[A different and complementary version of Krugman's argument]
Financial Times; Jan 02, 2003
North Korea has a point
By David Kang
George W. Bush's administration is right to ease the pressure on the North Korean regime, since the events of the past month have threatened to spiral out of control. But the US still lacks a long-range strategy to resolve the peninsula's tensions.
In a nutshell, the problem is this: the US refuses to give security guarantees to North Korea until it proves it has dismantled its weapons programme. The North refuses to disarm without security guarantees from the US. Hence, stalemate. Without movement towards resolving the security fears of the North, resolution of the nuclear weapons issue will be limited.
The US and North Korea are still technically at war - the 1953 armistice was never replaced with a peace treaty. The US has been unwilling to discuss even a non- aggression pact, much less normalisation of ties. While the US calls North Korea a terrorist nation and Donald Rumsfeld discusses the possibility of war, it is no surprise that it feels threatened.
The 1994 Agreed Framework was a process by which both sides set out slowly to build a sense of trust. But both sides began hedging their bets early in that process. Since neither the US nor North Korea fulfilled many of the agreed steps even during the Clinton administration, the framework was essentially dead long before the recent nuclear revelations.
The accepted wisdom in the US is that North Korea abrogated the framework by restarting its nuclear weapons programme. But both Clinton and Bush administrations violated the letter and the spirit of the agreement. For example, the US promised under the framework to help North Korea build light water reactors that could not be used to make nuclear bombs. The first of these was due to come into operation this year but it was clear in 1998 that it would be at least three years behind schedule because of US reservations and hesitancy.
Furthermore, the Bush administration made clear from the beginning that it had serious doubts about the Agreed Framework: the inclusion in Mr Bush's "axis of evil" speech made it clear that the Bush administration did not trust the North. For the Framework to have had any hope of being even modestly successful, both sides would have needed to implement the steps much more enthusiastically.
The collapse of the framework is disappointing because North Korea, unlike Iraq, is actively seeking accommodation with the international community. In addition to a voluntary moratorium not to test its missiles until 2003, North Korea has undertaken economic reform over the past decade. Last July, it introduced a free market system allowing prices to determine supply and demand for goods and services. In September, it announced a special economic zone in Shinuiju. Even in the past six months, work has begun to clear a section of the demilitarised zone to allow reconnection of the railway between North and South Korea. To cap these developments, Kim Jong-il admitted in September - after three decades of denials - that the North had kidnapped Japanese citizens in the 1970s.
Economic reforms can be slow to have an effect. But the changes under way in North Korea matter - and are becoming irreversible. It makes no sense to criticise the North for being isolationist and then refuse to trade with it. The North needs economic assistance to help open up its economy and ultimately its political system. The US should encourage this trend, not work against it with a policy of pressure and isolation.
If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons, it would have done so long ago. The North wants a guarantee of security from the US, and a policy of isolating it will not work. Isolation is better than pressure, because pressure would only make it even more insecure. But even isolation is at best a holding measure. Nor would the imposition of economic sanctions - or economic engagement - be likely to get North Korea to abandon its weapons programme.
Above all, the regime wants better ties with the US. The policy that follows from this is clear: the US should begin negotiating a non-aggression pact with the North. It should let other countries, such as South Korea and Japan, pursue economic diplomacy if they wish. If the North allows back UN nuclear inspectors and dismantles its reactors, the US can move forward to engagement. But to dismiss the country's security fears is to miss the cause of its actions.
The writer is associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and co-author, with Victor Cha, of Nuclear North Korea (forthcoming)