11 June 2004
A 'sincere' approach to Kashmir
By Ayaz Amir
Speaking at what passes for a think-tank, the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad, President Musharraf has called for "sincerity" in resolving the Kashmir dispute. If the leadership on both sides was sincere a solution to this problem could be found.
Like charity, sincerity too should begin at home. And its starting point in relation to Kashmir is the abiding truth that what you fail to win on the battlefield, you cannot win at the negotiating table.
Pakistan has fought two-and-a-half wars - the half being Kargil - to wrest Kashmir from Indian control or at least to change the status quo in Kashmir.
The first fought in 1947-48 was the most advantageous from Pakistan's point of view because the one-third of Kashmir it occupies is the fruit of that.
The second in 1965 was a strategic defeat, because setting out to liberate Kashmir, the Pakistan army found itself defending Lahore and Sialkot.
The third in Kargil, General Musharraf's personal contribution to the annals of Kashmir warfare, was a predictable disaster because it lacked any clear aim.
Far from focusing attention on the need for a Kashmir solution, it put the spotlight on Pakistan's sponsorship of "cross-border terrorism". After Sep 11 a combination of American and Indian pressure compelled Gen Musharraf to give assurances about rolling up "jihad" in Kashmir.
The Line of Control is thus not a whimsical line on the map. It marks the farther-most limits of Pakistani military prowess. Beyond this line we couldn't go. There can be nothing more concrete than this.
We waged war to bring India to the negotiating table but the Dien Bien Phu our generals hoped for, never happened. Instead, our wars exposed the limits of our capability and cast a wan light on many of our cherished illusions (mostly to do with our valour and Indian weakness).
>From 1989 onwards we looked to "jihad" as a way to bleed India and unfreeze
Kashmir. India has paid a price and continues to do so. But it is no closer
to quitting Kashmir now than it was when the insurgency began.
In fact, the insurgency peaked long ago and "jihad" fatigue has set in. How does "sincerity" fit into this equation? Are we saying that India should do voluntarily, on the basis of sincerity, which we failed to make it do through the use of arms?
India wants a solution too because it can do without this festering wound. But on its terms especially when Pakistan has exhausted other options. Pleading for a solution satisfactory to all three sides - India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris - is laudable but scarcely realistic.
Without saying so explicitly, Pakistan wants the division of Kashmir along communal lines, with the Valley acceding to Pakistan or enjoying some kind of international status. A section of Kashmiri Muslims favours accession to Pakistan. But the majority probably is in favour of independence, a plague on both your houses being its motto. How do you reconcile these conflicting positions?
There is the Irish solution based on the Good Friday agreement with Northern Ireland continuing to be a separate entity but with an assembly representing both shades of Northern opinion, Unionist and Republican.
Only problem is that unlike Northern Ireland, there is no IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Kashmir, a body speaking unequivocally for all Kashmiri Muslims, whether in favour of the armed struggle or not.
In Northern Ireland the IRA led the political struggle and also commanded the gun. An indigenous organization, it acted on its own and did its own thinking. In contrast, Pakistan's intelligence agencies put their stamp on the Kashmiri freedom struggle, not allowing it to develop an autonomous character.
The result is that while the All Parties Hurriyet Conference leads the political struggle, it has no control over the gun, most of the jihadi organizations drawing sustenance from private outfits in Pakistan.
This is a repeat of our Afghan failure when Pakistan's intelligence agencies insisted on controlling the Afghan resistance, now propping up one favourite, now another. When Najib fell, there was no cohesive entity to fill the vacuum.
We have a standpoint on Kashmir and let's not abandon it. Let the Line of Control remain a temporary line and not be turned into an international frontier. We are on unassailable moral ground when we insist on the Kashmiri right of self-determination.
Let us stick to this standpoint and not say, as Gen Musharraf has on more than one occasion, that we should go beyond stated positions. While this sounds eminently reasonable, in the context of Kashmir it amounts to nullifying the UN resolutions. Once that happens, we have no leg to stand on.
But while sticking to our position, let us also realize that no Kashmir solution is going to emerge tomorrow. Anyone can beat an empty drum. It takes courage and wisdom to make the best of an imperfect situation and accept the inevitable.
Is this too tough a proposition for Pakistani minds to accept? We got used to the loss of East Pakistan with remarkable ease. East Pakistan was half of Pakistan, Kashmir never a part of us. Nor did Kashmir figure in the partition plan leading to India's independence and the birth of Pakistan, as a princely state falling in a different category.
Strange, to say the least, that whereas the loss of half our body and soul is not a "core issue", the future of Kashmir is. For too long we have been governed by the pseudo-strategic preoccupations of GHQ and ISI. We know where these can lead. Our foremost concern should be the plight of the Kashmiri people.
If India continues to trample human rights in the Valley, our voice should be with the Kashmiris. If they want independence, so be it. If they settle for a better deal within the Indian Union, we should have the heart to work for that through quiet diplomacy. But let us stop saying that Kashmir is the core issue between India and Pakistan for it is not.
While with all our expenditure of defence we are no closer to liberating Kashmir, all this talk of core issue serves as an excuse to make the military the holiest cow in the Pakistani pantheon. We should not neglect our armed forces.
No nation should. But here the issue is the militarization of Pakistan going far beyond the bounds of necessity. It is a sobering thought to realize that the military today is far bigger than when there was both West and East Pakistan to defend.
And then we bemoan the sorry state of democracy. How can a fragile plant grow under a banyan tree? Consider another question. The primary aim of the Pakistan movement, from where it all began, was to provide constitutional safeguards for Muslims in the Muslim-minority provinces who were afraid of being swamped by a Hindu majority.
Being in a majority, the Muslims of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Frontier felt threatened by no one. It is an irony of history that those most in need of protection were left behind in India, while those who didn't need any protection inherited the new state.
This is water under the bridge but given this background, don't we have a moral obligation to see that our policies don't hurt the interests of Indian Muslims?
>From the strong impression one gathers while visiting India, most Indian
Muslims are not in favour of Kashmir leaving the Indian Union. For they look
upon the division of Kashmir along communal lines as (1) a threat to Indian
secularism, after all their strongest safeguard, and (2) a diminution of
their collective strength. The invocation of sincerity should take all these
factors into account.
© The DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2004