"I tell you the truth so I can lie to you later." (Military advocate for using deceptive inforwar tactics with the press, speaking at an information warfare conference)
As I said, it's the truth. I'm not saying it's NOT the truth. So, there's no need to prove it is the truth. What my objection was was this: you're reading it as if it "leaked" out, as if you're getting a glimpse of something "real" behind the frog of war [tm].
In one of your articles in the Washpost, for instance, the reporter quotes soliders a couple of times. A solider is not allowed to talk to a reporter. He's is strictly forbidden to do so, even if he's currently stationed in Guam. She can only do so if she's allowed by Public Affairs. To speak to a reporter about conditions on the battlefood and lack of food or whatever would be revealing sensitive information that jeopardizes them.
So, that reporter spoke to a soldier whose words were approved by a minder.
It's the truth: truth for a reason. I'm not saying its deception. In fact, deception works best when it's based on truth. As you know, you just provided a good example of it last week when you did a soc of the media analysis.
> > Of course, my position--my reading of the war party faction is that they
> > expected and needed this war to be a little more tough than "normal."
>
>I think I disagree with you here. If that were the case then they wouldn't
>have been presenting this as a 'cakewalk' from the beginning. They would
>have been emphasizing the difficulties in their PR before the attack. I
>can't see how it would be to the advantage of anyone in the "war party
>faction" to portray themselves as having been blindsided by the wily Saddam.
You have to see it from their point of view, not from your's. :)
They don't actually feel they've been blindsided by Saddam. Remember, the hullaballoo about Iraq falling only came out _after_ they thought they might have nailed Saddam. As far as I know, the Admin has _never_ said it'd be a cakewalk. Never.
In the war parties papers, in fact, they indicate something else entirely, before 9.11 Wolfowitz, for instance, talks about sealing off the South, using it as a staging ground for cultivating an uprising, and then taking out Saddam. Only then, would they get Russia and France to come around, to wit:
<quote> It is eminently possible for a country that possesses the overwhelming power that the United States has in the Gulf. The heart of such action would be to create a liberated zone in Southern Iraq comparable to what the United States and its partners did so successfully in the North in 1991. Establishing a safe protected zone in the South, where opposition to Saddam could rally and organize, would make it possible:
• For a provisional government of free Iraq to organize, begin to gain international recognition and begin to publicize a political program for the future of Iraq;
• For that provisional government to control the largest oil field in Iraq and make available to it, under some kind of appropriate international supervision, enormous financial resources for political, humanitarian and eventually military purposes;
• Provide a safe area to which Iraqi army units could rally in opposition to Saddam, leading to the liberation of more and more of the country and the unraveling of the regime.
This would be a formidable undertaking, and certainly not one which will work if we insist on maintaining the unity of the UN Security Council. But once it began it would begin to change the calculations of Saddam’s opponents and supporters -- both inside and outside the country -- in decisive ways. One Arab official in the Gulf told me that the effect inside Iraq of such a strategy would be “devastating” to Saddam. But the effect outside would be powerful as well. Our friends in the Gulf, who fear Saddam but who also fear ineffective American action against him, would see that this is a very different U.S. policy. And Saddam’s supporters in the Security Council -- in particular France and Russia -- would suddenly see a different prospect before them. Instead of lucrative oil production contracts with the Saddam Hussein regime, they would now have to calculate the economic and commercial opportunities that would come from ingratiating themselves with the future government of Iraq.
</quote>
None of the above would entail a quick strategy, as you can see.
So, the "evidence" we think we see of some sort of surprise to these guys wasn't a surprise at all. Going it alone was intended. A lengthier war than the public might have hoped for--or expected given GW1--was intended.
Does this mean that these things aren't hurting them? No.
The reason why we need a war that is relatively more difficult to prosecute than other conflicts is manifold. I'll just deal with what are the two obvious reasons. First and foremost, kicking ass against an enemy that actually fights back is important because we have to establish what is most important: military dominance in the ME. The u.s. has two things it must toss in the recycling bin of history if it wants to get taken seriously in the ME:
1. that our technological superiority isn't our achilles' heel. that we can fight a ground war. that we can fight in urban warfare. The US has to wipe out any sentiment that the US has wussy military that only knows how to prosecute videogame wars.
2. this is about kicking the ass of an enemy that puts up a fight, not a big fight, just enough of a fight. this need became even more important as Shrub et al were increasingly portrayed as bullies pounding on a near defenseless Iraq. no one iwas terribly impressed with Tyson's latest fight, were they? The u.s. has to evict that perception.
One other reason for domestic and foreign consumption: Demonstrating that sanctions don't work, only military aggression does. "See, they are really crazy muthafsckers! Tthey aren't giving up. they could never be trusted to disarm. we were _right_ about their aggression--whether we find chemicals weapons or not!"
Had Iraq rolled over, the war party would have looked very bad indeed.
As for why I called 'em the "war party", that's what people call 'em. Obviously you know that this is common parlance for this faction. If I'm not mistaken, they were called this from the beginning of Shrub's tenure, at least.