Washington well understands that its scheme for exercising total hegemony in the Middle East may succeed or fail based on whether it can demolish the Iraqi resistance in the next few months. The biggest asset the U.S. can deploy in this effort is history's most deadly military force. But if the "David" of some 7,000 Iraqi irregulars can force the "Goliath" of American militarism to terminate the occupation ahead of schedule, the White House will lose its most persuasive weapon in the Middle East: the fear that Uncle Sam, with his terrible swift sword, is omnipotent.
A reorganized Iraq under American economic, political and military dominion is generally intended to become the model imposed upon the Middle East, as well as a local base for future "regime-change" invasions in the region. The Bush administration expresses its strategic intentions in a different light: "We are resolved Š to turn the president's goal of a free and democratic Middle East into a reality," wrote ever-devious Secretary of State Colin Powell in a New Year's Day statement.
Washington's original occupation plan was based on the a supposition that the majority of Iraqis, who are 97% Muslim, would welcome the modern crusaders from Christendom-on-Potomac, converting their beleaguered but proud ancient society into a favored protectorate of yet another foreign empire (Britain was the last of seven empires which preceded the U.S. in dominating this remnant of Mesopotamia). In addition, many Iraqi Muslims are distraught over the pernicious influence of degrading and violent aspects of American popular culture.
The new government that was supposed to emerge from the puppet interim Iraqi Governing Council was to be hand-picked through a mechanism contrived to convey the impression that democracy was somehow involved in the process. The Pentagon planned to install its stooge, the roguish Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress exile group, as supreme leader. The CIA has a different candidate, Ayad Alawi, who heads the Iraqi National Accord exile faction ‹ but this is a problem for the Americans to solve, not the Iraqis. Once the "democratic" puppet administration took charge, the rest of the political and economic transformation of Iraq was to proceed without serious interference.
The plan degenerated soon after Washington's foreign legion triumphed over a nearly defenseless enemy. Most Iraqis, including opponents of the Hussein regime, did not welcome foreign invaders. The U.S. Army's mistreatment of civilians turned sullenness into hatred. Then the CPA bungled its postwar responsibilities. (Electrical blackouts averaging 16 hours remain a daily occurrence; gasoline is still severely rationed, disrupting transportation; the internal communications system remains a shambles; and bomb-destroyed housing will take ages to replace at the current rate of progress.) Finally came the patriotic armed resistance movement, an inevitability entirely unforeseen by the Bush administration.
The crux of the political disagreement between the Bush administration and the Shi'ites is that the former wants elections in the relatively distant future while the latter ‹ announced in a major declaration by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani ‹ seek direct popular elections in the next several months. The Shia religious leader correctly anticipates Bush's real goal is the long-term domination of Iraq. The Bush administration in fact needs more time to manipulate and bribe key political factions and to construct a "democratic" electoral framework that will still guarantee a continuing role for the United States, though probably not on the grandiose scale first fantasized in neoconservative think-tanks.
At this junction, the U.S. is preparing to transfer certain political responsibilities in July from the CPA to a provisional government that will not be elected by popular vote. A general election, under complicated rules devised by CPA proconsul Paul Bremer to further Bush's objectives, is supposed to take place in March 2005. The U.S. insists the delay is required to take a census to ensure fair elections. Iraqi officials told the U.S. in November that a census could be finished by September 2004, but they were ignored.
The Bush administration's intention to heavily influence future Iraqi politics was underscored Jan. 2 with the news that the State Department is assigning 3,000 "diplomats" ‹ a virtual colonial administration ‹ to its new embassy in Baghdad. According to Secretary of State Powell, their main task "will be helping the Iraqi people get ready for their full elections and full constitution the following year," as though the Iraqi people needed all those "diplomats" to teach them how to conduct their own affairs.
The Shi'ites expect to win an honest direct election on the basis of constituting 60-65% of the population, but they fear being outmaneuvered by the White House. They also expect the U.S. to withdraw after a democratically-elected government is finally selected, though a more flexible timetable is possible. Washington demands considerably more than a temporary extension of its lease ‹ and it also fears, despite assurances to the contrary from al-Sistani, that a Shi'ite government will establish an Islamic theocracy and, worse yet, strengthen the influence of neighboring Iran within Iraq and in the Gulf region. The most complicating factor is that the Shia may join the insurgency and doom Bush's entire expedition if thwarted in crooked elections or in its timetable for withdrawal.
This is a serious contradiction that may require the U.S. to contemplate an elaborate compromise involving "Axis-of-Evil" Iran, the only Shi'ite dominated country in the Muslim world. As we speculated some months ago, the outlines of a compromise might include Washington's support for a Shi'ite government in Baghdad in return for pledges to refrain from creating a religious regime and to circumscribe Iran's influence in Iraq. As part of a deal, the U.S. could offer not to take aggressive action against Iran, as it has threatened in the past, even if this would upset the influential right-wing faction in Israel that prefers Washington to topple the Tehran government. In exchange, Iran may be expected to compromise on nuclear issues and perhaps also limit support for anti-Israel factions in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon.
The foregoing approximates the dimensions of President Bush's election-year dilemma in Iraq, but there is no way to predict the outcome. A number of results are possible, including the fulfillment of Bush's key objectives. It is also possible that as a result of the invasion Iraq will be pushed into a civil war or even disintegration by dividing into three separate states, factors that would discombobulate the entire region. The most favorable outcome for those who oppose unjust wars and imperialism is for the Iraqi resistance and the U.S. antiwar movement to become potent enough to create sufficient reason for the American people to turn against the war before Election Day. (end)