Russia: Sociological Survey Shows Increase in Xenophobia Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian 14 Oct 03
[Report by Emil Abramovich Pain, head of the Center for Study of Xenophobia of the RAN [Russian Academy of Sciences] Institute of Sociology: "Why Xenophobia Has Gotten Younger"--taken from html version of source provided by ISP.]
WHY XENOPHOBIA HAS GOTTEN YOUNGER
On the scope and mechanisms of formation of ethnic prejudices
[caption to photo (not given here)]: To the mass consciousness, Azerbaijanis are those who have seized control of all the markets.
The unprecedented growth of ethnophobia in Russia is a topic which has not been overlooked. However, as always, a new phenomenon becomes overgrown with rumors, and a large number of hasty studies emerge, which often distort the real situation, and mainly--which make it difficult to understand the essence of the phenomenon.
We may judge the real scope of the xenophobia and certain regularities of the dynamics of this process from the materials of 12-year sociological monitoring performed by the VTsIOM [All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion] (1990-2002), and primarily by the answers to the following question: "On the whole, what is your attitude toward people of the following nationalities...?". The sum of answers such as "with dislike and irritation," and "with fear, mistrust," allow us to determine the hierarchy of negative appraisals by Russians in regard to representatives of various nationalities.
The graph presented here is based on the materials of the report by L. D. Gudkov, "Dynamics of Ethnophobias in Russia in the Past Decade," at the conference entitled, "National Minorities in the Russian Federation" (Moscow, June 2003). The columns in the graph indicate the fluctuations in negative judgments about a number of ethnic communities. Indicated at the bottom, under the name of the nationality, are the intervals or steps of these fluctuations in percent of the number of persons surveyed.
Title of Graphic: Attitude of "Dislike" and "Fear and Mistrust" Toward the Following Nationalities (in percent of respondents)
Categories:
1. Chechens
2. Gypsies
3. Azerbaijanis
4. Jews
5. Estonians
6. Americans
7. Germans
8. Arabs
9. Ukrainians
On the basis of these materials, I have isolated three groups of nationalities by level of negative attitude of residents of Russia towards them--and primarily of Russians, who comprised 85 percent of those surveyed.
"Completely foreign." This group was comprised of people in regard to whom the relative share of negative appraisals during the 12 years of observations did not drop below 40 percent of the respondents. Extreme negativism during all these years was manifested only toward the Chechens and the Gypsies. These are the only groups toward whom over half of the respondents exhibited a negative attitude. At the same time, such an attitude is recorded toward Chechens as of 1995, and toward Gypsies--as of 2002. The next in level of negative perception were the Azerbaijanis (relative share of negative appraisals in regard to them did not drop below 30 percent, and in 1998 it jumped to 48 percent of the number of respondents). Later, the negative attitude declines, but the appraisals of Armenians and Georgians fluctuate within the noted interval (relative share of negative appraisals did not dip below 27 percent, and in individual years it reached up to 45 percent of the number of respondents). Finally, the peoples of Central Asia round out this group, with 20-22 percent of the respondents giving them negative appraisals.
"Foreign." The second group includes ethnic communities in relation to which the negative appraisals fluctuated from 15 to 20 percent. Moderate negativism was exhibited toward Jews and Estonians. The relative share of their negative appraisals comprised from 13 to 17 percent, and once--in 1997--it increased to 20 percent in regard to Estonians. Negative appraisals of Tatars and Bashkirs fluctuated from 12 to 15 percent, and only in 1999 did their share increase to 18 percent in regard to the Tatars.
In 2002, Americans were also included in this group, but only by strictly formal indicators. At that time, the relative share of negative appraisals comprised 17 percent, although up until that time the attitude toward them was the same as toward peoples included in the next, third, group. It included nationalities in regard to which the negative appraisals did not exceed 15 percent. As it turned out, such comparatively weak negativism is related to other, entirely different, types of ethnic communities.
"Practically our own." These are groups, which are ethnically related to Russians--as for example Ukrainians. The negative appraisals toward them designate the lowest (weakest) threshold values of ethnophobia.
