On Thu, 27 Mar 2003 15:08:16 -0500 Yoshie Furuhashi <furuhashi.1 at osu.edu> writes:
>
> I agree with Justin. Bush & Co. don't want to learn from Clausewitz
> -- fine. The Iraqis are, however, showing that they have learned
> from him, especially about "a people's war":
Also of interest is Col. Harry Summer's article "Clusewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War." http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/mar-apr/summers .html
Colonel Summers notes that during the Vietnam War, General Westmoreland attempted to understand the North Vietnamese, by reading Mao, and the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, both of whom, Westmoreland believed had influenced General Giap's strategic thinking. Summers suggests that Westmoreland was led astray in his reading, which led him to take Sun Tzu, a bit too seriously, while ignoring the Clausewitzian roots of Mao's strategic thinking, and more importantly, the Clausewitzianism of Giap. Basically, Summers thinks that Giap fought a Clausewitzian war, whereas the Americans under people like General Westmoreland did not.
Apparently, in regards to Iraq, history may be repeating itself once again, with the Iraqis attempting to wage war on Clausewitzian principles while Bush and company blithely ignore the teachings of the old Prussian officer. Christopher Bassford, a staunch Clauswitzian notes in "On War 2000: A Modest Proposal" http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Complex/Proposax.htm
"Especially since 1991, when victory in the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed much of the emotional drive behind US military education, the serious study of Clausewitz in the PME schools has fallen into decay. Because much of the existing literature on Clausewitz explains his significance within an obsolete context, few educators are able to forcefully demonstrate his relevance in the post-Cold War world. Consequently, as one commentator notes, "The US Army War College's bust of Clausewitz has been moved from a prominent, shrine-like alcove to an off-center auditorium entrance, where it has a status somewhere between that of a Hummel figurine
and a hat-rack.""
Bassford also notes that Clauswitz tends to become popular in nations that have experienced military defeats or diasates, like Germany after 1848, France after 1871, Britain, following the Boer War, and the US in the wake of Vietnam.
Jim F.
>
> ***** Carl von Clausewitz, _On War_, Book VI "Defense," Chapter
> XXVI "Arming the Nation"
>
> A PEOPLE'S war...has its advocates and its opponents: the latter
> either considering it in a political sense as a revolutionary means,
> a state of anarchy declared lawful, which is as dangerous as a
> foreign enemy to social order at home; or on military grounds,
> conceiving that the result is not commensurate with the expenditure
> of the nation's strength....[W]ith regard to the latter point, we
> must observe that a people's war in general is to be regarded as a
> consequence of the outburst which the military element in our day
> has
> made through its old formal limits; as an expansion and
> strengthening
> of the whole fermentation-process which we call war. The requisition
> system, the immense increase in the size of armies by means of that
> system, and the general liability to military service, the utilizing
> militia, are all things which lie in the same direction, if we make
> the limited military system of former days our starting point; and
> the levée en masse, or arming of the people, now lies also in the
> same direction....In the generality of cases, the people who make
> judicious use of this means, will gain a
> proportionate superiority over those who despise its use....One
> essential part that is the moral element, is not called into
> existence until this kind of employment for it arises.
>
> [W]hat is the effect which such a resistance [i.e. "the resistance
> which the whole nation in arms is capable of making] can produce?
> What are its conditions, and how is it to be used?
>
> It follows from the very nature of the thing that defensive means
> thus widely dispersed, are not suited to great blows requiring
> concentrated action in time and space. Its operation, like the
> process of evaporation in physical nature, is according to the
> surface. The greater that surface and the greater the contact with
> the enemy's army, consequently the more that army spreads itself
> out,
> so much the greater will be the effects of arming the nation. Like a
> slow gradual heat, it destroys the foundations of the enemy's army.
> As it requires time to produce its effects, therefore whilst the
> hostile elements are working on each other, there is a state of
> tension which either gradually wears out if the people's war is
> extinguished at some points, and burns slowly away at others, or
> leads to a crisis, if the flames of this general conflagration
> envelop the enemy's army, and compel it to evacuate the country to
> save itself from utter destruction. In order that this result should
> be produced by a national war alone, we must suppose either a
> surface-extent of the dominions invaded, exceeding that of any
> country in Europe, except Russia, or suppose a disproportion between
> the strength of the invading army and the extent of the country,
> such
> as never occurs in reality. Therefore, to avoid following a phantom,
> we must imagine a people-war always in combination, with a war
> carried on by a regular army, and both carried on according to a
> plan
> embracing the operations of the whole.
