Macdonald Stainsby believes the agit-prop of the KCNA. You, in your much vaster depth of intelligence, do too?
Been reading Greg Elich again? "The hidden history of the nuclear issue
and U.S-North Korean relations. How the Bush Administration
deliberately created a crisis in international relations."
"Targeting North Korea"
by Gregory Elich
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI212A.html
(Since Greg in his, "North American Solidarity Deligation to Yugoslavia, "
in the early 90's saw fit to directly express solidarity with Milosevic's,
"favorite oppositionist, " the neo-fascist V. Seselj, perhaps he's planning
a WWP junket to North Korea? )
For policy wonks likely to have the ear of the Dubya admin. see, for
example, The Heritage Foundation, " Research Asia and the Pacific
BG1304:Time for a New North Korea Policy." <URL:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1304.cfm
> <URL: http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/1991/910214-dprk-usia.htm >
Tracking Number: 172636 Title: "AEI Fellow Says Korean Reunification 'Predictable'."
American Enterprise Institute fellow Dr Nicholas Eberstadt added that it is "impossible to predict if the reunification will occur under happy or unhappy circumstances." (910214) Author: MORSE, JANE A (USIA STAFF WRITER) Date: 19910214 Text:*EPF409 02/14/91 * AEI FELLOW SAYS KOREAN REUNIFICATION "PREDICTABLE" (Article on Eberstadt
telepress conference) (720) By Jane A. Morse USIA Staff Writer
Except for the likes of Frank Gaffney @ CSP and the Weekly Standard, can you
point to any policy planning doc that advocates an offensive, suicidal US military assault across the DMZ? Forget the US supported masscare at Kwangjiu
<URL: http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/jpri-con.htm > , the negative reaction in South Korea would be even more tremendous.
<URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/LRW.htm >
The Reunification Of Korea
CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Reunification of Korea
Author: Major R. W. Larsen, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: A study of the potential reunification of Korea
reveals political, military and economic issues of
importance to the region and the world.
Background: In the aftermath of German unification, there
is a general expectation by defense analysts that the time
for a single Korea is near at hand. It is, therefore,
prudent to consider some of the troubling political,
military and economic aspects of reunification. First, the
internal politics of the two Koreans are irreconcilable. In
the end the Northern elite will lose power and some
authority from the South will rule. The issues of concern
are how the power shift is to take place and the way in
which the Korean people will be governed. Second, there
will be no changing the geopolitics of the Peninsula. It
has been a battle ground for two millennia and the national
political interests of the surrounding giants are, and will
remain, dissimilar. Third, the military issue of
significance to the region is not so much the mobilization
of the huge armies as it is the demobilization of the
existing military manpower. Finally, while the economic
potential of a united Korea is imposing, the question of
paying for reunification is a sobering issue of world-wide
relevance. In sum, the broad concern for the Korean
situation is that the inevitable transition does not get out
of control. The risk and unpredictability of the
reunification of Korea warrants the attention of all nations
associated with this part of the world.
THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. A study of the potential reunification of
Korea reveals political, military and economic issues of
importance to the region and the world.
I.History and Geopolitics
II. Present Situation
III. Political Issues
A.Inside Korea
1.Concepts of Reunification
2. Leadership Accommodation
B. Inter-Regional Concerns
1. Post-Revolution Russia
2. Japan
3. China
4. United States
IV. Military Issues
A. Aggregation of Two Koreas
B. Demobilization of Forces
V. Economic Issues
A. Two Dissimilar Systems
B. Aggregation of Two Systems
C. Cost of Reunification
THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA
The continuing armed confrontation on the Korean
Peninsula does not set well in the New World Order. The
forty-year-old military stand-off along the demilitarized
zone (DMZ) lingers as an awkward leftover from World War II
and an uncomfortable reminder of the Cold War. As the cleft
between the North and South deepens and impedes the
commercial and diplomatic evolution of the region, the
Korean people and the cast of nation players become more
anxious for a solution.
