Helen Thomas vs. Ari Fleischer

Michael Pugliese debsian at pacbell.net
Wed Jan 8 21:09:40 PST 2003


Yoshie>...Higher estimates of famine deaths in North Korea mention that 2 million or more people died (Cf. <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9808/19/nkorea.famine/>) , a great boon if the US were planning for a military aggression for "regime change." And yet the US is far more gun-ho about "regime change" in Iraq than in North Korea -- despite the remaining Cold War rhetoric.

Macdonald Stainsby believes the agit-prop of the KCNA. You, in your much vaster depth of intelligence, do too?

Been reading Greg Elich again? "The hidden history of the nuclear issue and U.S-North Korean relations. How the Bush Administration deliberately created a crisis in international relations." "Targeting North Korea" by Gregory Elich http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI212A.html (Since Greg in his, "North American Solidarity Deligation to Yugoslavia, " in the early 90's saw fit to directly express solidarity with Milosevic's, "favorite oppositionist, " the neo-fascist V. Seselj, perhaps he's planning a WWP junket to North Korea? ) For policy wonks likely to have the ear of the Dubya admin. see, for example, The Heritage Foundation, " Research Asia and the Pacific BG1304:Time for a New North Korea Policy." <URL: http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1304.cfm
> <URL: http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/1991/910214-dprk-usia.htm >
Tracking Number:  172636 Title:  "AEI Fellow Says Korean Reunification 'Predictable'."

American Enterprise Institute fellow Dr Nicholas Eberstadt added that it is "impossible to predict if the reunification will occur under happy or unhappy circumstances." (910214) Author:  MORSE, JANE A (USIA STAFF WRITER) Date:  19910214 Text:*EPF409 02/14/91 * AEI FELLOW SAYS KOREAN REUNIFICATION "PREDICTABLE" (Article on Eberstadt

telepress conference) (720) By Jane A. Morse USIA Staff Writer

Except for the likes of Frank Gaffney @ CSP and the Weekly Standard, can you

point to any policy planning doc that advocates an offensive, suicidal US military assault across the DMZ? Forget the US supported masscare at Kwangjiu

<URL: http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/jpri-con.htm > , the negative reaction in South Korea would be even more tremendous.

<URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/LRW.htm >

The Reunification Of Korea

CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Reunification of Korea

Author: Major R. W. Larsen, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: A study of the potential reunification of Korea

reveals political, military and economic issues of

importance to the region and the world.

Background: In the aftermath of German unification, there

is a general expectation by defense analysts that the time

for a single Korea is near at hand. It is, therefore,

prudent to consider some of the troubling political,

military and economic aspects of reunification. First, the

internal politics of the two Koreans are irreconcilable. In

the end the Northern elite will lose power and some

authority from the South will rule. The issues of concern

are how the power shift is to take place and the way in

which the Korean people will be governed. Second, there

will be no changing the geopolitics of the Peninsula. It

has been a battle ground for two millennia and the national

political interests of the surrounding giants are, and will

remain, dissimilar. Third, the military issue of

significance to the region is not so much the mobilization

of the huge armies as it is the demobilization of the

existing military manpower. Finally, while the economic

potential of a united Korea is imposing, the question of

paying for reunification is a sobering issue of world-wide

relevance. In sum, the broad concern for the Korean

situation is that the inevitable transition does not get out

of control. The risk and unpredictability of the

reunification of Korea warrants the attention of all nations

associated with this part of the world.

THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

OUTLINE

Thesis Statement. A study of the potential reunification of

Korea reveals political, military and economic issues of

importance to the region and the world.

I.History and Geopolitics

II. Present Situation

III. Political Issues

A.Inside Korea

1.Concepts of Reunification

2. Leadership Accommodation

B. Inter-Regional Concerns

1. Post-Revolution Russia

2. Japan

3. China

4. United States

IV. Military Issues

A. Aggregation of Two Koreas

B. Demobilization of Forces

V. Economic Issues

A. Two Dissimilar Systems

B. Aggregation of Two Systems

C. Cost of Reunification

THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

The continuing armed confrontation on the Korean

Peninsula does not set well in the New World Order. The

forty-year-old military stand-off along the demilitarized

zone (DMZ) lingers as an awkward leftover from World War II

and an uncomfortable reminder of the Cold War. As the cleft

between the North and South deepens and impedes the

commercial and diplomatic evolution of the region, the

Korean people and the cast of nation players become more

anxious for a solution.

