Interview: Caucusus expert Robert Bruce Ware By Peter Lavelle This article was written for UPI - United Press International
During a recent visit to Moscow, he spoke with Peter Lavelle, United Press International's Moscow-based analyst, on the year that was in Chechnya.
The following is the transcript of the interview:
UPI: How different is Chechnya today as opposed to a year ago? What were the year's most important events?
Ware: In some ways, the situation in Chechnya seems tragically similar to that which we saw a year ago. Last December, 78 people were killed when a truck bomb exploded outside the Grozny headquarters of Akhmad Kadyrov, who was heading the Chechen administration that Moscow supported. This December, a total of 56 people died in two suicide explosions, on a train in southern Russia, and in central Moscow. Ten policemen were killed when militants from Chechnya invaded the neighboring Republic of Dagestan. During the intervening months there were another 14 terrorist explosions at locations throughout Russia that were connected with the Chechen conflict, and there have been sporadic skirmishes between Chechen militants and Russian forces. Last December, Russian officials evicted hundreds of Chechen refugees under appallingly inclement conditions from the Aki Yurt refugee camp in the neighboring Republic of Ingushetia. This December, Russian officials evicted dozens of refugees from the Alina camp in Ingushetia. Officials promised the refugees accommodation in a nearby camp, but there were delays.
Despite these similarities, 2003 will be remembered as a year that saw crucial changes in Chechnya. In March, a referendum adopted a new constitution for Chechnya. Though the referendum appeared to involve electoral irregularities, its result seemed to reflect a consensus among the Chechen population that it was time to move toward normal lives under the rule of law.
Therefore it was especially disappointing that the October presidential race was manipulated to favor the election of Akhmad Kadyrov. President Kadyrov lacks the support of many Chechens, some of whom have complained of brutalities inflicted on them by a militia that is headed by his son. Realistically, Kadyrov would have played some role in any Chechen administration, and it may be that none of the other presidential candidates was strong enough to lead Chechnya, but President Kadyrov's administration now lacks legitimacy and many Chechens are alienated from it. This situation was not improved by this month's election of Chechnya's representative to Russia's federal legislature. The Kremlin's candidate won in another suspicious election.
Q: How would you characterize Kremlin policy toward Chechnya this year? To what degree can it called a success?
A: All of the electoral events that we witnessed in 2003 have been consistent with a plan to stabilize Chechnya that Mr. Kadyrov proposed to Russian President Putin in September 2000. This plan the advantage of transferring power to Chechen officials and decreasing contacts between Russian soldiers and Chechen civilians. This is one of the reasons why 2003 saw a decrease in the brutal cleansing operations, by which Russian troops sought to separate Chechen fighters from the civilian population. However, it has also resulted in a Chechen administration that resorts to violent repression to control its opponents. Meanwhile, Chechen militants have promised to continue their terrorist attacks throughout Russia.
Overall, it was a disappointing year. After the March referendum Moscow missed an important opportunity to build upon a Chechen consensus that favored peace and stability. Genuine electoral competition for the Chechen presidency might have resulted in a legitimate Chechen government, capable of building a stable society on a foundation of popular support. The current atmosphere of cynicism and brutality is a poor substitute. Without popular support for peace in Chechnya, militants and extremists will be able to extend the conflict indefinitely.
Q: Do Chechen fighters have popular support?
A: Very little. That's one of the reasons why the militants have been weakened to the point that they resort to suicide attacks, often involving women. Most Chechens are exhausted by 12 years of turmoil and conflict. They are primarily interested in leading normal lives within a stable society. Most of them have realized that this is not something that radical nationalists and religious extremists are likely to provide.
Q: What motivates the so-called "black widows", the women involved in suicide attacks?
A: The name was initially intended to suggest that they were the vengeful widows of fallen Chechen fighters, but this is not always, and perhaps not often, the case. There is evidence that some of the women are motivated by personal convictions. There is evidence that others are coerced, manipulated, indoctrinated, or drugged. Some of the female attackers have demonstrated clarity and tenacity, but some have appeared to be disoriented, and some may have been attempting to flee at the time of the explosions. Some of the explosive devices have been detonated by remote control, so that the women, in these cases, essentially became vehicles for the explosives.
Q: Why has the conflict in Chechnya lasted so long?
