> The problem with considering Thomas' "ways" as proofs is that he thinks
> language about God doesn't work the way language (viz. about things)
> normally works, God not being a thing. He is quite willing to say that
> God exists/is good/causes things/etc., but not as we exist/are
> good/cause
> things/etc. To say that of God is to speak "analogically," he thinks
> (not
> metaphorically).
Yeah, that whole "analogy" thing in Aquinas is another thing I was always suspicious of back in the days I was studying this stuff half-way seriously. I tend to think it's a devious try at getting around the obvious problem that believers in "God" have: they want to say that he (she? it? they?) is "good," "wise," "intelligent," etc., and in fact superhumanly so -- "infinitely" good, wise, etc. But what does that mean exactly? Would a god who is really good, wise, intelligent, etc., and in fact has these qualities to a much greater degree that we do, sit around while the Holocaust happens? (Or an earthquake in Iran which kills 30-40,000 people, for that matter?) Surely, with his infinite intelligence, he would be smart enough to figure out how to prevent them?
Well, the believers say, the fact that God is infinitely wise, good, etc., means that we can't have any adequate idea of what God, in his enormous goodness and wisdom, thinks is the good or wise thing to do about stuff like Holocausts and earthquakes. It seems that God understands the goodness and wisdom of these things, and we humans just aren't smart enough to.
For Aquinas, apparently, the analogy approach works like this: God's wisdom, etc., is to our wisdom as his existence is to our existence. God's existence is "necessary" (identical with his essence), whereas the existence of us humans and other created things is only "contingent." The problem I have with this is this: what sense does it make to talk about two analogously related meanings of "existence"? Either something (whether God or a human or a rock) exists or it doesn't. The "proofs" that supposedly demonstrate that this "necessary being" exists are fairly obviously circular -- they assume what they try to prove, as far as I (and most contemporary philosophers) can see. And if the necessary being doesn't exist, or if there is no reason to think that it does, at least, then the whole analogy business turns out to be an interesting intellectual game with no reality to it.
Jon Johanning // jjohanning at igc.org __________________________________ When I was a little boy, I had but a little wit, 'Tis a long time ago, and I have no more yet; Nor ever ever shall, until that I die, For the longer I live the more fool am I. -- Wit and Mirth, an Antidote against Melancholy (1684)