Considerable thought and speculation has taken place
recently regarding the inevitability of a unified Korea,
particularly in the aftermath of German reunification. Some
analysts believe that the strong cultural identity of the
people will soon overshadow the distrust and enmity that
have characterized North-South relations since 1950. Others
suggest that the economic burden of the costly military
confrontation will force more amicable political
policies between the two antagonists. Time, fading
memories, and the expectations of the post-war generation
are also expected to contribute to a Seoul-Pyongyang
rapprochement. As these factors intertwine in regional
politics and economics, the expectation, and perhaps the
reality, of a single Korea becomes more pervasive.
The Korean situation is of global interest. Regardless
of the feasibility of near-term reunification, an analysis
of relevant questions and problems helps to define the
broader condition and is prudent in view of the plausible
outcomes. A study of the potential reunification of Korea
reveals political, military and economic issues of
importance to the region and the world.
BACKGROUND
The small Korean peninsula has been of interest to its
powerful neighbors for over 2,000 years. It has been the
battleground of the Mongols, Chinese, Japanese, Russians,
and Americans. In the first half of the last century the
peninsula was dominated by the military force and political
power of Japan. Since the end of World War II, the area
generally north of the 38th parallel has been a communist
state and the area south has developed along the Western,
democratic model. The two regions have been in a condition
of civil war since the invasion by the North on June 25,
1950. A truce signed in 1953 ended large scale warfare, but
the two huge armies have remained in a stalemate and have
kept the attention of the world powers for the past forty
years. Only in the last few months has there been an
inkling of progress toward political moderation.
The Korean peninsula is the geopolitical hub of Northeast
Asia. China and the former Soviet Union directly border the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.), and the
Korean Straits separate the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) from
the Japanese mainland by less than 200 miles. Diplomatic
relations are characterized by a fervent, nationalistic
pride and an overt absence of a common regional identity.
Area economics are, however, becoming increasingly
interwoven by aggressive East Asian and global corporate
entities with no clear-cut national allegiances. The
borders of the region are bristling with military forces and
relations are fraught with suspicion and deep cultural bias.
In view of the size and character of the area population,
and the political, military and economic power surrounding
Korea, the importance of the peninsula becomes apparent.
Though the North and South remain locked in a military
impasse along the 300-mile "trench line", there appears to
be genuine opportunity for a political termination of the
war and potential reunification. To escape the overwhelming
cost of its massive armed force, North Korea has been
increasingly conciliatory in its relations with South Korea,
the United States, and Japan. (4: 618) In the South, a
population weary of heavy-handed government and economic
sacrifice is exercising a new found political voice and
forcing the fledgling democracy into action.
Several significant indicators of improvement in relations
between the two Koreas have recently appeared. In
December 1991, high level delegates agreed to the first non-
aggression accord in 45 years. (2: A1) Two weeks later, in
Panmunjom, a "de-nuclearization" declaration was signed
banning nuclear weapons from the peninsula. (10: A1) Though
experts on both sides are cautious and agree that the
achievements have been largely conceptual, there is now
activity where there was previously none.
The international community, generally more concerned
with stability (and nuclear non-proliferation) than Korean
reunification, has also provided various lubricants to the
deadlock. Both Koreas have been accepted as members of the
United Nations. Improved trade relations between China and
South Korea, the post-Soviet Russia and South Korea, and
Japan and North Korea, all point to more normalized
affiliations. For its part, the United States has verified
the absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, urged the
South to take a larger portion of the burden for of their
national defense, and has conducted "the highest-level
meeting between (North Korea and the United States) since
the Korean War." (15: A18) Again, substantive changes are
limited, but the aggregate effect of political, military and
economic policy modifications is positive in terms of
regional stability and possible Korean unity.
KOREAN POLITICS
Since the departure of the Soviets from the North in
1950, there has been a nearly universal desire for national
reunification by the people of both North and South Korea.
To unify or not to unify has never been the question. The
issue is government. Despite the fears over monolithic
world communism," the Korean War was, after all,
nationalistic and largely an attempt to unify the Peninsula
by force.