Considerable thought and speculation has taken place

recently regarding the inevitability of a unified Korea,

particularly in the aftermath of German reunification. Some

analysts believe that the strong cultural identity of the

people will soon overshadow the distrust and enmity that

have characterized North-South relations since 1950. Others

suggest that the economic burden of the costly military

confrontation will force more amicable political

policies between the two antagonists. Time, fading

memories, and the expectations of the post-war generation

are also expected to contribute to a Seoul-Pyongyang

rapprochement. As these factors intertwine in regional

politics and economics, the expectation, and perhaps the

reality, of a single Korea becomes more pervasive.

The Korean situation is of global interest. Regardless

of the feasibility of near-term reunification, an analysis

of relevant questions and problems helps to define the

broader condition and is prudent in view of the plausible

outcomes. A study of the potential reunification of Korea

reveals political, military and economic issues of

importance to the region and the world.

BACKGROUND

The small Korean peninsula has been of interest to its

powerful neighbors for over 2,000 years. It has been the

battleground of the Mongols, Chinese, Japanese, Russians,

and Americans. In the first half of the last century the

peninsula was dominated by the military force and political

power of Japan. Since the end of World War II, the area

generally north of the 38th parallel has been a communist

state and the area south has developed along the Western,

democratic model. The two regions have been in a condition

of civil war since the invasion by the North on June 25,

1950. A truce signed in 1953 ended large scale warfare, but

the two huge armies have remained in a stalemate and have

kept the attention of the world powers for the past forty

years. Only in the last few months has there been an

inkling of progress toward political moderation.

The Korean peninsula is the geopolitical hub of Northeast

Asia. China and the former Soviet Union directly border the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.), and the

Korean Straits separate the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) from

the Japanese mainland by less than 200 miles. Diplomatic

relations are characterized by a fervent, nationalistic

pride and an overt absence of a common regional identity.

Area economics are, however, becoming increasingly

interwoven by aggressive East Asian and global corporate

entities with no clear-cut national allegiances. The

borders of the region are bristling with military forces and

relations are fraught with suspicion and deep cultural bias.

In view of the size and character of the area population,

and the political, military and economic power surrounding

Korea, the importance of the peninsula becomes apparent.

Though the North and South remain locked in a military

impasse along the 300-mile "trench line", there appears to

be genuine opportunity for a political termination of the

war and potential reunification. To escape the overwhelming

cost of its massive armed force, North Korea has been

increasingly conciliatory in its relations with South Korea,

the United States, and Japan. (4: 618) In the South, a

population weary of heavy-handed government and economic

sacrifice is exercising a new found political voice and

forcing the fledgling democracy into action.

Several significant indicators of improvement in relations

between the two Koreas have recently appeared. In

December 1991, high level delegates agreed to the first non-

aggression accord in 45 years. (2: A1) Two weeks later, in

Panmunjom, a "de-nuclearization" declaration was signed

banning nuclear weapons from the peninsula. (10: A1) Though

experts on both sides are cautious and agree that the

achievements have been largely conceptual, there is now

activity where there was previously none.

The international community, generally more concerned

with stability (and nuclear non-proliferation) than Korean

reunification, has also provided various lubricants to the

deadlock. Both Koreas have been accepted as members of the

United Nations. Improved trade relations between China and

South Korea, the post-Soviet Russia and South Korea, and

Japan and North Korea, all point to more normalized

affiliations. For its part, the United States has verified

the absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, urged the

South to take a larger portion of the burden for of their

national defense, and has conducted "the highest-level

meeting between (North Korea and the United States) since

the Korean War." (15: A18) Again, substantive changes are

limited, but the aggregate effect of political, military and

economic policy modifications is positive in terms of

regional stability and possible Korean unity.

KOREAN POLITICS

Since the departure of the Soviets from the North in

1950, there has been a nearly universal desire for national

reunification by the people of both North and South Korea.

