Judis on Iraq

Peter K. peterk.enteract at rcn.com
Wed Feb 26 18:49:24 PST 2003


[Didn't expect to hear the President say tonight that Israeli settlers must stop their activities. The Zionist conspiracy must be losing its grip on the White House. Brad Mayer?]

http://www.prospect.org/print/V14/3/judis-j.html

[clip] Before September 11, neither Bush nor Powell favored confrontation with Iraq. At the United Nations, Powell advocated "smart sanctions" designed to revive the Iraqi economy. Only the neoconservatives favored confronting Iraq, but they were preoccupied with China and were not represented within the cabinet itself. By last winter, however, opinion on Iraq had shifted dramatically. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld joined the neoconservatives in favoring confrontation. But they didn't share the neoconservative scenario of using an invasion of Iraq to install a model regime that would threaten its Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia. Instead, they were moved by two major considerations.

The first was geopolitical. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld were not concerned about enriching American oil companies, but they were worried that if Iraq acquired nuclear weapons, Hussein could achieve dominance over a region vital to world economic stability. Quipped one State Department official in explaining their reasoning, "If the Gulf produced kumquats, would we be doing this? I have my doubts." They also feared that if Iraq acquired nuclear weapons, Israel would either attempt a preemptive strike of its own or develop a second strike capability that would destabilize the region. In his State of the Union address, Bush vowed that Hussein "will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the U.S.," but the administration generally has avoided any statements of purpose that explicitly included either oil or Israel. To do so, administration officials feared, would be to invite misunderstanding and opposition. Not to do so has equally invited misunderstanding.

The second consideration was more psychological. The September 11 attacks, combined with the subsequent anthrax episodes, created a national trauma -- a feeling of powerlessness in the face of the unknown. Bush and his administration were certainly not exempt. After the al-Qaeda and anthrax attacks, the administration sought to counter or eliminate any possible threat, and administration explanations invariably invoked America's newfound "vulnerability." Bush stated his own recurring nightmare in his State of the Union address: "Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans -- this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known." This scenario, seemingly far-fetched to many Europeans, was not just for public consumption but rather reflected fears in the White House about another September 11. (Indeed, some CIA officials continue to believe that Iraq was responsible for the anthrax attacks after September 11.) Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld believed that by knocking out Hussein they would reduce America's vulnerability to attack. Of course, an attack against Iraq could increase the incidence of terrorism in the Middle East and against the United States by creating a new Islamic martyr. But Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld may have been convinced otherwise by neoconservative arguments that an attack would scare Arab leaders into cracking down on their own native terrorists and curbing anti-Americanism in their schools and media.

Powell and his allies did not share these views. They continued to believe that Hussein could be contained without risk to the United States. Last summer they provoked a debate within the administration that was finally resolved (with pressure from British Prime Minister Tony Blair and congressional Democrats) when Bush agreed to seek a UN resolution that would focus on disarming Hussein rather than overthrowing him. From that point on, the administration no longer spoke of regime change as its objective. But the resulting decision reflected at best a compromise between Powell and the other two factions. Bush outwardly embraced Powell's strategy but continued to act as if the administration's real objective was regime change. He didn't just send troops to the Mideast but leaked war plans, and even had a military general boast that troops were already inside Iraq. He sought to bully rather than work with the United Nations. [clip]



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