Today the North is interested in new options to what is
becoming an increasingly untenable political position. They
are committed to pursuing broad negotiations centering on
arms limitation and the removal of foreign forces.
Pyongyang's articulated formula for a reunified Korea is
through a North-South confederation based on the principle
of "one state, one nation, two systems, two governments."
(6: 492) This confederation would give equal representation
to both regions without regard to 43 million-to-22 million,
South-to-North population disparity.
Until recently, the North's political solution amounted
to a confederation of the two regions with an indefinite co-
existence of the two political systems. However, their
position has become increasingly conciliatory. They have
relaxed the notion of a clear-cut confederation allowing
that full unification would come with the gradual shift of;
diplomatic and defense authority to the combined national
government. In his 1991 New Year's address, North Korean
leader Kim Il Sung declared, "We are ready to discuss
vesting the autonomous regional governments of the
confederal republic with more rights on a tentative basis
and then increasing the functions of the central government
in the future." (4: 617) South Korea rejects the notion of
co-equal influence and regards it as an opportunity for the
D.P.R.K. to continue its subversive efforts by disarming the
South, removing American troops from the Peninsula, and
opening up the R.O.K. to North Korean influence.
The South Koreans advocate a unification model based on
free elections, with their numerically larger population
expectantly assuring political domination. President Roh
Tae Woo articulated the South's reunification policy in 1989
with his "Korean Commonwealth" plan. (4:616) The plan
envisions a Joint Secretariat and a governing body of an
upper and lower house. The upper house would provide equal
representation of the two states while representation in the
lower house would be based on population.
The South is being very deliberate with the ongoing
negations. President Roh recognizes that the reunification
issue could become a dangerous weapon in the hands of his
political opposition. He has combined a series of cautious
diplomatic gestures toward the North with a somewhat heavy-
handed effort to keep North-South contacts under the strict
control of the government.
Pyongyang has accused Seoul of dragging its feet during
negotiations as a means of stabilizing the status quo that
would keep defense spending high and force the North into
economic collapse. While the North is making limited
concessions, they are not prepared to accept the loss-of-
face implicit with the South's reunification plan along the
lines of the German model. Recently, Kim Yong Nam, Vice
Prime Minister, was interviewed and ruled out "unification
of the political systems of North and South Korea," adding,
"if either side tries to dominate the other side, it will
lead to conflict." (6: 492)
In addition to the dissimilarity of internal political
systems and unification models, leadership accommodation is
an issue critical to the idea of reunification. The
D.P.R.K. has been headed by Kim Il Sung since its creation
in 1948. As president and leader of the Korean Worker's
Party, the 79 year old Kim Il Sung is larger-than-life,
revered, and respected. The "Great Leader" has replaced
Marxism-Leninism with his own ideology of self-reliance,
juche, and has successfully managed to keep his country
intact since World War II.
It would be difficult to alter the politics of North
Korea without appearing to question the basic ideology of
autarchic self-reliance constructed about the personality
Kim Il Sung. It would be equally difficult to envision a
mutually agreeable, peaceful reunification as long as he
remains alive. However, while there is no power struggle in
Pyongyang, there appears to be a policy struggle under way.
The economic realities are increasingly at odds with juche
isolationism.
The elder Kim hopes to hand over political power to his
son, Kim Jong Il. In recent months the junior Kim has been
named supreme commander of the North Korean armed forces and
has assumed direction of his country's foreign policy. Kim
Jong Il does not enjoy the high regard of his people, has
been characterized as irrational, and has long been
associated with North Korean terrorism. Further, there are
concerns about the "dynastic succession" and there are
intimations that the military will likely play a more
assertive political role with the death of the elder Kim.
Personalities aside, the political power in the North
rests in the hands of a leadership elite who have
perpetuated their status based on who they know rather than
merit. They will not be eager to forsake their positions
and lifestyles on the behalf of pan-Korean nationalism. (13)
A segment of the Northern leadership elite that bears
observation is the younger, second echelon military
officers. Many of these leaders were trained abroad and
have seen the world outside North Korea. The grisly demise
of Ceaucescu and the theory of "perestrika' have presumably
not been lost on these men. A Western diplomat recently
remarked, "In the not too distant future we will have a
North Korean military leadership to deal with that will be a
lot easier than dealing with Kim." (5: 41)
In the South, the first free presidential elections were
held in December 1987. Roh was elected president with 30
percent of the vote as the opposition was split three ways.