To unify or not to unify has never been the question. The

issue is government. Despite the fears over monolithic

world communism," the Korean War was, after all,

nationalistic and largely an attempt to unify the Peninsula

by force.

Today the North is interested in new options to what is

becoming an increasingly untenable political position. They

are committed to pursuing broad negotiations centering on

arms limitation and the removal of foreign forces.

Pyongyang's articulated formula for a reunified Korea is

through a North-South confederation based on the principle

of "one state, one nation, two systems, two governments."

(6: 492) This confederation would give equal representation

to both regions without regard to 43 million-to-22 million,

South-to-North population disparity.

Until recently, the North's political solution amounted

to a confederation of the two regions with an indefinite co-

existence of the two political systems. However, their

position has become increasingly conciliatory. They have

relaxed the notion of a clear-cut confederation allowing

that full unification would come with the gradual shift of;

diplomatic and defense authority to the combined national

government. In his 1991 New Year's address, North Korean

leader Kim Il Sung declared, "We are ready to discuss

vesting the autonomous regional governments of the

confederal republic with more rights on a tentative basis

and then increasing the functions of the central government

in the future." (4: 617) South Korea rejects the notion of

co-equal influence and regards it as an opportunity for the

D.P.R.K. to continue its subversive efforts by disarming the

South, removing American troops from the Peninsula, and

opening up the R.O.K. to North Korean influence.

The South Koreans advocate a unification model based on

free elections, with their numerically larger population

expectantly assuring political domination. President Roh

Tae Woo articulated the South's reunification policy in 1989

with his "Korean Commonwealth" plan. (4:616) The plan

envisions a Joint Secretariat and a governing body of an

upper and lower house. The upper house would provide equal

representation of the two states while representation in the

lower house would be based on population.

The South is being very deliberate with the ongoing

negations. President Roh recognizes that the reunification

issue could become a dangerous weapon in the hands of his

political opposition. He has combined a series of cautious

diplomatic gestures toward the North with a somewhat heavy-

handed effort to keep North-South contacts under the strict

control of the government.

Pyongyang has accused Seoul of dragging its feet during

negotiations as a means of stabilizing the status quo that

would keep defense spending high and force the North into

economic collapse. While the North is making limited

concessions, they are not prepared to accept the loss-of-

face implicit with the South's reunification plan along the

lines of the German model. Recently, Kim Yong Nam, Vice

Prime Minister, was interviewed and ruled out "unification

of the political systems of North and South Korea," adding,

"if either side tries to dominate the other side, it will

lead to conflict." (6: 492)

In addition to the dissimilarity of internal political

systems and unification models, leadership accommodation is

an issue critical to the idea of reunification. The

D.P.R.K. has been headed by Kim Il Sung since its creation

in 1948. As president and leader of the Korean Worker's

Party, the 79 year old Kim Il Sung is larger-than-life,

revered, and respected. The "Great Leader" has replaced

Marxism-Leninism with his own ideology of self-reliance,

juche, and has successfully managed to keep his country

intact since World War II.

It would be difficult to alter the politics of North

Korea without appearing to question the basic ideology of

autarchic self-reliance constructed about the personality

Kim Il Sung. It would be equally difficult to envision a

mutually agreeable, peaceful reunification as long as he

remains alive. However, while there is no power struggle in

Pyongyang, there appears to be a policy struggle under way.

The economic realities are increasingly at odds with juche

isolationism.

The elder Kim hopes to hand over political power to his

son, Kim Jong Il. In recent months the junior Kim has been

named supreme commander of the North Korean armed forces and

has assumed direction of his country's foreign policy. Kim

Jong Il does not enjoy the high regard of his people, has

been characterized as irrational, and has long been

associated with North Korean terrorism. Further, there are

concerns about the "dynastic succession" and there are

intimations that the military will likely play a more

assertive political role with the death of the elder Kim.

