"Despite the lessons of history, including those learned in Malaya and the Philippines, orthodox commanders have continued to employ a wide range of weapons and tactics that, judged by results, have been more appropriate to conventional warfare. These have included wholesale bombings and mass artillery interdictions of suspected sanctuary areas, division- and corps-strength "sweeping" operations in which only a few guerrillas are captured or killed while entire villages are destroyed, free-fire areas, the building of defended but isolated chains of military outposts, the construction of massive walls that can be outflanked, mass arrests, and brutal interrogations. The result: an expenditure in lives and money that in time have lost whatever support the government enjoyed at home. France backed down in Algeria, Portugal in Mozambique and Angola, the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These campaigns failed because commanders chose quantity over quality to fight "little wars," in which victory is attainable only by patient application of intelligent, skillful, and extremely subtle strategy and tactics."
"Precisely the same command qualities are necessary in fighting urban guerrilla warfare and international terrorism ..."
Robert Brown Asprey, "guerrilla warfare", Encyclopædia Britannica Premium Service, [Accessed May 18, 2003]. http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache:wwsBKlxpoPUJ:www.britannica.com/ebc/print%3Feu%3D118860