President Roh's term is finished in 1992 and his efforts to
alter the constitution, which prevent him from serving a
second term, will probably fail as a result of the recent
unexpected defeat of his party in national elections.
Roh shares his political power with hawkish elements tied
closely to defense industries. Defense contractors and a
bloated military elite live with the same fear as their
opposite numbers in the North. Jobs, influence and
lifestyles would be lost in the event of a demilitarized
reunification. This group opposes dramatic changes advanced
by reunification-minded politicians.
The opposition to President Roh is a liberal coalition of
politicians sensitive to public pressure for a shift in
resource allocations from military to social welfare. They
are generally pro-unification and pro-labor, and embrace the
general demand for broader democratization. A growing anti-
Americanism is also developing from a blend of injured pride
and national resentment. As evidenced by recent elections,
this element may be the emerging power and the political
policies of all involved nations may need adjustment.
Despite subtle shifts in respective approaches, the basic
reunification policies of the North and South are at
conceptual and procedural loggerheads. Seoul does not
perceive the advantages of a neutralized and bi-systemic
all-Korean confederation and Pyongyang opposes South Korea's
proposal for incremental unification due to the difference
in population size and the wide economic gap between the two
countries. Further, neither of the reigning power elites
have a great deal to gain and recognize that reunification
risks loss of influence. In both the D.P.R.K. and the
R.O.K. , however, are peripheral groups which could
facilitate and, more importantly, accommodate the change
necessary for the transition to a single Korea.
INTER-REGIONAL POLITICS <SNIP>
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Blank, Stephen J., "Moscow, Seoul, and Soviet Strategy
in the Asia-Pacific Region," 23 November 1991, Strategic Studies
Institute U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
2. Blumstein, Paul, "Two Koreas Pledge to End Aggression,"
Washington Post, 13 December 1991, p. A1.
3. Eberstadt, Nicholas, and Banister, Judith, "If Korea Tears
Down Its 'Wall' . . .," Washington Post, 5 January 1992, p. C3.
4. Harrison, Selig S., "A Chance for Detente in Korea,
World Policy Journal, Fall 1991, pp. 599-630.
5. Impoco, Jim, "If the Walls Come Tumbling Down," U.S.
News & World Report, 20 August 1990, p. 41.
6. "JDW Interview," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 September
1991, p. 492.
7. "Kim's Son Moves Up," Washington Post, 26 December 1991,
p. A14.
8. Klintworth, Gary, "Beleaguered, Bewildered, but Looking
for New Options," Asian-Pacific Defence Reporter, August 1990, pp.
16-17.
9. "Mini-Dragons, Public Broadcasting System, Channel 32,
Washington, D.C., 6 January 1992.
10. Oberdorfer, Don, "N. Korea Seen Closer to A-Bomb,"
Washington Post, 4 January 1992, p. A1.
11. Rosario, Louise do, "Passing the Hat," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 10 October 1991, p. 75.
12. Segal, George, North-East Asia: Common Security or a'
la Carte?," International Affairs, 67:4, 1991, pp. 755-767.
13. Switzer, LTC Warren H. , Telephone interview about Korea.
Washington, D.C., 4 February 1992.
14. Tharp, Mike, "Two Nations Still at War," U.S. News & World
Report, 25 June 1990, p. 46.
15. "U.S., N. Korea Meet at U.N. on Nuclear Issues," Washington
Post, 23 January 1992, p. A18.
16. Wilborn, Thomas L., "How Northeast Asians View Their
Security," 8 August 1991, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
17. Wise, Michael Z., "North Korea Signs Agreement For
Inspection of Nuclear Site," Washington Post, 31 January 1992, p. A
-- Michael Pugliese