I think what is not satisfactory with the answers that you cite is that fall into the "omniscient rationality" genre - a model that people have a more or less full information about all possible outcomes of their actions and act on that knowledge to maximize their utility or benefits. Once you accept the omniscient rationality assumption, you can rationalize pretty much everything.
My problem with this model is that the omniscient rationality must be quietly assumed to make the argument work (without that assumption the whole utility maximization argument is a non sequitur), but it cannot be explicitly spelled because it is patently false. If it were true, people would be gods not human beings.
I think a more realistic model, which I spelled out in Chapter 6 of my obscure and rarely read book _Civil Society and the Professions in Eastern Europe_ http://www.springeronline.com/sgw/cda/frontpage/0,11855,4-40106-22-33167878- 0,00.html?changeHeader=true makes a more realistic assumption how our cognitive capacities work.
There are two essential elements in this model. The first essential element is that before people make any determination as to what course of action will be most beneficial for them they make another, far more important determination, that substantially affects the outcome of their cost/benefit calculations. That determination pertains to what kind of information is relevant for these calculations.
This process is known in cognitive science as framing, or using cognitive "filters" or schemata that focus on certain kinds of information while ignoring other kinds, and group the information on which they focus in a particular pre-set way. Framing is necessary, because without it, our brains would be overloaded with information.
The second essential element in that model is that people usually use one frame for evaluating their costs and a different frame to evaluate their benefits. The pairing of different cognitive frames (or schemata) - one for costs and one for benefits - results in very different cost/benefit evaluations of the same reality. If the frame used to evaluate costs is narrow - it ignores information about certain types of cost (i.e. environmental or social cost) - while the frame used to evaluate benefits is broad (i.e. including all kinds of good things created by corporations) - the benefits are likely to outweigh costs in the actual cost/benefits calculations which our valiant pundits and business leaders pride themselves doing. If - on the other hand - the frame for evaluating costs is broad and the one evaluating benefits is narrow - the cost will outweigh benefit in the final calculation (which is a domain of assorted doom sayers).
The model also stipulates that these paired sets of frames are not adopted at will or randomly by individuals, but instead they are grounded in social habits, institutionalized expectations, and norms. In fact, the above referenced book shows how the organization form and legal status pre-define a particular set of frames that shape political discussions (in this case, about the nature of professional work). The 1990s socio-political changes in Eastern Europe provided an excellent opportunity to study that process empirically.
To summarize, people's perceptions of what is beneficial and what is too costly depends, for the most part, on what sets of cognitive frames (or schemata) they happen to use, and this in turn depends on institutionalized habits, expectations and norms.
With that model in mind, we can explain the apparent paradox of the US-style capitalism: a seemingly unbounded opportunity coexisting side by side with the entrapment of poverty and defeatism.
For people who live in poverty and exploitation and want to change that - they need to have a game plan as to what course of action is most likely to succeed in bringing the benefits of good life. What is more, they need to have a concept of what good life is. Thus, this game plan ultimately depends on determining bads and goods and selecting a course of action the fewest possible bads and most possible goods.
The problem is, however, that in making that determination people, and especially poor people, do not operate in a vacuum, but come to the table with whole bunch of preconceived ideas - or cognitive frames as I would say - that pretty much pre-determine the conclusion they are going to reach. An these "preconceived ideas" or cognitive frames are, for the most part , a product of social-cultural norms, which in turn are affected by social institutions (religion, media, business, government, etc.). In a society inculcated with the cognitive frames that exaggerate benefit of individuals "getting ahead" of everyone else and mi9nimizing the benefits of collective action - it is not surprising that people who are most likely to benefit forma collective action shun it and opt for individual "muddling through."
If this sound similar to the old Marxist notion of "false consciousness" - it is not a coincidence. In fact, the concept of "false consciousness" taken from the _18th brumaire_ was the inspiration behind the cognitive cost/benefit model discussed above, and is duly acknowledged in my book. However, that cognitive cost/benefit model drops the normative and ideological connotations of the "false consciousness" concept - focusing instead on a description social and cognitive processes.
To summarize - the persistence of deprivation amidst plenty that characterizes US capitalism and the virtual lack of action to correct that even by the legally available means is fundamentally rooted in the cherished American institutions, business, religion, and the culture of individualism, and the effects they have in shaping human perception of reality. It is amazing how these institutions can make individuals give up material benefits that are easily within their reach, and do so practically without coercion, making it look as if these were "free choices" made by the affected individuals.
Wojtek