The Wahabbization of Chechnya (2)

[ChrisD(RJ)]

> The Making of a Terrorist Entity 
> The polity of Chechnya since mid December 1996 has been that of a
> quintessential terrorist state. On the one hand, Aslan Maskhadov has been
> pursuing an overt policy concentrating on two foci: (1) getting the Arab
> world to overtly support an independent Muslim state in Chechnya; and (2)
> furthering the negotiations with Russia in the hope of ultimately
> attaining formal independence. At the sub-rosa level, the Chechens have
> relied on terrorism and subversion, both domestic and anti-Russia, in
> order to influence their "interlocutors" into concessions beyond what the
> strength and legitimacy of the Chechens' position would have achieved on
> its own. 
> The Chechens' road to the elections scheduled for January 1997 was made
> possible by Islamist terrorism. Since December 1996, as the preparations
> for the elections were heating up, it became imperative for the entire
> political leadership -- virtually all candidates -- to remove Western
> presence and influence from Chechnya. The Chechen leadership was
> apprehensive about the international ramifications of first-hand reporting
> by Westerners of election rigging and intimidation, as well as the
> "moderating influence" Western humanitarian workers and activists might
> have on potential voters. 
> Indeed, in mid January 1997, by the time the elections campaign peaked,
> there were very few Westerners (including Russians) in Chechnya. This was
> the result of a seemingly unrelated, and duly condemned, spate of
> terrorism against Westerners. The first round was the assassination in
> cold blood of six ICRC officials in mid December 1996. Since then, there
> developed a sustained campaign characterized by the kidnaping of several
> humanitarian workers and journalists, including Russians, that is yet to
> be resolved. Consequently, the extent of Western direct involvement in,
> and thus having first-hand knowledge of, Chechnya has all but ceased. 
> The Chechens were determined to establish a state based on Islamic values
> and laws.	
> The six Red Cross workers were assassinated in mid December, 1996, at the
> hospital in Novyye Atagi near Grozny. The close range shooting with
> silenced handguns was a professional job. By the Summer of 1997, the
> identity of the perpetrators remained a mystery. Still, by late 1996, the
> assassination brought to the fore the importance of the foreign Mujahedin
> in post-war Chechnya. Although the attackers are yet to be formally
> identified, ICRC officials believe the murders were committed by Mujahedin
> answering to the commander called "Emir Khattab", who, in turn, was
> serving under Salman Raduyev. According to ICRC officials, the murdered
> medics might have heard "hot" information while treating Mujahedin and had
> to be "silenced". Irrespective of who committed the assassination, most
> Westerners immediately left Chechnya as expected and desired. 
> However, Grozny's pointing fingers at Khattab, as well as Chechen
> commanders described as rogue, was only a cover of deniability for
> carrying out terrorism as needed by the Grozny leadership. 
> Indeed, the importance of key Mujahedin commanders increased by early
> 1997, in the aftermath of the war. These Mujahedin commanders are now
> serving as assistants and aides to key Chechen military and intelligence
> commanders-turned-politicians. Ameer Khattab, also popularly known as
> "one-armed Akhmed" and "the Black Arab", is no different. Prior to his
> arrival in Chechnya, he had fought in Afghanistan and in several Persian
> Gulf countries. He also claims to have personally conducted a number of
> terrorist strikes against Israeli and French citizens. In Chechnya,
> Khattab established an elite force of veteran Mujahedin and Islamist
> Chechens that played a central role in some of the more demanding battles
> and terrorist strikes. He is a revered commander, considered harsh but
> caring and fair. A specialist in sabotage and subversive activity, Khattab
> was in command of the special forces that destroyed a Russian armored
> convoy near the villages of Serzhen-Yurt and Yarysh-Mardy back in the
> Spring of 1996. 
> When it erupts, the Chechen war will be a regional conflict aimed to
> liberate the entire Caucasus and punish Russia.	
