First, let me ask Chris why he and MP aren't discussing the merits of the arguments in the Spikeonline article (I find it falls to pieces if I try to rationalize 'liberal' policy in the Balkans). At least you two would have something to agree about.
First, CD writes about what I said about the Spain attacks:
>>
It _can_ be given that, if you ignore the particular
demands that were given, that had to do with Iraq.>>
Wow, I see all sorts of connections that do not contradict. Moroccans attacking good old fashioned European imperialists who were engaged in good old fashioned European imperialism at the time in an Arab country. It didn't take much of a reach to motivate the attacks while still not ignoring what I wrote about the old connections.
>>Certainly the connections between Chechnya and
"international terrorism" of the latter sort are not
in doubt.>>
Made all too abundantly clear by all sides in the matter, including Putin's government announcing efforts to re-double mutual efforts in the struggle against terrorism with Israel (oh, or maybe he hadn't noticed that this country is a major exporter of state-sponsored terror, perhaps not, he's a busy guy, fighting terror and taking tips from Sharon).
>> I don't see how any Ingush cause is
furthered by fanning ethnic conflict, especially since
Moscow has become so much more pro-Ingush since 1999.
There is no way the Ossetians are going to give over
that territory now. It does however make sense if what
you are trying to do is destabilize the Caucasus by
turning the Chechnya conflict into an Orthodox-Muslim
conflict, esp. if you already see the conflict in
terms of infidels fighting believers>>
Your reasoning only seems to work if we have to attribute what Ingush extremists might be working for to all Ingush. BTW, please note, I've never denied the 'plan' that might well be behind the Beslan massacre. But it already was an Orthodox-Muslim conflict to some extent, and as I already said, going back to 1992, when the Russian center wasn't so sensitive to the fact that most Ingush weren't extremists or separatists or desiring to murder Ossetians or armed, for that matter.
>> You just said there were "ethnically based moves to
break away from the center in some form." I deny that
thse moves exist, except in the case of
ultranationalists.>>
Well, isn't it obvious that extremists aren't working for subsidiarity and peaceful autonomy in a wider federation? I simply didn't attribute their motivations and views with the majority of their own ethnic groups, you just assumed I did.
>>Basayev says that 2 of the hostage-takers were Arabs.
Two were supposedly ethnic Russians.>>
Yet other reports deny this while talking of Ukrainians and turncoat anti-terrorist police hired in Ossetia. I'm all ears if you've got the lowdown because I really do want to understand and know more.
>>Not Saudi. "Wahabbi" is the term the locals use in the
North Caucasus to refer to the form of extremist
fundamentalism that was imported into the area in the
early 90s from _some_ sources in the Gulf (I do _not_
mean the Saudi government). It blended with local
cultures, where it has the support of about 5%-10% of
the population, according to my sources, and is by no
means a simple copy of Saudi official Islam. The
Shariah Code of Chechnya was copied from that of
Sudan. Basayev is an Islamic fundamentalist of the
Mullah Omar type. <<
I have my doubts that it is a coherent force. I think the best use of the term 'Wahabbi' is as the state religion of Saudi Arabia (based on Salafism, but nationalized by the British who used it to help form a Saudi state). Perhaps that is another post though.
I'm told Basayev dismisses the term 'Wahabbi', as would Mullah Omar (an ultrafundamentalist stemming from Deobandi teaching, so not in conflict with other Sunna Salafi). And OBL (1) wouldn't bow down to the official Saudi version of it (and in fact was dimissed by Saudi religious officials) and (2) was called by the Saudi Wahabbists the term 'Kharijite' (I'm disregarding his lack of status as a religious figure, even in relatively non-hierchical Sunna Islam).
Which segues to discussion of the Igor Rotar article. First off, like the spikedonline article, I can't quite grasp the ideology that motivates the article. I mean, I'm not a Russian Orthodox nationalist nor am I someone who thinks Clinton was a leftist. Nor would I cite Huntington to support a thesis. But I will try to be generous here:
Skipping down past the introduction, I get to:
>>The opponents of the Tajik opposition said
that they were not fighting real Moslems, but
"Wahhabites." The Islamic opposition in Tajikistan did
indeed take up certain elements of Wahhabite ideology,
calling, for example, for a rejection of opulent
weddings and funerals. One of the leaders of the Tajik
opposition, Hadji Akbar Turadzhonzoda, made no secret
of the fact that his "Moslem brothers" had had an
enormous influence on him, and that he considered them
fine philosophers. "
So is an opponent of the opposition in Tajik a pro-establishment person? And what is that establishment? I'm confused. There seemed to be a lot of interference in independent Tajikistan from Iran and from Russia. We have to realize that 'fundamentalism' is not limited to Sunna Islam, or Salafism. The appeal of 'revolutionary' Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran was fundamentalist and Shia, and, though Shia, the Iranians gained a lot respect and influence for at least appearing to stand up to the US and Israel in the 1980s (Oliver North and the Israelis could tell some different stories). In other words, the Sunna Muslims took notice of the rise of Shia fundamentalism and many grew to respect it. This might have been the case in Tajikistan, but in the Shia vs. Sunni Salafi configuration, the use of the term 'Wahhabi' sounds nonsensical to me here. I would suspect relatively secular, moderate and conservative (possibly all natinalist) Tajik Sunna Muslims to be capable of using the term t
o dismiss outsiders of a religious bent stirring up trouble against their status quo.