A: It has to do partly with deep historical grievances, partly with local cultures, partly with low levels of morale and organization among Russian troops, and partly with the bitterness and hostility that those troops have generated among the Chechen population. But it also has to do with the fact that people on all sides of the conflict, and in many parts of the world, have an interest in the perpetuation of the conflict. Chechen fighters, Chechen civilians, Chechen officials, and Russian troops all conspire with one another to exchange weapons, alcohol, drugs, petroleum products, and scrap metal stripped from Soviet-era infrastructure. Economic support for Chechnya is embezzled by Russian officials and Chechen officials alike. International Islamist leaders, like Osama Bin Laden, use the Chechen conflict as a basis for fund raising and recruitment. International Islamist organizations provide funds that are used to employ young Chechen men as fighters. Russian officials have staked their reputations on the war, and many people in the West are glad for the opportunity to bash Russian officials. So there are many people who are benefiting economically, politically, or professionally from the continuation of the conflict. The only people who do not benefit are the families who live in and around Chechnya, and they are without power.
Q: After decade of bloodshed and enormous hardship in Chechnya, can the republic every truly be part of the Russian Federation again -- in a normal sense?
A: Chechnya will be part of Russia for one reason above all others: When Chechnya achieved de facto independence in the period between the two wars, from 1996 to 1999, Russian citizens in the surrounding region were attacked on a daily basis by groups from Chechnya. Thousands of people were held hostage in Chechnya under horrific conditions. Many were sold into slavery. Property crime was epidemic. Chechen militants repeatedly vowed to conquer surrounding Russian republics, and to forcibly subjugate their citizens. Then in 1999, Russia was twice invaded by the militants. After that Russian officials demanded that Chechen leaders close militant bases and hand over militant leaders. Chechen leaders refused to do so. No state can tolerate conditions like that, and every state has a moral obligation to protect its citizens. So the question is really how Chechnya can be part of Russia?
Even more than in other parts of the world, people in the North Caucasus do best when they control their own lives and choose their own futures. Chechnya, like other North Caucasian republics, needs a lot of autonomy and support. At least for the next decade, Moscow would be well advised to extend these republics substantial economic subsidies and political latitude. There have been some indications that President (Vladimir) Putin would grant exceptional autonomy to Chechnya. However, Mr. Kadyrov has declared that he will not request autonomy. The more that people in the North Caucasus feel that they are subjugated the more problems there will be in the future. Unfortunately, it sometimes seems that officials in Moscow understand the mechanics of subjugation better than they understand the mentality of the North Caucasus. Moscow has been centralizing its control over the region.
Q: Has the world forgotten about Chechnya? For example the Bush administration rarely comments on Chechnya these days.
A: The world always forgets about this region, apart from outbursts of hysteria during moments of crisis. The North Caucasus is little known and less understood, in Moscow and in the West. The problems that arose during Chechnya's de facto independence were almost completely ignored. When Moscow was finally forced to respond to them in 1999, it met with an uninformed and imbalanced reaction in the West. Then in 2001 the pendulum swung to the other extreme, and Moscow was given more latitude by some Western officials.
Anyone who cares about this region should support an informed and balanced approach. Russia deserves Western support as it struggles with complex problems arising from international Islamist extremism, regional economic collapse, and local cultural conflicts. But this does not mean that Western officials should ignore the desperate circumstances that confront Chechen civilians. There is no contradiction in respecting Russia as an ally and a friend, while also reminding it of its responsibilities to all of its citizens, and cautioning it against counter-productive actions, as true friends do. Moscow officials are more likely to respond to criticism when it is balanced and fair.
Q: Predicting the future is always risky business, but what do you think the future holds for Chechnya?
A: Not only Chechnya, but also the surrounding region, is now seeing increasing activity by Islamist extremists. They do not have the support of most Chechens, and outside of Chechnya they have virtually no popular support. Yet this will not prevent terrorist attacks and assassinations during the coming year. In order to control Islamist extremism, it is necessary for Moscow to come to terms with the people of Chechnya. But even peace in Chechnya would not be sufficient to end the region's problems with extremism. As violence is slowly stifled in Chechnya it will spread outward through the region. Chechnya will not be fully stabilized until most people in Chechnya are satisfied with their economic and political circumstances. Given this year's disappointments, it seems unlikely that this satisfaction will be achieved within the next 5 years. For at least that long, Chechnya is likely to remain the scene brutalities and tragedies. Yet because most of its people want peace, Chechnya will slowly and unevenly stabilize.
Professor Robert Bruce Ware is associate professor at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville. After receiving his doctoral degree from Oxford University in 1995, he has conducted field research in the North Caucasus. He is also the author of numerous articles and papers on the region.
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