[lbo-talk] Old Friends

Michael Pollak mpollak at panix.com
Sat Jun 14 23:28:50 PDT 2003


On Sat, 14 Jun 2003, Dennis Perrin quoted a bit from the Asia Times at:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EF14Ag01.html

[But having read it, I think the whole thing is worth posting. This fellow gives the appearance of knowing about what he's about, and if his picture of the future comes true, whoa. The last sentence is a doozy. Does anybody know his stuff from elsewhere?]

Saturday, June 14, 2003

Asia Times (Hong Kong)

Central Asia

US turns to the Taliban

By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - Such is the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan,

compounded by the return to the country of a large number of former

Afghan communist refugees, that United States and Pakistani

intelligence officials have met with Taliban leaders in an effort to

devise a political solution to prevent the country from being further

ripped apart.

According to a Pakistani jihadi leader who played a role in setting up

the communication, the meeting took place recently between

representatives of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the

US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Taliban leaders at the Pakistan

Air Force base of Samungli, near Quetta.

The source told Asia Times Online that four conditions were put to the

Taliban before any form of reconciliation can take place that could

potentially lead to them having a role in the Kabul government, whose

present authority is in essence limited to the capital:

Mullah Omar must be removed as supreme leader of the Taliban.

All Pakistani, Arab and other foreign fighters currently engaged in

operations against international troops in Afghanistan must be thrown

out of the country.

Any US or allied soldiers held captive must be released.

Afghans currently living abroad, notably in the United States and

England, must be given a part in the government - through being

allowed to contest elections - even though many do not even speak

their mother tongue, such as Dari or Pashtu.

Apparently, the Taliban refused the first condition point blank, but

showed some flexibility on the other terms. As such, this first

preliminary contact made little headway. It is not known whether there

will be further meetings, but given the fact that the reason for

staging the talks in the first place remains unchanged, more contact

can be expected.

The channels for the contact have been set up by Taliban who defected

when the government collapsed in Kabul, and fled to Pakistan, where

they were sheltered in ISI safe houses. Now these defectors, working

with Pakistani jihadis who know how to approach the Taliban

leadership, are acting as go-betweens.

The backdrop to the first meeting is an ever-increasing escalation in

the guerrilla war being waged against foreign troops in Afghanistan.

Small hit-and-run attacks are a daily feature in most parts of the

country, while face-to-face skirmishes are common in the former

Taliban stronghold around Kandahar in the south.

According to people familiar with Afghan resistance movements, the one

that has emerged over the past year and a half since the fall of the

Taliban is about four times as strong as the movement that opposed

Soviet invaders for nearly a decade starting in 1979.

The key reason for this is that the previous Taliban government -

which is dispersed almost intact in the country after capitulating to

advancing Northern Alliance forces without a fight - is backed by the

most powerful force in Afghanistan: clerics and religious students.

For centuries, these people were the most respected segment of Afghan

society, and before 1979 they never participated in politics. On the

contrary, their role was one of reconciliation in conflicts. During

the Afghan resistance movement against the USSR, things changed, and

clerics threw their weight behind the mujahideen struggle, but, with a

few exceptions, such as Maulana Yunus Khalis, they were not in

command.

With the withdrawal of the Soviets and the emergence of the Taliban in

the early 1990s, though, the situation once again changed. The

Taliban, taking advantage of the power struggles among bitterly

divided militias in Kabul, consolidated themselves into an effective

political movement led by clerics and in 1996 seized power in Kabul. A

part of their success also lay in the fact that initially Afghans,

especially Pashtuns who make up the majority of the country, were

reluctant to take up the gun against clerics.

Now, in the renewed guerrilla war against foreign troops, it is the

clerics who are calling the shots. For instance, Hafiz Rahim is the

most respected cleric in the Kandahar region, and he commands all

military operations from the sanctuary of the mountainous terrain.

The US forces have employed maximum air support and advanced

technology in an attempt to curtail attacks, but without the help of

local Afghan forces they are unable to track down Hafiz Rahim, who to

date has targeted US convoys scores of times. The United States has

admitted a few deaths, while the Taliban claim they have killed many

more than the official numbers state. For funds, the Taliban use money

looted from the central bank before they abandoned Kabul, estimated in

excess of US$110 million, in addition to money received from Osama bin

Laden's al-Qaeda.

At the same time, famed warlord Gulbbudin Hekmatyar has joined the

resistance after returning from exile in Iran. His Hezb-i-Islami

Afghanistan (HIA) is the most organized force in Afghanistan, and its

participation has added real muscle to the resistance. Many top slots

in the Kabul administration are occupied by former HIA members who,

although they were once anti-Taliban, are loyal to the Islamic cause

and anti-US. Also, several provincial governors and top officials are

former HIA commanders. They are suspect in the eyes of the Americans,

but because of their huge political clout it is impossible to remove

them.

With this groundswell of support - even if in places it is only

passive - and with Kabul's influence restricted to the capital, the

Americans and their allies will remain vulnerable targets, let alone

be in a position to restore any form of law and order. It is in

situations like this, argue most experts on Afghanistan, that

traditionally insurrections begin in the Afghan army against foreign

administrators.

This is not the end of the problems. More than 2 million Afghan

refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees, have returned to Afghanistan from countries all over the

world, including India, Russia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and

Central Asian countries. Many of them belonged to communist factions

during and after the Soviet invasion, while a number of their

counterparts remained and now hold positions in Kabul.

At present, Kabul is divided into two main factions. The first is

pro-US, which is represented by the US and allied troops and those

loyal to President Hamid Karzai. The second is pro-Russian and

pro-Iranian, represented by Defense Minister General Qasim Fahim and

his Northern Alliance forces. Although the camps are cooperating at

present, they are silently building their support bases to make a grab

for full power once the present interim administration runs its

course, a process that is due to begin in October with a loya jirga

(grand council).

In this respect, every returned or returning former "communist

comrade" is important, for should the Northern Alliance faction

develop sufficient critical mass, it would come as no surprise if its

leaders openly forged an alliance with the resistance movement.

(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please

contact content at atimes.com for information on our sales and

syndication policies.)

Jun 14, 2003

Copyright 2003, Asia Times Online, 4305 Far East Finance Centre, 16

Harcourt Rd, Central, Hong Kong



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