Justin writes:
> Well, a while ago I posted my view that first, that
democracy was in a sense prior to any justification --
as Rorty says, even if we could not think of a good
justification or even if there was a theoretical
problem with democracy that seemed unanswerable (see,
for example, Arrow's theorem), we would not give it
up.
Okay, serious question. How is this any different from my saying that suffering should be used as a measure? Isn't it imposing a value/ethic (the worth of democracy) on people without making sure first that they share it?
How can something be asserted as fair or right prior to any justification? It doesn't make sense.
> And second, I said that in a perfectly commonsense way
democracy is justified by utility and deontology -- in
English, by the fact that it leads to better outcomes
for the most people than the alternatives (as a rule),
and is also the fairest way of making decisions.
But isn't "better outcomes" equivalent to less suffering?
As for fairness -- who determines what is fair?
Authoritarianism can also lead to better outcomes -- it all depends on how one measures/defines the outcomes.
> Utility isn't sufficient by itself partly for the reason you
state, so we need rights/fairness too -- I don't see
why rights and fairness are too vague to be
determined.
Aren't they are a little vaguer than suffering? Isn't it easier to empirically measure and define suffering? In fact, doesn't determining rights and fairness entail an examination of suffering in the first place? Don't we create the concept of rights in order to curtail suffering?
> Maybe they cannot be empirically determined, but so what?
Well, if they cannot be empirically determined, then they are imposed on others without their say so -- what you and Miles accuse me of doing with my concept of empirically measured suffering.
Isn't it better to ground the creation of rights in something that can be empirically determined, rather than pull them out of thin air?
> Maybe many people will disagree about what moral rights we
have, but that does not mean that we can't come up with a
provisional short list that we can use to work with.
What makes you think it will be short (I am not saying it mightn't be; I am just wondering about your evidence).
> So, yes, I am sort of a deontologist. I hate that
word. It's ugly.
Also, what does it mean?
Brian Dauth Queer Buddhist Resister