[lbo-talk] Saudis may be mulling nuke acquisition

Grant Lee grantlee at iinet.net.au
Sat Sep 20 04:38:35 PDT 2003


Saudis may be mulling atomic acquisition

[A very interesting article from the Daily Star in Lebanon. At the end is a reference to the Saudis supposedly funding Saddam's nuke program.]

Saudis may be mlling atomic acquisition Gulf power balance prompts policy rethink

In what the Americans would no doubt consider a low blow from a longtime ally, Saudi Arabia is said to be conducting a strategic review at the highest levels that includes the possibility of getting nuclear weapons. Given the kingdom's current status as a virtual rogue state in American eyes following Sept. 11, 2001, and that the US nuclear umbrella under which it had sheltered for several decades can no longer be taken for granted, that might seem a prudent option to consider. That they are even contemplating the nuclear option is a cause for concern and underlines the depth of the insecurity felt in the kingdom. With the Iranians supposedly hell-bent on producing their own nuclear weapons sometime in the next two to five years, depending on which nightmare scenario one subscribes to, and the Israelis seeking to extend their nuclear reach into the Indian Ocean through their German-built submarines (three in service, with another three planned if budget cuts permit), the Saudis find themselves caught in the middle, without any guarantees of US support.

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It's not as though the Saudis have suddenly discovered they are in an awkward predicament. Long before Sept. 11 2001, even after the 1991 Gulf War, they had questioned just how far they could rely on the US when it came to the kingdom's security, whether US interests would be compatible. As well they might. After Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution and the fall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Saudis urged Washington to beef up security for the kingdom. Jimmy Carter sent a squadron or two of F-15 strike aircraft, then declared that they were unarmed. So when Saddam invaded Kuwait in a decade later and threatened Saudi Arabia's eastern oil fields, the center of the kingdom's economic power, the Saudis were unsure about US support. Their ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, was quoted as telling George Bush the elder's national security adviser, Brent Scrowcroft: "Frankly, we're worried. Do you guys have the guts or don't you? We don't want you to put out a hand then pull it back and leave us with this guy on our border twice as mad as he is now." The Saudis already have in place much of the infrastructure for a nuclear weapons capability ­ CSS-2 Dong Feng 3A ballistic missiles bought from China in the mid-1980s. Ironically that was because the US Congress refused to sell Riyadh F-15s and Lance surface-to-surface missiles to protect itself from Iran. The US only found out about the Chinese missiles in 1988 when spy satellites spotted the desert launch pads. Irate demands from Washington to remove the missiles were ignored by Riyadh. The rift was smoothed over soon enough after Riyadh signed the NPT, effectively pledging not to arm the missiles with nuclear warheads. But the Saudis subsequently refused to sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the UN's nuclear watchdog, as required by the treaty. The 50-60 CSS-2s the Saudis bought had been designed to carry nuclear warheads as powerful as three megatons, but Riyadh said they had been modified to carry conventional warheads containing up to 2,500 kilograms of high explosive. Still, the missiles, with a range of up to 4,000 kilometers depending on the weight of payload, could be reconfigured for nuclear arms easily enough. If the Saudis, who have doggedly refused all US demands for on-site inspections, do decide to take the nuclear option, it is more likely that they will want to replace the aging Dong Fengs with newer variants. Military analysts have long considered Saudi Arabia as most likely to take up the nuclear option in response to Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons, in large part because it can no longer place any reliance on US support in the face of Iranian intimidation. The kingdom's conventional forces ­ the state-of-the-art combat aircraft, the legions of tanks and all the other weapons they have spent billions of dollars buying from the US ­ are no match for the missiles and other systems proliferating around them, so the nuclear option could provide a deterrent.

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If the Saudis go for the nuclear option, they would be more likely to seek to buy nuclear weapons rather than pursue the lengthy process of developing a weapon-related infrastructure, as the Iranians are doing. The most obvious sources are China, which provided the CSS-2s in the first place and wants to strengthen its ties with the Saudis to ensure oil supplies for its expanding economy, and Pakistan, whose nuclear arms program the Saudis are alleged to have funded over the years. The US would move heaven and earth to prevent such sales and Pakistan, in the US camp since Sept. 11 2001, would no doubt comply. As for China, in November 2000, when Beijing signed with Washington to halt the sale of missiles and technology to countries such as Iran and Pakistan, it surprised the US by asking that Saudi Arabia be excluded. Whether Beijing would be prepared to provide Riyadh with nuclear materiel is open to question, but its track record would indicate that such a move is possible because of economic and political imperatives. Saudi Arabia has long had close ties with Pakistan; both, for instance, were staunch supporters of the Taleban in Afghanistan. High-level Saudi delegations have visited Pakistan's nuclear and ballistic facilities in recent years. In May 1999, the powerful Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan, visited a uranium enrichment plant and a facility that produces the Ghauri missile, and was briefed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan 's nuclear program. That was the first known instance of a foreign visitor being let into these maximum-security facilities. The Saudis denied Sultan's visit indicated the kingdom sought nuclear weapons, but there were suspicions Riyadh was mulling the nuclear arms option back in the 1980s. These were fueled in 1994, when a senior Saudi diplomat, Mohammed Khilewi, who sought political asylum in the US, alleged Riyadh had pumped billions of dollars into Saddam Hussein's clandestine nuclear program. He also claimed the Saudis had tried to buy nuclear research reactors from China and a US firm in 1989 under a secret effort to develop nuclear weapons.

Ed Blanche, a regular contributor to The Daily Star, has covered Middle Eastern affairs for many years and is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/20_09_03_e.asp



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