>I don't know what the point of deploying all these cops is, except maybe
>to frighten and reassure the population simultaneously. It's not like the
>terrorists are stupid enough to try to plant bombs several hours after
>London got hit.
>
>Doug
>_______
heh. precisely because people would think it would be stupid would be why a terrorist might do it.
anyway, richard forno (IIRC) pegged it correctly four years ago: nerf-based security.
I was a play on time-based security, a concept with which i'm intimately familiar. heh. the argument of TBS is that, of course, you can't keep out the bad guys. With enough time, any good cracker can figure out your password or the combination to your safe. No such thing as a fortress. So, all you can do is use time against them, by erecting a layered security architecture that keep the bad guys out by tying up their time: fences, locks, access codes, etc.
even if they're not perfect -- and nothing is -- it buy you time to catch the bad guy, to get better clues from tracks she leaves behind, etc. Funny thing is, a lot of physical security is bad, but we don't hear about all the lock exploits there are. There's a different code in the locksmith community and the wider physical security community: you don't talk about it. (Honey and homemade bread will sometimes warm up your local locksmith, though!) Consequently, we don't hear about it and we think we're safe. Just as importantly, casual criminals also think locks work, so they don't try.
Nerf-based security, though, is all about nerf guns. There! Take that. Wooo. Wow. That hurt. I'm so scared of the big nerf gun. It's a game.
Hasbroily,
kelley
"Finish your beer. There are sober kids in India."
-- rwmartin