"Virtual." These are groups whom the overwhelming majority of Russians have never encountered, and appraise them only on the basis of information gleaned from the mass media. Thus, the upsurge in negative appraisals of Arabs to 12 percent in 2002, which seems unexpected at first glance (despite the fact that there were generally no negative appraisals of this group in the sociological monitoring in previous years), is undoubtedly explained by the informational reaction to the events of 11 September and the increased mention of this group in the mass media in connection with terrorism throughout the world, including also in Chechnya.
In regard to these groups, we may speak of a combination of two interrelated factors in formation of ethnophobias: On one hand, we may speak about a real cultural distance--that is, about the degree of actual difference in external indicators, behavior, culture, and lifestyle of the ethnic communities. And on the other--about construed information. Both factors mutually intensify each other.
The role of reports by the press, which are often distorted upon subsequent translation in public opinion, is especially great in regard to the groups which are comparatively new to this territory. For example, the Azerbaijanis are today accused of having seized control of all the city markets, jacking up prices, and driving out "outside" traders, etc. However, when the ordinary Russian consumer comes to the market, he can hardly distinguish the Azerbaijani from representatives of other Caucasian peoples. He gets the information about the "guests seizing control" of the markets from the mass media, which are simply not interested in the fact that the overwhelming majority of the markets in the country are nevertheless controlled by representatives of the ethnic majority. The interest of the press in Russian market owners awakens only in certain especially "piquant" situations, as for example those in Khabarovsk, where the main owner of the city market (its director), Boris Suslov, is a former first secretary of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] gorkom [municipal committee].
Meanwhile, the process of replacement of "Caucasus natives" by Russians at most markets in Russia has taken on an irreversible character. On one hand, Russian business (legal, as well as illegal) is ever more edging the Caucasus natives out from the market with the apparent and non-apparent cooperation of the local authorities. On the other hand, the Caucasian peoples themselves have begun withdrawing into the shadows, and instead put up representatives of the ethnic majority to act as the sellers. This process has especially intensified after the series of pogroms [raids] staged against Caucasus natives on the Russian markets. Even more important is the fact that, in the past decade, an entire generation of Russian people has grown up in Russia for whom trade at the bazaar is an entirely customary and even prestigious business. Therefore, the process of consistent reduction in the role of the ethnic minorities is taking place constantly, but as yet it has not influenced the dynamics of xenophobia.
A significant role in formation of ethnic phobias and feelings of caution toward migrants, fears and disappointments, is played by the manifestations of social misfortune. Therefore, as noted in the aforementioned report of L. D. Gudkov, despite the overall extremely high level of suspicion and negative attitude toward foreign ethnic migrants, such an attitude is more strongly expressed in the small and medium-sized cities than in the large ones. Only one group of respondents--entrepreneurs--demonstrated a significantly lesser level of malevolence toward foreign ethnic migrants, even though 50 percent of the respondents in this group stated that their attitude toward migrants is "rather negative" and "sharply negative." However, in the most numerous social groups, such as blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and pensioners, the indicators of xenophobia exceed 65 percent. The "leading" group by level of ethnic negativism also included young people who were students. This was an unexpected result.
It is considered practically axiomatic among researchers of ethnophobias that young people are less inclined toward xenophobia, than people of elderly age. This was the case in Russia even 5-6 years ago, although today the situation has changed. According to the latest data of VTsIOM, the following responses were given to the question, "In your opinion, do people of non-Russian nationalities living in Russia pose a threat to Russia's security today?": 58.5 percent of respondents aged 55 years or older said they posed a "big threat" or "somewhat of a threat," as did 53.6 percent of persons in the 40-54 age group, 52.3 percent of those in the 25-39 age group, and 58.7 percent of those aged 18 to 24.
Thus, the former tendency toward growth in the level of ethnophobia with increased age of the respondents is observed today. However, this is only if we begin the countdown from the 25-39 year age group--that is, those who (in their majority) were under 24 years of age in the early 90's. However, today's young people demonstrate an even greater level of ethnophobia than representatives of the most elderly of the groups represented in the table. This cannot be explained simply by the greater excitability of young people, because such a peculiarity of age-related psychology was manifested even before. However, in the early 90's, [this group] exhibited the greatest level of ethnic tolerance, while today is expresses the greatest ethnic phobias and fears.
