[lbo-talk] RE: ConocoPhillips, Lukoil, and the war for oil

John Bizwas bizwas at lycos.com
Tue Oct 12 04:55:21 PDT 2004


Sorry for the late response to MG's post, but I do try to read everything on the list, at least quickly, before replying to a thread that has already developed. And being away for the last 4 days, it took a bit of catching up to get to this.

Anyway, MG:


>>You would think that if the invasion of Iraq was primarily an American war for oil, with the Bush administration the instrument of US oil interests, the US occupiers would simply have invalidated the Lukoil concession and awarded it outright to Conoco. Why did the latter feel the need to move in behind Lukoil to exploit Iraq's oil in anticipation Lukoil's claim will be recognized? Similar pre-invasion concessions awarded to France's Total and other non-US companies are also expected to be honoured.>>

I think Chris D. got one key answer right away: a lot of the oil infrastructure in Iraqi is Russian, and the Halliburtons and Bechtels of the US have no idea what they are doing in Iraq (other than soaking up billions of dollars budgeted to the DoD). But I'd also like to look at the 'war for oil' question again (however tiring it's getting).

If you start with the following thought, instead of the mainstream and 'liberal' media's begged question about 'war for oil', you might arrive at a different conclusion: The war against Iraq was about bringing the world's potential number 2 supplier into the very system that Marvin seems to be writing about and around. It was about the destruction of a regime that was outside the US system, an end to that regime's ability to manipulate things like the price of oil and what currency it was traded in. There is no doubt--wow, just go back and re-read some mainstream, establishment, US government articles on Iraq from the past decade--that Iraq was always a top target--if not the major target of the US war machine (and I'd argue it was the major target, from 1998).

9-11 simply helped give more popular acquiescence to the pre-existing national security state consensus (Saddam's secular, pan-Arab Baathist state must be destroyed).


>>The Lukoil-Conoco deal seems to be another illustration that the avowed unilateralism of the Bush administration and invasion of Iraq did not reflect an effort by US capital to drive its European and other rivals from the field in an effort to attain absolute global hegemony. <<

If you want to discuss hegemony, ask yourself first who is making the decisions here and what allows them to make those decisions? I think it makes pretty good sense in looking after American interests for an American company to make headway into Russia and Iraq (and as Chris pointed out, the oil infrastructure in Iraq is largely Russian-built, and US-destroyed).

Then ask yourself who is going to profit most from a decision that enables a US company to drive both into Russian oil and Iraqi oil when the price of oil is high (or so say the wildly popular oil futures markets). The Conoco deal into Russia seems common enough I might call it a trend (US-UK oil globals moving into Russian holdings, including wherever that might take them, including Iraq).


>>Big Capital prefers international stability and negotiating the division of the spoils to wasteful and uncertain conflicts which jeopardize profits and the integrity of the system -- at home and abroad. There is much more interpenetration of competing national capitals since World Way I, and there has not been any serious intercapitalist conflict since WW II.>>

How has the really high price of oil--or the sustained speculation on it going still higher--hurt profits YET for the capitalist interests most directly behind the funding of the Bush regime? I sure don't see it. They bet on defense, the war against terror, homeland security, and infrastructure for bombed-out Iraq and are loving every minute of the Bush rule.

Nor is the rest of US capital in any habit of leading an open struggle against Republican presidencies, however much their own particular faction of capital might not agree with the priorities of a particular presidency (unless you think that voting Kerry is a rebellion--but remember, companies like Microsoft or IBM or Coca Cola are more likely to hedge their bets and place money behind both major parties).

The theory is that with the Soviet and Yugoslav systems gone, a US-dominated multilateral system simply can not last. What is so stable about oil profits linked to futures markets? What is so stable about such a hugely interventionist foreign policy linked to the needs of a handful of US federal contractors to have ever more government spending on weapons systems and 'government services'? That the Europeans are in Afghanistan keeping that sham going says they want to hedge their bets for restoration of the old 'multilateralism' (http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20041012/ap_on_re_eu/nato_defense&cid=518&ncid=716).

