> Sorry for the late response to MG's post, but I do try to read everything
on the list, at least quickly, before replying to a thread that has already
developed. And being away for the last 4 days, it took a bit of catching up
to get to this.
(snip) ------------------------------- Thanks for your detailed response. John. It reminded me that, at bottom, what what we and everyone else around the world seem to be weighing is whether the bipartisan consensus around US foreign policy has fundamentally changed from multilateralism, with NATO and the UN seen as important instruments, to unilateralism, along the lines spelled out in the Project for a New American Century and the 2002 National Security Strategy document. How you answer the question, I think, largely determines your outlook on the current US election and the likely course of international relations over the next four years.
If you see the so-called "Bush doctrine" of preventive war as something more than that, as a "bipartisan doctrine", then of course it makes little sense to support Kerry over Bush since both will pursue the same foreign policy. That's why Kerry's current line on Iraq, which seems indistinguishable from Bush's (much to the uncomprehending dismay of the his supporters) does not seem incomprehensible at all the the "anti-ABB" left. It thinks a Kerry administration would also likely have invaded Iraq, even without the sanction of the UN, and that it can be expected to take equally aggressive action against Iran, North Korea, and other states outside the US orbit, if elected. The differences between the US and its traditional allies will continue to widen because the US elite, in its desperate scramble for oil, is being forced to act unilaterally in defence of its interests or, if they don't widen, it will be because the Europeans and others will simply capitulate and become true vassal states allowing the US to have its own way in the world. From this perspective, the Cubans, Iranians, North Koreans, and other targets of Western imperialism don't have much stake one way or the other in the outcome of the US election. They'll be equally under the gun from Kerry as from Bush.
My own view is that a Gore or Kerry administration wouldn't have invaded Iraq, especially in open defiance of the UN and its closest allies, but would have continued its policy of containment through continued economic pressure supplemented by periodic air strikes against Iraq's military and strategic infrastructure, and attempts to topple the regime from within using proxies. That's how US foreign policy traditionally operates. I don't think it would have launched a ground invasion in the unstable and strategically important Middle East aiming at regime change. This was not only the position of the Democrats, but also of the Republican foreign policy establishment represented by Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Powell, and even Kissinger, all of whom, you'll recall, broke in not so subtle unprecedented fashion with the Bush administration over its moralistic rhetoric about the "axis of evil" and deliberate alienation of France, Germany, China, Russia and others in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion. That's why I think the "bipartisan consensus" remains essentially multilateral, and that the PNAC and NSS documents -- and the doctrine of unilateral preventative wars they prescribe -- are products of the right wing of the Republican party, which narrowly came to power in 2000.
I think Iraq may have chastened the imperialist zealots on the right -- it has demonstrated US weakness rather than power -- and made these mavericks more cautious in approaching Iran and NK. This doesn't preclude a second term Bush administration from stepping up the pressure on these two countries, short of a ground invasion, through economic pressure, selective air strikes, and internal subversion, which will also need to be opposed and could result in wider wars. A Kerry administration, like other DP ones before it, might do the same, but it's still likely to feel more constrained by the pressure of its allies to cut deals with these countries, and to generally act more collaboratively on other international issues like Kyoto and the ICC. So there still are differences to be found and exploited within the framework of a broad foreign policy consensus, although I think the more important division is in domestic affairs, along a wide range of economic and social policy issues, which flows from the fact the parties represent different mass constitutuencies. (IMO, that is more important for the US left than the foreign policy issues in defining its relationship to the DP, if it wants to become something more than an impermanent solidarity coalition.)
I may have left the misleading impression that I don't think the invasion was a "war for oil". It was a factor. So were bases. So was demoralizing the Palestinians and forcing a peace settlement on US/Israeli terms. But these complemented what seemed to me to be the overriding motive of the Bushites: to demonstrate to to its foes (and, incidentally, to soft Democratic liberals and its European allies) that the US would brook no interference and exercise no restraint in attaining its foreign policy objectives. Iraq was seen as a "slam dunk" because of its large internal opposition and weakened military. North Korea and Iran were supposed to be cowed into disarming. Of course, it hasn't quite worked out that way.
That Kerry's Iraq policy now seems indistinguishable from Bush's is not because both would have invaded Iraq, but because the bipartisan consensus decrees that a US withdrawal must not be perceived as a "defeat", something which can only be finessed by the involvement of the UN and an international peacekeeping force. The dilemma is that other countries and international agencies won't come in until the US guarantees their security, which I think explains the big push being planned against the Sunni triangle -- by both Kerry and Bush.
MG