> In the Winter of 1996-97, Khattab converted to peacetime operations. He
> established a terrorists-commando training school near the village of
> Serzhen-Yurt, Vedeno Rayon, where he and several of his senior veteran
> 'Afghan' and 'Bosnian' Mujahedin serve as instructors. Significantly,
> these Mujahedin also remain as the core of an operational unit for
> terrorist and other clandestine operations. The school trains and
> indoctrinates some of the most promising Chechen youth, all war veterans,
> as the core of Chechnya's future intelligence, special and terrorist
> forces. Significantly, Khattab's school also has a special department
> training Algerians and French Maghribis for terrorist operations in
> France. Significantly, Khattab's camp and the entire terrorist-Mujahedin
> infrastructure remains under the supervision and control of the
> international Armed Islamic Movement and the key terrorism sponsoring
> states. 
> Since January 1997, key Chechen leaders, particularly Maskhadov and
> Yandarbiyev, under whose command Khattab fought, have been building a
> deniability gap with Khattab. Consequently, Shamil Basayev emerged as
> Khattab's primary patron. The reason for this disengagement was Khattab's
> embarking on a major project -- organizing, training and preparing of a
> high quality terrorist force made of both Chechens and foreign Mujahedin
> for the conduct of spectacular terrorist strikes at the heart of Russia,
> as well as throughout the West. The threat, and possible conduct of such
> terrorist attack, could be used by Grozny in order to build pressure on
> Moscow to compromise in the then forthcoming negotiations with the newly
> established Chechen government. However, the Chechen leaders must not be
> identified as the instigators of the terrorism they are clearly
> benefitting from. 
> The polity of Chechnya since mid-December 1996 has been that of a
> quintessential terrorist state.	
> The late January 1997 presidential elections in Chechnya, and Maskhadov's
> inauguration as the president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in mid
> February, brought Chechnya as close to unilaterally declaring independence
> without burning all bridges to Moscow as possible. Grozny was convinced
> that the Muslim World would now rally to support Chechnya both financially
> and politically. To stress the Islamic factor, Maskhadov immediately went
> on Hajj to Saudi Arabia. During his stay in the Middle East, he made a
> concentrated effort to demonstrate his Muslim identity and win Arab
> support. It did not work. Maskhadov's Hajj proved futile because Arab
> states have remained too apprehensive of Russia, and too much in need of
> weapons and military assistance, to overtly support Chechens. Several Arab
> leaders explained this logic to Maskhadov in no uncertain terms. By the
> Spring of 1997, several Arab and Muslim governments quietly notified
> Grozny that with the Chechen people's "liberation struggle" completed and
> with no threat of war in sight, they could no longer openly support
> Chechen secessionism. 
> Indeed, returning from the Hajj, Maskhadov knew that he could not count on
> all out support from the Muslim World in dealings with Moscow. Moreover,
> he knew that Moscow also knew that. Still, Maskhadov remained committed to
> the maximalist objective of complete independence. "I fully intend
> building an independent state," he declared in late February. Hence,
> Grozny found itself at a disadvantage as negotiations with Moscow were
> becoming more complicated and challenging. By late March, Maskhadov
> conceded that the negotiations with Moscow "have reached a dead end." He
> further warned that the "political and economic blockade" imposed by
> Russia would have to be breached or else Chechnya would collapse. As a
> signal of the nature of the possible breakout, Maskhadov nominated Shamil
> Basayev as his first deputy. 
> The Chechens have relied on terrorism and subversion. 	
> Concurrently, Grozny was building up the "terrorist alternative" to
> concessions by the "moderate" Maskhadov in the form of an increasingly
> belligerent and outspoken Salman Raduyev. Starting mid January 1997,
> Raduyev was building a pressure campaign by promising a campaign of
> spectacular terrorism against Russia on April 21, the anniversary of
> Dudayev's assassination. "We are declaring April 21 a day of national
> revenge," Raduyev declared in late January. "At least three Russian towns
> will go up in smoke... Revenge is inevitable." The validity of Raduyev's
> threats was markedly enhanced in early April, when he was badly wounded
> when his car was blown just outside Grozny. His aides attributed the
> assassination bid to Russian intelligence, and vowed to intensify the
> terrorism campaign planned for April 21 as revenge for Raduyev's injuries.