That the NATO Europeans aren't in Iraq says that there really is some sort of crisis in the US system, but one might also conjecture that a good old fashioned Democrat, with his ties to nationalist industry and nationalist 'labor', won't really be able to do much about that crisis. Perhaps that is the ultimate paradox of capital's globalization--that it can not be real globalization if the US's federal government (its White House, its State Dept., its security apparatuses, its military) excercise such domination of the 'system'.


>>This is why the Bush administration's reckless adventure in Iraq was out of step with influential sectors of the US ruling class and the international bourgeoisie who were (correctly) alarmed by its destabilizing effect on the world economy and the Middle East. The administration has since been forced back into line.>>

I have to disagree somewhat. Within the US and UK (and some of NATO), there was to quite an extent elite consensus and popular support of a war against Iraq. If certain capitalist interests thought it was going to bring down the price of oil, then they were naive. But I highly doubt that anyway. See the Fed and Congressional discussions in 2000-1 where everyone was worried about deflation hurting profitability, and a lot of interests linked to oil worldwide saw the free flow of Iraqi oil as a threat (e.g., letters from congressman from oilpatch states to the Clinton White House).


>>It suggests also that those who see Iraq as a template for
the future unilateral direction of US foreign policy under a bellicose Kerry or a Bush administration may be jumping to conclusions. A global economic crisis, with its epicentre in the US, could see a reversion to intercapitalist rivalry under national flags in conditions of scarcity, but that is not the current paradigm. The US interest in managing its complex relationship with emerging rival China, rather than confronting it, can be viewed the same way.>>

The analogy to Iraq being like Serbia (only with lots of oil) is far stronger. The reality of the Baathist state of Iraq was that it was a corpse that was hardly even twitching when the US attacked it. What does that tell you about what the US learned from Vietnam or Serbia? Basically, don't invade a country if it can fight back, but use any other means (including bombing) to get what you want. You seem to be more concerned with how the capitalist Europeans are reading the Bush administration, Marvin. The US elite's uncertainty over Iraq is that the Bush administration dared to go for a long-term occupation of a country without getting a puppet state together to sign treaties for that occupation. This is what kept Pops Bush, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Richard Lugar, Joe Biden, Ted Kennedy, and Colin Powell up nights, in the period fall of 2001 to spring 2003.

Now the question for a Pres. Kerry will be: should the US continue such a massive occupation of a country that clearly wants ALL US forces out, or should the US go for a quick withdrawal (which would then make the US lose face and credibility amongst its 'allies')? If Bush is elected, it's pretty clear, his administration and military would brutally try to keep the insurgency down and continue the occupation, with greater and greater loss of Iraqi life.

My own prediction for a Kerry presidency is that the DLC Dems, CentCom, Wes Clarke as Def. Sec. or Sec. of State, and the bipartisans would 'brainstorm' a military 'solution' that would most likely escalate the US 'pacification' of Iraq without providing any clear cut solution.

So perhaps those on the left who think it is the Republicans who are going to bring about a real foundational crisis are actually wrong. The current guys in power really ARE conservatives. They are doing what they think is necessary to preserve the US's domination of a multilateral system that they felt was drifting away from the US's ability to dominate it. They might see themselves as on the cutting edge of new models for investing and wielding power for US interests, but what are we talking about besides wielding power and accruing wealth for US interests?

OTOH, I think the fastest way to have the entire country of Iraq up in arms against the occupiers will be a Democratic presidency under Kerry 'staying in Iraq until the job is done'. Yes, the DLC Democrats would commit to a worse bloodbath than has already gone before. Their favorite action verb in debates is 'KILL', though when Edwards says it it sounds more like 'KEEEEL'. And the Democrats would continue to pursue the inherent paradox of 'multi-lateralism' without any real 'multi-lateralism'in sharing power with the hegemonist want-to-bes of Europe and E. Asia. The Kerry Dems might actually bring about a bigger crisis, not only in Iraq but also with the Europeans.

F

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