Personalities aside, the political power in the North

rests in the hands of a leadership elite who have

perpetuated their status based on who they know rather than

merit. They will not be eager to forsake their positions

and lifestyles on the behalf of pan-Korean nationalism. (13)

A segment of the Northern leadership elite that bears

observation is the younger, second echelon military

officers. Many of these leaders were trained abroad and

have seen the world outside North Korea. The grisly demise

of Ceaucescu and the theory of "perestrika' have presumably

not been lost on these men. A Western diplomat recently

remarked, "In the not too distant future we will have a

North Korean military leadership to deal with that will be a

lot easier than dealing with Kim." (5: 41)

In the South, the first free presidential elections were

held in December 1987. Roh was elected president with 30

percent of the vote as the opposition was split three ways.

President Roh's term is finished in 1992 and his efforts to

alter the constitution, which prevent him from serving a

second term, will probably fail as a result of the recent

unexpected defeat of his party in national elections.

Roh shares his political power with hawkish elements tied

closely to defense industries. Defense contractors and a

bloated military elite live with the same fear as their

opposite numbers in the North. Jobs, influence and

lifestyles would be lost in the event of a demilitarized

reunification. This group opposes dramatic changes advanced

by reunification-minded politicians.

The opposition to President Roh is a liberal coalition of

politicians sensitive to public pressure for a shift in

resource allocations from military to social welfare. They

are generally pro-unification and pro-labor, and embrace the

general demand for broader democratization. A growing anti-

Americanism is also developing from a blend of injured pride

and national resentment. As evidenced by recent elections,

this element may be the emerging power and the political

policies of all involved nations may need adjustment.

Despite subtle shifts in respective approaches, the basic

reunification policies of the North and South are at

conceptual and procedural loggerheads. Seoul does not

perceive the advantages of a neutralized and bi-systemic

all-Korean confederation and Pyongyang opposes South Korea's

proposal for incremental unification due to the difference

in population size and the wide economic gap between the two

countries. Further, neither of the reigning power elites

have a great deal to gain and recognize that reunification

risks loss of influence. In both the D.P.R.K. and the

R.O.K. , however, are peripheral groups which could

facilitate and, more importantly, accommodate the change

necessary for the transition to a single Korea.

INTER-REGIONAL POLITICS <SNIP>  

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Blank, Stephen J., "Moscow, Seoul, and Soviet Strategy

in the Asia-Pacific Region," 23 November 1991, Strategic Studies

Institute U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

2. Blumstein, Paul, "Two Koreas Pledge to End Aggression,"

Washington Post, 13 December 1991, p. A1.

3. Eberstadt, Nicholas, and Banister, Judith, "If Korea Tears

Down Its 'Wall' . . .," Washington Post, 5 January 1992, p. C3.

4. Harrison, Selig S., "A Chance for Detente in Korea,

World Policy Journal, Fall 1991, pp. 599-630.

5. Impoco, Jim, "If the Walls Come Tumbling Down," U.S.

News & World Report, 20 August 1990, p. 41.

6. "JDW Interview," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 September

1991, p. 492.

7. "Kim's Son Moves Up," Washington Post, 26 December 1991,

p. A14.

8. Klintworth, Gary, "Beleaguered, Bewildered, but Looking

for New Options," Asian-Pacific Defence Reporter, August 1990, pp.

16-17.

9. "Mini-Dragons, Public Broadcasting System, Channel 32,

Washington, D.C., 6 January 1992.

10. Oberdorfer, Don, "N. Korea Seen Closer to A-Bomb,"

Washington Post, 4 January 1992, p. A1.

11. Rosario, Louise do, "Passing the Hat," Far Eastern Economic

Review, 10 October 1991, p. 75.

12. Segal, George, North-East Asia: Common Security or a'

la Carte?," International Affairs, 67:4, 1991, pp. 755-767.

13. Switzer, LTC Warren H. , Telephone interview about Korea.

Washington, D.C., 4 February 1992.

14. Tharp, Mike, "Two Nations Still at War," U.S. News & World

Report, 25 June 1990, p. 46.

15. "U.S., N. Korea Meet at U.N. on Nuclear Issues," Washington

Post, 23 January 1992, p. A18.

16. Wilborn, Thomas L., "How Northeast Asians View Their

Security," 8 August 1991, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War

College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

17. Wise, Michael Z., "North Korea Signs Agreement For

Inspection of Nuclear Site," Washington Post, 31 January 1992, p. A

 

-- Michael Pugliese



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