Asking in all earnestness now, did some Shia fundamentalists(a major minority in Tajikistan) form a unity front with Sunna fundamentalists in the Tajikistan conflict? I would predict Iran backing Shia factions, as they did in the Afghanistan civil wars of the 1990s. Do you have a profile of the major viable factions? At the start, and now that a more stable form of post-Soviet government has emerged?
>> Akhtaev's view is probably not far from the truth, and
in fact the term "Wahhabites" is generally used to
describe all groups of Moslems in the former Soviet
Union who criticize the regional features of Islam
which often incorporate local customs and even Soviet
innovations.>>
I doubt that because apparently some of the criticism was coming from Shia groups backed by Iran and , as far as I know, there is just no way to refer with derision to them as 'Wahhabi' in any serious way. I might be wrong, since I only know what I know from reading and from talking with the Muslims I meet from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, which doesn't give me major information on Islam relative to the RF or post-Soviet C. Asia.
>>Given this
state of affairs, many Moslems lose their confidence
in the effectiveness of the actions of the secular
authorities, and become convinced that it will only be
possible to deal with this legal chaos if society
lives by the laws of the Shariah.>>
This makes sense and seems quite reasonable. Sharia law is one way of imposing a system that treats everyone on the same footing (however, traditional, fundamentalist, and with different rights according to gender), at least in theory. It can be interpreted, declared and manifested in practice as a 'fair' system of rule for many traditional systems, and people of various backgrounds can adapt to it even as it evolves in actual practice over time. In other words, it is one way in the world to overcome ethnic differences and even quell conflicts.
>>The success of Islamic fundamentalism can also be
attributed to the fact that its ideology is
organically intertwined with nationalist ideology.
Thus not only Chechen separatists, but also Tajik and
Uzbek fundamentalists stand up for their national
distinctiveness, setting this against the
"destructive" influence of the West.>>
So one distinction that might need clarified here is, are these national identities really a post-Soviet form quite analogous to 19th century nationalism (where the artifices of state and the mother culture and language become the basis of a new religion)? One drift of your ongoing argument Chris, is that they aren't traditional nationalists but something else. I deny the Huntington thesis of supercultural groupings in inevitable conflict. On the other hand, I also tend to theorize and hope for some supergroupings that can reconcile differences, find commonalities. If, for example, western Trinitarian Christianity, its proponents and believers, could come to recognize Islam as the major line of evolution of NON-TRINITARIAN branch of CHRISTIANITY, might they come to see that there is more in common than in conflict?
BTW, even Russians cite the 'destructive' influence of the West.
>>It is interesting to note that among the leaders of both the Uzbek and
the Tajik opposition there are many people who speak practically no Russian (a rare phenomenon in Central Asia today), yet speak fluent Arabic. As the Russian eastern specialist Robert Landa rightly points out, "for any nationalist, even a nonbeliever... Islam is the "everyday life" which protects them from invasion from outside and from modernization which is forced upon them (as is customary to believe). Therefore Islam is an integral part of nationalism" (2).>>
Well, that's a nice little leap of 'therefore', but I'm not sure I can make it. The Uzbek vs. Tajik dichotomy is one largely created by Russian dominion over the region, and they are basically, linguistically speaking, Turks. I truly doubt the assertion about fluent Arabic ability being that widespread. Arabic tends to be restricted to religious use and loan words in native vocabularies. However, quite a few from troubled former Soviet countries did seek and find refuge in Arab countries such as the Gulf States, so the influence and intercourse going both ways cannot be denied. That, most likely, is where the 'fluent'Arabic phenomenon comes from if it actually exists. Chechens who speak fluent Arabic most likely have lived in an Arab country; there's no denying their exodus.
Also, the US wanted Turkey to assert influence in the region to offset Russian and Iranian power, but then also worried about fundamentalists in Turkey asserting too much power. Now the US even has military bases in the region, while Turkey's government is more keen on getting into the EU and pursuing a European future.
I'd like to see those censuses to support the demographics the article cites: Religion: Islam Do you consider yourself a modern, a conservative or a fundamentalist? If fundamentalist, which branch?
It's interesting discussion about the growing fundamentalism, but it can also be motivated by chaos, civil war, economic disparities, societies in turmoil, in transition from very traditional or socialist to post-modern capitalist. In other words, I see nothing new in the phenomenon. Nor anything at all very Huntingtonesque about it.
F
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