> "When, therefore, it is a question of investigating the driving powers
> which — consciously or unconsciously, and indeed very often
> unconsciously — lie behind the motives of men who act in history and
> which constitute the real ultimate driving forces of history, then it
> is not a question so much of the motives of single individuals,
> however
> eminent, as of those motives which set in motion great masses, whole
> people, and again whole classes of the people in each people; and
> this, too, not merely for an instant, like the transient flaring up of
> a straw-fire which quickly dies down, but as a lasting action
> resulting in a great historical transformation."
>
> So, is it saying that one person's own desires do not make history,
> but the group desires that the masses have in common? Like the masses
> can be seen to be programmed to have? Through advertising, religion,
> schooling etc, etc.
It's taking issue with the role Hegel assigns to "World Historical Individuals." Marx makes use of Hegel's idea of the "passions" to characterize the motives of individuals as members of classes e.g. the capitalist class.
For both Hegel and Marx, however, human consciousness is potentially rational self-consciousness and history is understood as an "educational" process through which this potential is realized. When this occurs motives will no longer be "passions." This conception of human consciousness is incompatible with the idea of it as "programmed" insofar as by this is meant the product of circumstances in the deterministic way conceived by the kind of "materialism" Marx is rejecting e.g. in the third thesis on Feuerbach.
"The History of the World begins with its general aim - the realization of the Idea of Spirit - only in an implicit form (an sich) that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History . . . is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one." (Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 25)
"That man is free by Nature is quite correct in one sense; viz., that he is so according to the Idea of Humanity; but we imply thereby that he is such only in virtue of his destiny - that he has an undeveloped power to become such; for the 'Nature' of an object is exactly synonymous with its 'Idea'. ... Freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural, does not exist as original and natural. Rather must it be first sought out and won; and that by an incalculable medial discipline of the intellectual and moral powers. ... To the Ideal of Freedom, Law and Morality are indispensably requisite; and they are in and for themselves, universal existences, objects and aims; which are discovered only by the activity of thought, separating itself from the merely sensuous, and developing itself, in opposition thereto; and which must on the other hand, be introduced into and incorporated with the originally sensuous will, and that contrarily to its natural inclination." (pp. 40-41)
"The first glance at History convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters and talents; and impresses us with the belief that such needs, passions and interests are the sole springs of action - the efficient agents in this scene of activity." ( p. 20)
"Passion, it is true, is not quite the suitable word for what I wish to express. I mean here nothing more than the human activity as resulting from private interests - special, or if you will, self-seeking designs - with this qualification, that the whole energy of will and character is devoted to their attainment; that other interests (which would in themselves constitute attractive aims) or rather all things else, are sacrificed to them. The object in question is so bound up with the man's will, that it entirely and alone determines the "hue of resolution," and is inseparable from it. It has become the very essence of his volition. ... The term 'character' likewise expresses this idiosyncrasy of Will and Intelligence. But Character comprehends all peculiarities whatever; the way in which a person conducts himself in private relations, etc., and is not limited to his idiosyncrasy in its practical and active phase. I shall, therefore, use the term 'passions'; understanding thereby the particular bent of character, as far as the peculiarities of volition are not limited to private interest, but supply the impelling and actuating force for accomplishing deeds shared in by the community at large." (pp. 23-4)
"Passions" as the effective agents of change are embodied in what Hegel calls "World-Historical Individuals" e.g Caesar and Napoleon. These individuals are not moral if by morality is meant unquestioning obedience to existing laws and morality; in fact, their actions violate and undermine these. The dissatisfaction which leads to such actions, however, arises from the inadequacy, the "unreality," of the laws and morals concerned - an inadequacy arising from their inconsistency with the "idea of humanity" - "freedom."
The purposes and vocation of "World-Historical Individuals" arise "not from the calm regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order; but from a concealed fount - one which has not attained to phenomenal, present existence - from that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the surface, which, impinging on the outer world as on a shell, bursts it in pieces, because it is another kernel than that which belonged to the shell in question." (p. 30)
Though World-Historical Individuals discover the truth of their time on their own, they are then able bring others along with them because the "idea of humanity" is "the inmost soul of all individuals; but in a state of unconsciousness which the great men in question aroused. Their fellows, therefore, follow these soul-leaders; for they feel the irresistible power of their own inner Spirit thus embodied." (pp. 30-31)
Though these passions are not fully consistent with the "idea of humanity," they are appropriate to the time. Though they had "no consciousness of the general Idea," World-Historical Individuals
"were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time - what was ripe for development. ... It was theirs to know this nascent principle; the necessary, directly sequent step in progress, which their world was to take; to make this their aim, and to expend their energy in promoting it." (p. 30)
They do not, however, have the ultimate consequences of their actions consciously in view. In spite of this, the situation is such that their actions do produce appropriate consequences. At times Hegel appears to suggest that this result is providential, an example of the "cunning of reason" in the sense that these individuals are simply the means of a real agent manipulating them. Yet he also explicitly rejects any characterization of human beings as merely means in this sense. To be adequate means for the attainment of the object of Absolute Spirit, humans have to be capable of reason and freedom and hence autonomy. The full realization of the "idea of humanity" requires that women and men use their autonomous reason to make it their own object and then set out to realize it. The attainment of full objective freedom requires the attainment of full subjective freedom. (pp. 33-34)
Ted