http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EF14Ag01.html
[But having read it, I think the whole thing is worth posting. This fellow gives the appearance of knowing about what he's about, and if his picture of the future comes true, whoa. The last sentence is a doozy. Does anybody know his stuff from elsewhere?]
Saturday, June 14, 2003
Asia Times (Hong Kong)
Central Asia
US turns to the Taliban
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI - Such is the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan,
compounded by the return to the country of a large number of former
Afghan communist refugees, that United States and Pakistani
intelligence officials have met with Taliban leaders in an effort to
devise a political solution to prevent the country from being further
ripped apart.
According to a Pakistani jihadi leader who played a role in setting up
the communication, the meeting took place recently between
representatives of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the
US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Taliban leaders at the Pakistan
Air Force base of Samungli, near Quetta.
The source told Asia Times Online that four conditions were put to the
Taliban before any form of reconciliation can take place that could
potentially lead to them having a role in the Kabul government, whose
present authority is in essence limited to the capital:
Mullah Omar must be removed as supreme leader of the Taliban.
All Pakistani, Arab and other foreign fighters currently engaged in
operations against international troops in Afghanistan must be thrown
out of the country.
Any US or allied soldiers held captive must be released.
Afghans currently living abroad, notably in the United States and
England, must be given a part in the government - through being
allowed to contest elections - even though many do not even speak
their mother tongue, such as Dari or Pashtu.
Apparently, the Taliban refused the first condition point blank, but
showed some flexibility on the other terms. As such, this first
preliminary contact made little headway. It is not known whether there
will be further meetings, but given the fact that the reason for
staging the talks in the first place remains unchanged, more contact
can be expected.
The channels for the contact have been set up by Taliban who defected
when the government collapsed in Kabul, and fled to Pakistan, where
they were sheltered in ISI safe houses. Now these defectors, working
with Pakistani jihadis who know how to approach the Taliban
leadership, are acting as go-betweens.
The backdrop to the first meeting is an ever-increasing escalation in
the guerrilla war being waged against foreign troops in Afghanistan.
Small hit-and-run attacks are a daily feature in most parts of the
country, while face-to-face skirmishes are common in the former
Taliban stronghold around Kandahar in the south.
According to people familiar with Afghan resistance movements, the one
that has emerged over the past year and a half since the fall of the
Taliban is about four times as strong as the movement that opposed
Soviet invaders for nearly a decade starting in 1979.
The key reason for this is that the previous Taliban government -
which is dispersed almost intact in the country after capitulating to
advancing Northern Alliance forces without a fight - is backed by the
most powerful force in Afghanistan: clerics and religious students.
For centuries, these people were the most respected segment of Afghan
society, and before 1979 they never participated in politics. On the
contrary, their role was one of reconciliation in conflicts. During
the Afghan resistance movement against the USSR, things changed, and
clerics threw their weight behind the mujahideen struggle, but, with a
few exceptions, such as Maulana Yunus Khalis, they were not in
command.
With the withdrawal of the Soviets and the emergence of the Taliban in
the early 1990s, though, the situation once again changed. The
Taliban, taking advantage of the power struggles among bitterly
divided militias in Kabul, consolidated themselves into an effective
political movement led by clerics and in 1996 seized power in Kabul. A
part of their success also lay in the fact that initially Afghans,
especially Pashtuns who make up the majority of the country, were
reluctant to take up the gun against clerics.
Now, in the renewed guerrilla war against foreign troops, it is the
clerics who are calling the shots. For instance, Hafiz Rahim is the
most respected cleric in the Kandahar region, and he commands all
military operations from the sanctuary of the mountainous terrain.
The US forces have employed maximum air support and advanced
technology in an attempt to curtail attacks, but without the help of
local Afghan forces they are unable to track down Hafiz Rahim, who to
date has targeted US convoys scores of times. The United States has
admitted a few deaths, while the Taliban claim they have killed many
more than the official numbers state. For funds, the Taliban use money
looted from the central bank before they abandoned Kabul, estimated in
excess of US$110 million, in addition to money received from Osama bin
Laden's al-Qaeda.
At the same time, famed warlord Gulbbudin Hekmatyar has joined the
resistance after returning from exile in Iran. His Hezb-i-Islami
Afghanistan (HIA) is the most organized force in Afghanistan, and its
participation has added real muscle to the resistance. Many top slots
in the Kabul administration are occupied by former HIA members who,
although they were once anti-Taliban, are loyal to the Islamic cause
and anti-US. Also, several provincial governors and top officials are
former HIA commanders. They are suspect in the eyes of the Americans,
but because of their huge political clout it is impossible to remove
them.
With this groundswell of support - even if in places it is only
passive - and with Kabul's influence restricted to the capital, the
Americans and their allies will remain vulnerable targets, let alone
be in a position to restore any form of law and order. It is in
situations like this, argue most experts on Afghanistan, that
traditionally insurrections begin in the Afghan army against foreign
administrators.
This is not the end of the problems. More than 2 million Afghan
refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, have returned to Afghanistan from countries all over the
world, including India, Russia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and
Central Asian countries. Many of them belonged to communist factions
during and after the Soviet invasion, while a number of their
counterparts remained and now hold positions in Kabul.
At present, Kabul is divided into two main factions. The first is
pro-US, which is represented by the US and allied troops and those
loyal to President Hamid Karzai. The second is pro-Russian and
pro-Iranian, represented by Defense Minister General Qasim Fahim and
his Northern Alliance forces. Although the camps are cooperating at
present, they are silently building their support bases to make a grab
for full power once the present interim administration runs its
course, a process that is due to begin in October with a loya jirga
(grand council).
In this respect, every returned or returning former "communist
comrade" is important, for should the Northern Alliance faction
develop sufficient critical mass, it would come as no surprise if its
leaders openly forged an alliance with the resistance movement.
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Jun 14, 2003
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