> To assert the existence of God is not
> to state a fact within an established intellectual system but to claim
> the
> need for exploration; it is to claim that there is an unanswered
> question
> about the universe: viz., "Why is there anything instead of nothing?"
This assumes, in the first place, that this question makes sense. As far as I can see, that is highly dubious. What would a world, or a reality, in which there was absolutely nothing, look like? Is it possible? If a completely empty reality -- a reality that exists, but has nothing *in* it -- is inconceivable, then this question answers itself: there is something because it couldn't be otherwise.
Of course, this is the theist's "necessary being" (that is, God). A non-theist would agree that there is a necessary being, but it's just the sum total of what is. There is no reason to call it "God," or worship it, unless you want to go with Spinoza and call everything "God."
> Theists in the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam)
> take
> a further step. Each of the traditions asserts that that unknown God
> has
> spoken. (They differ, though not completely, on how.) Christians only
> know of God speaking because the church -- the Christian movement --
> hears
> and responds. They admit that it's not a matter of deduction but of
> faith
> -- rather like trusting someone (since we can rarely prove deductively
> that someone is trustworthy).
But if there isn't anyone there *to* trust, trusting is nonsensical. And if there's no reason to suppose that there is a God, in the sense that the Abrahamic traditions speak of him/her/it, that's the end of the story. Hence Aquinas and other rational theologians have thought that it was necessary to find rational "proofs" for at least the *existence* of God. But most Christians today (I mean the not terribly intellectual folks in the pews) take it all on faith. One has faith that there is a God, and then has faith that one can trust him/her/it. Thus the "faith" becomes nothing but a empty straw man that can be blown away by the skeptics -- unless the people of faith can shout down or eradicate them.
> In MacIntyre's view the Theses on Feuerbach mark the point where Marx
> turned
> from philosophy to politics, having stated a set of crucial problems in
> social philosophy better than anyone before him, but failing to find
> adequate philosophical solutions"
What would an adequate philosophical solution be, in his view? I think Marx just came to the conclusion that reforming society politically was more important than philosophical discussions. Hence his pronouncement about changing the world being the point, not just interpreting it in various ways. Obviously, this was a personal decision on his part. The philosophers would like to demand that he prove philosophically that changing the world was more important than doing philosophy, but his reply would be: "Stay in the classroom if you want; I'm going out into the street."
Jon Johanning // jjohanning at igc.org _____________________________ It isn’t that we believe in God, or don’t believe in God, or have suspended judgment about God, or consider that the God of theism is an inadequate symbol of our ultimate concern; it is just that we wish we didn’t have to have a view about God. It isn’t that we know that “God” is a cognitively meaningless expression, or that it has its role in a language-game other than fact-stating, or whatever. We just regret the fact that the word is used so much. — Richard Rorty