> You're missing something. First, until recently with UES' grab of the
Georgian energy system, > there were virtually no Russian investments in
Georgia (or any other investments). Actually
> Russia subsidizes Georgia's economy at a net loss. UES is not working for
profit.
For the moment this may be true. And I'm not precluding the idea that their may be minor benefits for (some) Georgians in Russian neo-imperialism, just as there were for some British imperial subjects, in terms of investment flows etc. (If it's popular with both subject peoples _and_ imperial rivals, it's not usually called "imperialism".)
> Georgia has been on the brink of civil war for the past decade. Any civil
war in Georgia could well spread to neighboring Abkhazia,
> Dagestan, and _Chechnya_. There are three secessionist areas (not
"enclaves") in Georgia, two of which want to merge with Russia. BTW
> those "Russian" military bases on those areas are manned 90% by Georgians.
If Russia folds up those bases, the local residents will see
> that as a go-ahead to Tbilisi to use armed force.
Which would be terrible; but can't you see the irony of defending this kind of policy when Moscow does it in Chechyna and attacking it when Tbilisi does it to it's minorities? (Yes, I know there are lots of ethnic groups in Russia and Georgia, but that doesn't explain why some engage in tenacious secessionist campaigns and others do not.)
> As an aside, if there is anything I have learned from the fSU, it is that
"national determination movements" are quite often a very bad idea.
Sure. (By the same token, except for unusual cases like India, it's pretty hard to show how the ex-British colonies are more independent of foreign influence and/or are better off economically, than they were 50 years ago. However, most nationalisms seem to be such strong ideologies that they are hard to satisfy, except by (formal) political independence. As empty as that may be.)
Grant.