>
> The conditions under which alone the people's war can become
> effective are the following --
>
> 1. That the war is carried on in the heart of the country.
>
> 2. That it cannot be decided by a single catastrophe.
>
> 3. That the theatre of war embraces a considerable extent of country.
>
> 4. That the national character is favourable to the measure.
>
> 5. That the country is of a broken and difficult nature, either from
> being mountainous, or by reason of woods and marshes, or from the
> peculiar mode of cultivation in use.
>
> Whether the population is dense or otherwise, is of little
> consequence, as there is less likelihood of a want of men than of
> anything else. Whether the inhabitants are rich or poor is also a
> point by no means decisive, at least it should not be; but it must
> be
> admitted that a poor population accustomed to hard work and
> privations usually shows itself more vigorous and better suited for
> war.
>
> One peculiarity of country which greatly favors the action of war
> carried on by the people, is the scattered sites of the dwellings of
> the country people...The country is thus more intersected and
> covered; the roads are worse, although more numerous; the lodgement
> of troops is attended with endless difficulties, but especially that
> peculiarity repeats itself on a small scale, which a people-war
> possesses on a great scale, namely that the principle of resistance
> exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangible....
>
> National levies and armed peasantry cannot and should not be
> employed
> against the main body of the enemy's army, or even against any
> considerable corps of the same, they must not attempt to crack the
> nut, they must only gnaw on the surface and the borders. They should
> rise in the provinces situated at one of the sides of the theatre of
> war, and in which the assailant does not appear in force, in order
> to
> withdraw these provinces entirely from his influence. Where no enemy
> is to be found, there is no want of courage to oppose him, and at
> the
> example thus given, the mass of the neighboring population gradually
> takes fire. Thus the fire spreads as it does in heather, and
> reaching
> at last that part of the surface of the soil on which the aggressor
> is based, it seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the
> vital thread by which his existence is supported. For although we
> entertain no exaggerated ideas of the omnipotence of a people's war,
> such as that it is an inexhaustible, unconquerable element, over
> which the mere force of an army has as little control as the human
> will has over the wind or the rain; in short, although our opinion
> is
> not founded on flowery ephemeral literature, still we must admit
> that
> armed peasants are not to be driven before us in the same way as a
> body of soldiers who keep together like a herd of cattle, and
> usually
> follow their noses. Armed peasants, on the contrary, when broken,
> disperse in all directions, for which no formal plan is required;
> through this circumstance, the march of every small body of troops
> in
> a mountainous, thickly wooded, or even broken country, becomes a
> service of a very dangerous character, for at any moment a combat
> may
> arise on the march; if in point of fact no armed bodies have even
> been seen for some time, yet the same peasants already driven off by
> the head of a column, may at any hour make their appearance in its
> rear. If it is an object to destroy roads or to block up a defile;
> the means which outposts or detachments from an army can apply to
> that purpose, bear about the same relation to those furnished by a
> body of insurgent peasants, as the action of an automaton does to
> that of a human being. The enemy has no other means to oppose to the
> action of national levies except that of detaching numerous parties
> to furnish escorts for convoys to occupy military stations, defiles,
> bridges, etc. In proportion as the first efforts of the national
> levies are small, so the detachments sent out will be weak in
> numbers, from the repugnance to a great dispersion of forces; it is
> on these weak bodies that the fire of the national war usually first
> properly kindles itself, they are overpowered by numbers at some
> points, courage rises, the love of fighting gains strength, and the
> intensity of this struggle increases until the crisis approaches
> which is to decide the issue.
>
> According to our idea of a people's war, it should, like a kind of
> nebulous vapoury essence, never condense into a solid body;
> otherwise
> the enemy sends an adequate force against this core, crushes it, and
> makes a great many prisoners; their courage sinks; every one thinks
> the main question is decided, any further effort useless, and the
> arms fall from the hands of the people. Still, however, on the other
> hand, it is necessary that this mist should collect at some points
> into denser masses, and form threatening clouds from which now and
> again a formidable flash of lightning may burst forth. These points
> are chiefly on the flanks of the enemy's theatre of war, as already
> observed. There the armament of the people should be organised into
> greater and more systematic bodies, supported by a small force of
> regular troops, so as to give it the appearance of a regular force
> and fit it to venture upon enterprises on a larger scale. From these
> points, the irregular character in the organisation of these bodies
> should diminish in proportion as they are to be employed more in the
> direction of the rear of the enemy, where he is exposed to their
> hardest blows. These better organised masses, are for the purpose of
> falling upon the larger garrisons which the enemy leaves behind him.