The question naturally arises: Why is it specifically today that there are more fears, although the country's socio-economic indicators have not become worse as compared with the revolutionary period? I think that this is associated to considerable degree with the fact that xenophobia itself is becoming a systemic factor. Previously, social problems were politicized. That is, the blame for them was placed on the authorities and on the oligarchs who stood behind them. But now, problems are ever more often "ethnicized," and the responsibility is shifted to "foreign" ethnic communities.
If we speak of the sentiments of the ethnic majority, we see that it is ethno-demographic processes that have a traumatizing effect on it. The process of decline in the relative share of Russians on the background of rapid rates of growth of ethnic communities, which are often united under the common name of "Islamic peoples" (or, more precisely, "peoples historically associated with Islamic tradition"), is painfully perceived. This process has been ongoing for over four decades now, but it has become most notable in recent years. When the ethnic majority senses the threat of loss of its status or actually loses it on certain territories, this, as a rule, intensifies the positions of ethnic nationalism. The greatest growth of Russian nationalism is observed in the southern regions of Russia, where processes of change in the ratio between the majority and the minority are most apparent.
The Chechen war, which itself is a result of the incomplete and inconsistent reform of federal relations and the vagueness of ethnic policy, has had a serious effect on the growth of xenophobia in Russia, and continues to do so to this day. The two military campaigns could not help but put the Chechen ethnos at the center of public opinion. At the same time, the second war began with an informational campaign organized by the state structures. According to the plan, it was aimed against the rebel fighters and terrorists in Chechnya, but, in the mass consciousness, it was easily transferred to all Chechens. By 2002, the indicator of xenophobia in regard to Chechens had reached 70 percent.
The Chechen war is a systemic factor in the life of our society, which entails many consequences. The very growth of estatism in the country and the increased hopes for a "strong hand" were largely associated with the Chechen war. The war also determined the increased influence of the generals and high-ranking officers of the army, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the security forces on the political life of the country. Sociologists call the country's political elite of Putin's times "militocratic." According to the data of O. Kryshtanovskaya, the relative share of scientists in the present-day elite has declined by 2.5 times as compared with the times of Yeltsin's rule (from 52.5 percent to 20.9 percent), while the relative share of military men increased by almost the same amount (from 11.2 percent to 25.1 percent). The history of many world countries--France in the period of the "Dreyfus case," Germany and Italy in the 20's-40's of the last century, Greece under the "black colonels"--shows that, with the increased influence of the army on political life, nationalism also increases in society.
According to certain estimates, in the two campaigns, around 1.5 million people from various regions of Russia passed through the crucible of Chechnya. These included military servicemen (career soldiers and draftees) and civilians engaged in provision of the army, the MVD, the security forces, etc. A considerable part of them was comprised of people with mental instability and high level of aggression. It is no accident that, in the Russian jails today, there is an extremely high relative share of prisoners who committed their crimes after returning from army units stationed in Chechnya.
"For most Russian people, the Chechen is no more or less than a robber, and Chechnya is a haven for gangs of thieves," stated one of the books from the end of the 20th Century. And already at that time, such views were defined by the author as ignorance. But today, this statement looks like a quote from a contemporary sociological survey. According to the data of VTsIOM, 67.2 percent of Russians are convinced that Chechens understand only the "language of force," and that efforts to talk to them "as equals" are perceived merely as weakness of the opposing side. The overwhelming majority of Russians (68 percent) is convinced that the next generation of Chechens will be even more hostile in regard to Russia than the current one. And even more of our fellow citizens (78 percent) fear the possibility of falling victim to terrorist acts on the part of Chechen rebels already in the nearest time. Such fears have become the reason for the demonization of the Chechens, to whom almost biological hatred toward Russians is being ascribed.
Ethnic phobias have high inertial stability, and may persist in the mass consciousness for a long time, even after disappearance of the real political reasons which gave rise to them. Therefore, even if it is possible to successfully resolve the Chechen crisis in time, the echo of its consequences may be rather prolonged. At the same time, xenophobia is uncontrollable in the sense that it cannot be directed only toward one ethnic community, but, as a rule, extends over a broad spectrum of "foreign peoples." It is no accident that, from 2000 through 2002, negative appraisals in relation to not only Chechens became more frequently, but also in regard to over half of the ethnic communities included in the VTsIOM survey sheet. This is not yet a tendency, but already a danger.
If fears and phobias become the leitmotif of civilian life, then this will create a background for overall destabilization of the political situation in the country.
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