On Fri, 28 Mar 2003, Bradford DeLong wrote:
> _National Journal_ reporters detailing how Rumsfeld cut the invasion
> force in half only four months ago,
And we're sticking with that. The problem is that when we started we had half of the half. And that was because Turkey didn't budge.
> and messed up not just combat power but logistics entirely as a result.
Actually the logistics were already messed up 4 months ago by dint of the fact we couldn't use Saudi Arabia to unload. Kuwait has one tenth its capacity and so takes 10 times as long. Not to mention the fact that materiel couldn't go across Europe by train and out Italy, but had to go out Rotterdam and around by boat because Austria wouldn't let us cross their territory.
The cut down to half size was agreed to by Franks because logistics was making it a necessity, not in spite of it.
> Everyone asking why the reserves--1 Cavalry and 1 Armor--are still at
> Ft. Hood and Weisbaden rather than in Kuwait (where reserves belong).
Because they couldn't be unloaded and staged. The main reason we sent the 4th Infantry -- the our newest, lightest, fastest division with the most advanced electronics -- to Turkey was because we couldn't unload both divisions in Kuwait in time for a March 15th take off date. Secondarily it was nice to have armor up there to overawe the Kurds. But as is now obvious, we didn't feel that was necessary. It was the bottlenecks that were forcing it.
The true crazyness was not to call off the war until next winter since we faced no threat. The only reason we rushed in half-assed is because we were terrified of peace. Which is nuts.
Michael