[lbo-talk] Little differences among elite parties

[Grant Lee]

[...in Indonesia of course, which country did you think I meant?]


INDONESIA: Little policy differences among elite parties

Max Lane

With only six weeks until the general election, there still seems to be very
little popular interest in it. Even professional politicians, who are very
interested, are focused on possible cross-party alliances, rather than
competitive campaigning for voters support.
Not only are elite parties not offering new or different policies, they are
not even trying new sloganeering or packaging of current ones.
It is easy enough to identify the parties, but what are their policies?
There has rarely been any opposition to the neoliberal economic policy or
conservative social legislation President Megawati Sukarnoputri has put
forward.
Megawati heads the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), along
with her husband, businessman and long-time political operator, Taufik
Kiemas. It is the largest party in the parliament, having won around 34% of
the vote in 1999.
The PDIP has a strong base among provincial businesspeople and some aspiring
national conglomerates. These figures campaign for the party among workers
and peasants in less-Islamicised areas of Indonesia, such as Java. Many of
these elite figures trace their political lineage back to the right-wing of
the Indonesian National Party (PNI). Most of the left of the PNI was killed
or imprisoned in 1965.
The Golkar party, which was former dictator Suharto's party, is the second
largest in the parliament. In 1999, most of its 23% was collected in eastern
Indonesia and some parts of Sumatra. Its current chairperson, Akbar Tanjung,
had his corruption conviction quashed by the High Court.
Golkar's support comes from big business, the bureaucracy and the big layer
of technocrats in the private sector. Many of these, especially those loyal
to Tanjung, were right-wing Islamic student activists in the 1960s and `70s.
The Golkar faction that was loyal to former president BJ Habibie now seems
to be backing General Wiranto as Golkar's presidential candidate.
A new small party on the scene is the Democratic Party. Despite no apparent
public support, it has recruited General Bambang Susilo Yudoyono, the
coordinating minister for politics and security, and is hoping to get the 3%
of the vote necessary to nominate Yudoyono for president. Yodoyono scores
high in polls among the professional and business classes in Jakarta. There
are several other new small elite pro-business parties standing in the
elections. It is impossible to assess their electoral pull.
The United Development Party (PPP), the Star and Crescent Party (PBB), the
Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) are
parties based among the stricter Muslims of the country's towns.
This base descends from the 1970s merchants of the major ports, particularly
batik merchants, whose ancestors converted to Islam from Hinduism in the
16th and 17th centuries. Their children dominated the universities after the
expulsion of most of the left-wing student population in 1965, and then came
to dominate the public service, business and the professions.
Before 1965, they were represented by one major party, the right-wing
Masyumi. Today there are at least 10 parties supported by this constituency,
those listed above the most prominent.
The PPP was developed as an instrument of the Suharto regime. It scored 11%
at the 1999 elections, and its current head Hamzah Haz is the Indonesian
vice-president. It is not clear whether it has enough support among Islamic
elites in the middle-size towns to maintain its vote.
The PBB is headed by Yusril Mahendra, formerly a Suharto speech writer, and
current minister for law and human rights. It pitches at the most
conservative Muslim clerics, and got 2% at the last election. Mahendra has
championed a new reactionary law on moral codes and sexual mores.
PAN started off as a multi-religious party, attracting some liberal
intellectuals. Under Amien Rais's leadership, it has become more identified
as an Islamic party. It scored 7% on the last elections.
The PKS is the most active of the four, with influence among Islamic
students on many university campuses and mosques in villages around Jakarta.
It combines a fundamentalist call for Islamic law with modern forms of
organisation. It has organised street protests against corruption, attended
by university students and home-working women. It has also been critical of
what it sees as excessive military influence in politics. It scored 1.36% in
the 1999 elections.
The National Awakening Party (PKB) is led by Abdurrahman Wahid, who was
president in 1999-2000. The PDIP, Golkar and the Islamic right parties
combined to dismiss him.
In an often uncomfortable combination, the PKB draws its support from
socially conservative rural Islamic clerics (who have guru-like influence
over some villagers), and the more liberal intellectuals of the Indonesian
establishment.
The PKB is associated with the Nahdatul Ulama. However, this 60-year-old
organisation of clerics is now trying to assert its own interests. It
contains both wealthy landlords and impoverished public servants and
farmers.
The PKB, which won 13% of the vote in the last election, is the party
closest to having differing policies from the government, in politics if not
economics. These include a further reduction in the political role of the
army and "reconciliation", including the restoration of rights, with former
members of the Indonesian Communist Party and their families.

http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2004/572/572p19.htm