Khas. was the First Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of Russia when Yeltsin shelled it in 1993. He is Chechen BTW.
Yezhenedelnyi Zhurnal No. 45 November 22, 2004 RUSLAN KHASBULATOV: I FEAR SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS MOST OF ALL An interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov about the Chechnya conflict Author: Vladimir Voronov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] [Ruslan Khasbulatov: "The international community needs to be involved in resolving the Chechnya conflict. The priority is to defend the people of Chechnya from three forces: the federal troops, the guerrillas, and the armed formations of the Chechen government."]
Ruslan Khasbulatov knows about the war in Chechnya: in 1991- 93, as speaker of Russia's Supreme Soviet, he did a great deal of work on Chechnya issues; in 1994, he headed a peace-making group that aimed to depose Djokhar Dudayev without bloodshed and normalize relations between Chechnya and the federal government. Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov is now a professor at the Russian Economic Academy.
Question: The present war would not have been possible if the first war in Chechnya had not happened. But was war avoidable in 1994?
Ruslan Khasbulatov: There were too many factors involved in the first war. Firstly, I'm sure it was linked to the events of October 1993, when troops fired on the government building. So the regime decided that if such things could be done in Moscow, why not elsewhere as well? The economic situation in Russia was difficult at the time, if you recall; protests against the Kremlin were starting; there was a very powerful opposition movement. And of course, the regime counted on using the war in Chechnya to distract the public from the gathering crisis.
The second important reason is largely to do with me. On my release from the Lefortovo prison, I became the head of a peace- making group in Chechnya - by popular demand - and hundreds of thousands of people came to our rallies! So when the Kremlin saw that Khasbulatov was on the way to bringing down Dudayev peacefully, it grew afraid. Many informed sources in Moscow told me straight out: the Kremlin fears that you will come to power there. And further developments are well-known. Moscow hastily armed that Provisional Council - Avturkhanov and the rest - and threw them into battle. They were defeated, of course, but they did succeed in provoking a conflict between Chechnya and Russia.
So Yeltsin started that war out of his fear of Khasbulatov's shadow.
Question: But what influenced the decision to start the second war?
Ruslan Khasbulatov: Similar reasons apply to the second war as well, to some extent. At the time, if you recall, there were efforts to spread myths of an Arab caliphate being created in Chechnya, with a Muslim threat to the entire Caucasus and the Trans-Volga area... So this myth-making also played a role.
But I think material factors - finances and economics - did play a substantial role in that decision, of course. Modern warfare is big business and big money, after all, and controls over spending are frequently lax. Even in the first war, there were entire groups of people making money there. And they're doing the same in this war. They include military officers, civilians, secret service personnel, bureaucrats, people from the defense sector, people from the political establishment - all of them with their own specific interests: financial interests, career interests, political interests.
As many of those in the know affirm - and I agree with them - the role of provocateur was played by Anatoly Kvashnin, former chief of the General Staff. He was the one pushing the policy of a "manageable, localized armed conflict - while deliberately prolonging it. Even though everything could have been wrapped up back in 2000-01, by capturing the guerrilla leaders. But the top brass were so sure they could "manage" this conflict! And Kvashnin deliberately set out to prevent it from ending. But Putin no longer wants this war, I'm sure of that. For him, it has already served its purpose.
But it seems that Putin is no longer capable of fundamentally changing the situation. In part, the weakest link is Moscow's personnel policy in Chechnya: the emphasis on the marginalized layers of Chechen society as the closest allies of the federal government is a grave error. Moscow ought to make the people of Chechnya its allies - the most respected and authoritative representatives of the people - rather than ex-guerrillas who are despised by the people. In the process of pacification, Moscow should seek support from the intellectual layers of Chechen society - but at present these people are in the position of pariahs. These are self-evident truths, but Moscow has been stubbornly ignoring them for the past decade.
The results are also obvious. The people chosen by Moscow now as its pillars of support are incapable of doing anything for Chechnya. Don't forget that Chechnya is in ruins. A colossal amount of damage has been done - over $100-120 billion worth of damage! At least! Chechnya is in ruins. In a number of my books and articles, I have looked at the question of calculating the damage done to Chechnya, and Russia as a whole, in the course of two wars - yes, it's $100-120 billion. Don't forget that the Grozny Petrochemicals Combine, the oldest such enterprise in Russia, supplied over 60% of requirements for the Soviet Army in 1941-45; there were some large petrochemicals plants and oil refineries there, including one factory producing 100% of aviation oil and fuel for spacecraft, and so on. There was a concentration of the most complex and valuable part of a powerful petrochemicals industry - research institutes, laboratories, thousands of skilled specialists and their unique developments. All of it is gone. And none of this will ever be restored. That's what war has brought to the people of Chechnya - not to mention the tens of thousands of innocents killed. And how much is a city of 450-500,000 people worth? Calculate the value of residential buildings alone, and the figures won't seem exaggerated to you.
You know what I fear now - what people in Chechnya fear? Most of all, they fear that all those supporters of Maskhadov, Dudayev, and Basayev might return to power. Chechens come to see me and say: Russia will never win this war anyway, since it's relying on nonentities - and some day it will get sick of this, give up, and pull out by starting separate peace negotiations - and another Khasavyurt accord will be signed behind our backs. That's what the people of Chechnya fear most: that those political bankrupts who used to be in power might come back.
Question: But how could the war continue at all if the people don't support the Resistance?
Ruslan Khasbulatov: That isn't true! Is universal support necessary for one thousand or three thousand people to fight?! Or do you seriously think they really have that support?! The people of Chechnya greatly dislike both the separatist guerrillas and the federal forces.
Question: You used to say that negotiations with Aslan Maskhadov were essential.
Ruslan Khasbulatov: I've changed my mind. Before the latest round of major terrorist attacks, I argued that such talks were necessary. Now, I don't think they would serve any purpose.
Question: Why not?
Ruslan Khasbulatov: They wouldn't accomplish anything. The so-called commanders of the armed resistance aren't actually in command of anything at all. Most of the guerrilla detachments are motivated by personal vengeance - taking revenge for their burned homes and dead families. They don't take orders from Maskhadov or anyone else. So there's only one solution: internationalizing the conflict. The international community needs to be involved in resolving it. The priority is to defend the people of Chechnya from three forces: the federal troops, the guerrillas, and the armed formations of the Chechen government.
Translated by Pavel Pushkin
===== Nu, zayats, pogodi!
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