> OK, I am little puzzled here and need some clarification. There are apparently things about which other cultures can be
> demonstrably wrong, just not moral things? So the Nazis can be wrong that the Jews are "inferior" in some nonmoral
> sense, or maybe that the Jews were a powerful group that was plotting to get them, or that there are races, or something > like that. But they were not demonstrably wrong that it is wicked to gather up large numbers of people and machine gum > them into ditches or gas them in extermination camps?
>
> And the reason there is this difference is, what, that people disagree agree about one sort of issue, the moral ones, but
> not the other sort of issue, the nonmoral ones? That is Miles' view. But that can't be right, people disagree about the
> nonmoral issues too.
I don't agree with the notion that since there's no correct standard of morality, we ought not impose our own standard (if there's no correct standard, why shouldn't we feel free to impose our own, as arbitrary as it may be?). But surely there's a better case for some sort of subjectivist view (e.g. expressivism) regarding ethics than, say, mathematics or astronomy.
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