> Besides, they serve to create a feeling of uneasiness and dread, and
> increase the moral impression of the whole, without them the total
> action would be wanting in force, and the situation of the enemy
> upon
> the whole would not be made sufficiently uncomfortable.
>
> The easiest way for a general to produce this more effective form of
> a national armament, is to support the movement by small detachments
> sent from the army. Without the support of a few regular troops as
> an
> encouragement, the inhabitants generally want an impulse, and the
> confidence to take up arms. The stronger these detachments are, the
> greater will be their power of attraction, the greater will be the
> avalanche which is to fall down. But this has its limits; partly,
> first, because it would be detrimental to the army to cut it up into
> detachments, for this secondary object to dissolve it, as it were,
> into a body of irregulars, and form with it in all directions a weak
> defensive line, by which we may be sure both the regular army and
> national levies alike would become completely ruined; partly,
> secondly, because experience seems to tell us that when there are
> too
> many regular troops in a district, the people-war loses in vigour
> and
> efficacy; the causes of this are in the first place, that too many
> of
> the enemy's troops are thus drawn into the district, and, in the
> second place, that the inhabitants then rely on their own regular
> troops, and, thirdly, because the presence of such large bodies of
> troops makes too great demands on the powers of the people in other
> ways, that is, in providing quarters, transport, contributions,
> etc.,
> etc.
>
> Another means of preventing any serious reaction on the part of the
> enemy against this popular movement constitutes, at the same time, a
> leading principle in the method of using such levies; this is, that
> as a rule, with this great strategic means of defence, a tactical
> defence should seldom or ever take place. The character of a combat
> with national levies is the same as that of all combats of masses of
> troops of an inferior quality, great impetuosity and fiery ardour at
> the commencement, but little coolness or tenacity if the combat is
> prolonged. Further, the defeat and dispersion of a body of national
> levies is of no material consequence, as they lay their account with
> that, but a body of this description must not be broken up by losses
> in killed, wounded, and prisoners; a defeat of that kind would soon
> cool their ardour. But both these peculiarities are entirely opposed
> to the nature of a tactical defensive. In the defensive combat a
> persistent slow systematic action is required, and great risks must
> be run; a mere attempt, from which we can desist as soon as we
> please, can never lead to results in the defensive. If, therefore,
> the national levies are entrusted with the defence of any particular
> portion of territory, care must be taken that the measure does not
> lead to a regular great defensive combat; for if the circumstances
> were ever so favourable to them, they would be sure to be defeated.
> They may, and should, therefore, defend the approaches to mountains,
> dykes, over marshes, river-passages, as long as possible; but when
> once they are broken, they should rather disperse, and continue
> their
> defence by sudden attacks, than concentrate and allow themselves to
> be shut up in some narrow last refuge in a regular defensive
> position. However brave a nation may be, however warlike its habits,
> however intense its hatred of the enemy, however favourable the
> nature of the country, it is an undeniable fact that a people's war
> cannot be kept up in an atmosphere too full of danger. If,
> therefore,
> its combustible material is to be fanned by any means into a
> considerable flame it must be at remote points where there is more
> air, and where it cannot be extinguished by one great blow....
>
> However decisive, therefore, the overthrow may be which is
> experienced by a State, still by a retreat of the army into the
> interior, the efficacy of its fortresses and an arming of the people
> may be brought into use. In connection with this it is advantageous
> if the flank of the principal theatre of war is fenced in by
> mountains, or otherwise very difficult tracts of country, which
> stand
> forth as bastions, the strategic enfilade of which is to check the
> enemy's progress.
>
> If the victorious enemy is engaged in siege works, if he has left
> strong garrisons behind him everywhere to secure his communications,
> or detached corps to make himself elbow-room, and to keep the
> adjacent provinces in subjection, if he is already weakened by his
> various losses in active means and material of war, then the moment
> is arrived when the defensive army should again enter the lists, and
> by a well-directed blow make the assailant stagger in his
> disadvantageous position.
>
> <http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/On_War/BK6ch26.html> *****
> --
> Yoshie
>
> * Calendar of Events in Columbus:
> <http://www.osu.edu/students/sif/calendar.html>
> * Student International Forum: <http://www.osu.edu/students/sif/>
> * Committee for Justice in Palestine: <http://www.osudivest.org/>
> * Al-Awda-Ohio: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Al-Awda-Ohio>
> * Solidarity: <http://solidarity.igc.org/>
>
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