> 
> In mid April, the highest authorities of the key terrorism sponsoring
> states authorized the use of their assets in Chechnya -- senior Mujahedin
> and specialized equipment -- in the forthcoming strikes in Russia. With
> Raduyev neutralized, Adam Deniyev, a close aide of Raduyev's, was put in
> command of the planned terrorism campaign. Meanwhile, Abu Movsayev, the
> chief of Chechnya's security organs, made political capital for Grozny by
> warning Moscow about the impending spate of terrorism. The ensuing
> security alert throughout Russia deterred the Chechens from activating
> their plans. 
> The extent of Western direct involvement in and thus having first-hand
> knowledge of Chechnya has all but ceased.	
> Instead, between late April and early May, the Chechens blew up two bombs
> in Armavir and Pyatigorsk in southern Russia, causing a few fatalities and
> injuries, as well as widespread damage. There were also several clashes
> between armed Chechens and Russian security forces in areas adjacent to
> Chechnya. These operations were a far cry from the promised wave of
> terrorism, but they proved that Chechen terrorism was still alive, and
> that a regional eruption of violence was a viable option. While denying
> any connection to the escalating terrorism, Chechen officials warned
> Moscow that unless they had "achievements" to show, it would be
> increasingly difficult for Grozny to restrain the building frustration and
> despair in Chechnya, as well as contain the ensuing radicalism and
> violence. Reinforcing Grozny's warning, Raduyev reemerged in early May and
> repeated is promises for an escalatory wave of terrorism. "The explosions
> in Armavir and Pyatigorsk were carried out on my personal order," he
> declared. "This is a new phase in the Russian-Chechen war." While Grozny
> continued to profusely condemn terrorism and even allege provocations by
> Russian intelligence, Basayev's continued patronage of Raduyev remained
> solid. 
> Pressure through terrorism was once again the choice means. 	
> By now, Moscow and Grozny were negotiating the fixing of the major oil
> pipeline crossing Chechnya and the resumption of shipping oil from the
> Caspian Sea to Russia. In early June, as the pace of the oil negotiations
> was growing, Maskhadov sought to stress the Islamic identity of Chechnya
> in order to gain political support from the oil producing states of the
> Middle East. Hence, Maskhadov dissolved Chechnya's secular courts and left
> only Islamic tribunals, based on the Sharia, as the legitimate elements of
> the country's legal system. 
> Once again, increasingly dependent on Russian weapons supplies, the Arab
> World proved reluctant to take on Moscow. Hence, pressure through
> terrorism was once again the choice means. This time, however, official
> Grozny went to exceptional steps in order to build a gap of deniability.
> In mid June Maskhadov ordered the disbanding of all private armies,
> specifically mentioning Raduyev's forces as an objective. Under the
> decree, Raduyev would be permitted only to retain a personal guard force.
> Maskhadov offered that the rest of Raduyev's force join either the
> national guard or the largely ceremonial presidential guard. 
> This cycle of violence spread into nearby Dagestan. 	
> In late June, an attempt was made on Khattab's life. He was driving a jeep
> near Benoy, some 70 kilometers south of the capital Grozny, when a
> remote-control land mine blew up seconds after the car had already passed
> it. Khattab was not hurt. This expertly built and deployed but belatedly
> activated bomb could have been a signal to Khattab -- a make-believe
> assassination attempt to enhance deniability. 
> Indeed, a marked escalation in the violence started immediately. This
> cycle of violence spread into nearby Dagestan. Chechen raiding parties
> planted mines and ambushed government vehicles. In early July seven
> Russian policemen were killed and 13 were injured near the town of
> Khasavyurt in Dagestan, near the Chechen border, when the truck they were
> traveling in was blown up. 
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