On Wed, 1 Sep 2004, ravi wrote:
> > What's important, as Justin keeps emphasizing, is a good method
> > for adjudicating between people with different moral beliefs and
> > practical objectives.
>
>
> would the method be derived from a shared set of beliefs and objectives?
>
yep, that's the catch: people have to share that particular belief in legal adjudication. If they believe in something else (deportation of anybody with the wrong beliefs, or outright genocide), then these kind of legal solutions won't work.
> but is the law (and its application) well-defined? are their additional
> rules of thumb provided to the judge? if the judge brings in some
> personal criteria or method in interpreting and deciding issues, can
> that be avoided? if not, what are such personal criteria based on? what
> if it turns out that they are the judge's personal moral sentiments?
This same problem comes up in psychological diagnosis: should the clinician rely on personal "rules of thumb"? In both cases (judge and clinician), the goal is the consistent application of documented rules (legal statutes for the judge, the DSM for the clinician). If the professional relies on idiosyncratic criteria (e.g., moral beliefs that others may not be using), this will lead to inconsistent decisions. In terms of the functioning of bureaucratic organizations, this is a nightmare.
So I guess I'd say the more judges rely on their own morals to make legal decisions, the less consistent and effective our legal system becomes.
Miles