> ...is done. Gove me the word and I'll send it out.
i'd much like to see it. BTW, what do you think of Stanislav's summary (pasted below) printed Tuesday? my own take - extracting the mineral rents from the "oligarchs" while they continue to be armed with nuclear weapons (remember Chubais' threats of [nuclear] civil war in early 1996) is necessarily a very cautious and patient project.
john mage
September 2. 2003 YUKOS: TWO MONTHS ON Tragedy all but forgotten By Stanislav Menshikov
Exactly two months ago, on July 2. Platon Lebedev, executive head of Menatep financial group, close partner of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and large shareholder in YUKOS oil company, was arrested on charges of embezzling the government eight years ago for an alleged $280 million. Another YUKOS executive in charge of company security was charged with double murder. Menatep and YUKOS offices were searched by the police. Khodorkovky was called in for questioning but promptly released.
Unlike another former oligarch, Mikhail Gusinsky, wanted on a similar embezzlement charge and recently arrested by the Greek police on an Interpol warrant but freed on bail by a Greek judge, Lebedev and the other YUKOS official remain in custody in Lefortovo jail. Despite protests by his lawyers, the Basmaniy regional court in Moscow just extended Lebedev's incarceration for another two months pending his trial.
Lebedev's arrest created quite a sensation at the time and was widely thought to be the start of a much wider persecution of oligarchs, including YUKOS head Khodorkovky and Sibneft owner Roman Abramovich. Word was spread that the Kremlin was about to formally reconsider the 1992-1995 privatisation, in which many former government-owned companies were bought by the new tycoons at bargain basement prices. These rumours caused panic in the stock markets, which sharply fell. The authorities were accused in the media of causing multibillion damage to the Russian economy and destroying the country's image in the eyes of international investors.
Because Khodorkovsky was also financing opposition parties, supporting reduction of the constitutional powers of the president and displaying personal ambitions to perhaps become prime-minister, the authorities were also accused of political bias and endangering democracy. The matter was brought up by the international press. The US ambassador in Moscow asked the Foreign Ministry for explanations. The British ambassador expressed concern about the possible cancellation of the BP-TNK merger decided upon in principle last spring.
In order to cool down the heat, premier Kasyanov made a series of statements to the effect that no reconsidering privatisation was being planned and that he personally objected to rough handling of prominent businessmen. But Vladimir Putin kept an ominous silence while the General Prosecutor's office chided the premier for illegally bringing pressure on officers of law.
Adding to the political temperature, an anonymous Russian high official told the foreign press that it was difficult to stop the anti-big-business campaign once it had started. Results of an authoritative opinion poll were published showing that 70 percent of the population considered the oligarchs swindlers and largely responsible for the problems in the Russian economy.
And then, suddenly, the tables seemed to turn. The media bru-ha-ha around YUKOS and the oligarchs subsided. The stock market, after reaching a low point in mid-July, started recovering and broke new records in late August overtaking the previous June peak by 2.4 percent. Igor Kostikov, chairman of the Federal Securities Commission just boasted that total securities market capitalisation has reached the all-time high of $165-168 billion, a more than threefold jump since spring 2001. when Vladimir Putin publicly complained about its underdevelopment. Lebedev in his cell saw his personal fortune increase by $33 million since the day when he was arrested. Poor solace for a prison inmate but yet some.
Turning the tide were two decisions by the Ministry for Anti-Monopoly Policy apparently taken after top clearance with the Kremlin. One was to formally approve the YUKOS-Sibneft merger significantly bolstering the economic influence of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Also approved was another mega-merger of BP's Russian interests with TNK (Tyumen Oil Company) creating the third largest Russian oil concern after YUKOS-Sibneft and LUKOIL.
These decisions go a long way in demonstrating that the mid-summer ado about purging the oligarchs and revising privatisation wholesale was a lot of nonsense. By catching Platon Lebedev red handed on an old and relatively small but unproper deal, Kremlin made its point that the oligarchs were still at its mercy because practically all of them had breached even the very uncertain laws of the early 1990s.
Putin had explained as much to Arkady Volsky, chairman of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in July when he privately suggested that the oligarchs should continue to "play by the rules" meaning non-interference in politics and sharing more with the economy, society and the fight against poverty. Volsky made that message public in August and the oligarchs seemed to agree. Plans were announced to hold a joint business-government forum in November where a new package of co-ordinated economic policy is to be discussed.
This, of course, is no capitulation by Big Business. It has yet to explicitly agree to concede most of the mineral rent to the government which is the legal owner of the oil and non-ferrous metals deposits. That is not an exorbitant price for permitting private businesses to keep the government-owned economic assets acquired for a pittance. In an election year, Putin cannot go against the expressed will of the majority and fully legalise scandalous privatisation. In any case, the oligarchs will have to pay.
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