[lbo-talk] specious generalizations...

KJ kjinkhoo at gmail.com
Sun Jul 17 20:04:06 PDT 2005


On 7/18/05, James Heartfield <Heartfield at blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:
> Iraq might have featured in the London bomber's motivations (which of course
> we cannot know because they declined to tell anyone why they were killing
> them) but who knows what stimuli could have triggered this psychotic
> response.

True in so far as we are never going to hear it from their mouths. But it does appear, does it not, that there is a broad belief -- at least within the British Muslim communities (going by reports in the media, incl Newsnight, etc.) -- that that was indeed one, if not the principal, motivation.


>The error here is to try to force an irrational act into a
> rational explanatory framework, as if to tame it and make it sensible.

Not sure what you mean, but this is to abandon rationality, no? Even the acts of psychotics are subject to a rational explanatory framework -- whether it be hormonal or chemical imbalances or whatever.


> And I don't agree that Islamic terrorism is on a par with anti-imperialist
> movements, like the 'physical force' Irish nationalists, or the PLO.

Did I say it was? On the other hand, in the hands of the respective states, it's all the same, no? I know where I am, the detention camps are now filled mainly with "Islamic terrorists" where they used to be once filled with "communist terrorists". And yes, there are those now who do support such detentions of "Islamic terrorists" who would once have opposed the detentions of "communist terrorists".


> The Al Qaeda inspired terrorism in Europe and the US, by contrast, uses
> violence in isolation from any popular struggle. Even though Iraq features
> (along with a lot of less intelligible stuff) in its sporadic communiques,
> there is little evidence that these individuals are hold themselves
> accountable to any human authority. A lot of the arguments - that the Arab
> states and most Muslims are not really Muslims - express the contempt these
> individuals feel for the judgement of their fellow men and women.
> Organisationally, clandestine organisation and small cells insulate these
> bombers from popular judgement. The tactic, suicide bombing, relieves the
> individual of facing up to the messy human experience of the atrocities they
> leave behind them.

Much of this is, I think, true. But I think it is self-defeating to think that they aren't interested in popular opinion and popular struggle. It's not your or my opinion or struggle that's of immediate interest to them, but rest assured -- which means not so restful -- that indeed they are interested in that popular opinion and struggle which is relevant to them.

What they say may be gobbledygook to you and me, but it's not to significant swathes of Muslim opinion. They don't just blow themselves and others up every day. They are talking, staking out a position, seeking to gain influence, etc. Yes, clandestinity may serve to insulate -- but in this they aren't that different from any number of other movements which you or I may find more palatable even where we disapprove of their tactics. And any closely held ideology has an enclosed character of internal self-justification -- recall the "false consciousness" or even the "labour aristocracy" of yore which, incidentally, may have had an analytical truth to it, but the language of the "concepts" which summarised them was intended to be dismissive, unworthy of further consideration.

Still, in some ways they exhibit an acute sense of politics. Note that there were no claims for 9/11 till long after. Let me speculate that part of the reason was that there was indeed widespread horror -- resulting in denial -- amongst Muslims. But by the time ObL actually took "credit" for it, a number of events had occurred that had undercut a fair bit of that initial horror. I'm generally glad that the British authorities have responded in a measured way to the London bombings -- although denials of any link to foreign policy and Iraq are, I think, specious, as are references to 9/11 as having pre-dated Afghanistan and Iraq. Aside from that July 10 report in The Times, there's now the one from the Boston Globe relating to the new generation of jihadists. If the anti-Soviet Afghanistan "jihad" was the opening of Pandora's Box, the Globe report implies that not only has it not been closed, but it's opened for another generation.

Sure, a majority of Muslims haven't and won't become suicide bombers. But to dismiss those who have in the manner you wish to do -- I think in an attempt to strip them of any legitimacy and out of fear that linking it to foreign policy may provide them legitimacy -- is to retreat from asking what needs to be done to ensure (or rather, to convert) others do not passively support them along the lines of "I disagree/disapprove/condemn, but I can understand". I thought the young British Muslim they had on Newsnight who criticised the mosques for not more actively channelling British Muslim anger into democratic processes to be an attempt to address that issue -- but that of course raises a whole other set of issues about the political role of mosques and religious institutions.

Finally, as for contempt for their fellow men and women -- again, do you really believe that they are peculiar in this? I would have thought the history of socialist movements is replete with enough examples -- and indeed, this list itself, with all the generalisations about "the left" by people who generally consider themselves of "the left" (else why bother with a list called Left Business Observer-Talk (LBO-Talk)?) is also evidence that the kind of contempt by al-Q types for their fellow Muslims is a trait shared by others. It seems that there are enough people of "the left" who hold other people of "the left" in contempt as not "really" of "the left".


> In Algeria, the FIS did contest elections in the aftermath of the first Gulf
> War, when the remnants of the Nationalist government had lost support for
> supporting Desert Storm, and they won the majority of the country, which was
> a significant new departure for the Islamist. What's more the repression
> that followed ought to have seen the FIS consolidate that popular base.
> However, their own tactics were widely seen by Algerians as brutal as the
> authorities, and they haemmoraged support.

I do not know enough about the Algerian situation to comment intelligently, although I believe that the situation is somewhat more complex -- there are more factions at work than just one.

What I can say is that, accepting the truth of what you say, such an outcome is hardly peculiar to Algeria. In British Malaya, the massive counter-insurgency repression had a similar outcome. Sure, there were specific circumstances -- but that's just a reminder that indeed specious generalisations do not help.


> The frittering away of the FIS popular base in Algeria was one of the key
> event that consolidated the shift towards all-out war against the US

This one, I do think, is specious, at least as far as al-Q is concerned. Most accounts I've seen do not put the turn against the US to FIS and Algeria.


> It is not popular opposition to the war in Iraq, but the lack of popular
> support for the ideas of Al Qaeda that pushes its activists into terrorism.

A statement which forgets the history of the idea of the propaganda of the deed? Worse, it forgets the history of the Afghan jihad and the extent to which it engaged in terror as a weapon -- and not just against Soviets.

kj khoo



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