if you like, the use of "medium" infantry &/or light cavalry. Which is not as effective as the reconnaissance/raiding model. Which is not that practical in densely populated, semi-hostile areas.
> What follows is an interesting typology, and I don't think I disagree it
> with most of it. But I'm not sure I understand why Marines don't qualify
> as an SAS-type force, to the extent that it is best understood as a light
> infantry force. And to the extent it is best understood as a secretive
> special force, I'm not sure why the Green Berets and Seals shouldn't be
> considered forces of the same nature and effectiveness.
The Green Berets are light infantry, if I gave any impression to the contrary. I deliberately left out any mention of _naval_ commandos like the the Royal Marines and the SEALS to avoid confusing the issue, although they _are_ also classic light infantry forces. The US Marines are basically an integrated amphibious _frontal_assault_ force, which is about as "heavy" as it gets. Conversely the SAS-type mainly operates behind_enemy_lines, not on the frontline. (The difference was symbolised for me by an Aussie SAS guy I met, who complained that the US Marines he had trained with were "stupid". Of course they aren't, the difference is the emphasis on discipline in the training of crack assault troops like the USMC, as opposed to the SAS-type's reflexive skills.)
> Delta force, by contrast, doesn't seem to have much to do with light
> infantry of the sort that has anything to do with counterinsurgency
> warfare. I thought they were for unconventional attacks on conventional
> targets and for use in hostage situations.
"Unconventional attacks on conventional targets" is a partial definition of the SAS-type. Remember that DF were the mainstay of that failed raid on Tehran in 1980. And as I said, hostage situations and other urban antiterrorist operations -- while they are more of a police/SWAT type role -- are also a good fit with the kind of light infantry training that SAS-type outfits receive.
The following is an apt illustration of the distinction between heavy and light infantry:
"Watching the amazing 350 mile dash along the desert roads by the 3rd (US) Infantry Division towards Baghdad and the US Marine Corps crashing through the defences in Central Iraq raised a number of perfectly sound military questions such as why two fine but seemingly ill-chosen 'heavy' infantry units should be used in what would normally be the domain of an Armoured Division, while the British 1st Armoured Division with the famed 7th 'Desert Rats' Tank Brigade and the 16th Air Assault Brigade of the legendry 'Paras' should be deployed just across the few miles to Basra and basically sit there for three weeks slowly investing the city has puzzled many observers. It has been suggested that this may be taken as a comment on the reliability of much of the British equipment and the lack of the logistic support that would be required for a significant advance towards Baghdad...
"Too little attention has been paid so far to the outstanding operations conducted by Special Forces [here mostly meaning light infantry] units from the United States and those of Britain and Australia. Here a remarkable level of co-operation was achieved between the highly specialized formations such as Delta Force; the 160th [i.e. the Night Stalkers, really a specialised air transport unit]; SEALs, and the various US Army and Marine special forces with the intelligence paramilitaries of both the CIA and Israel's Mossad. The SBS and the SAS Regiments from both Britain and Australia were also deeply committed along with elements from their respective intelligence services; MI6 (SIS) and the ASIS [Aust. foreign intell. service] ..."
[Richard M. Bennett and Maj. Frank Hayes, 16th April 2003, "A war fought on a multitude of levels" http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2962.htm ]