[lbo-talk] Re: Referenda & Takings (part 1 of 2)

Jim Devine jdevine03 at gmail.com
Wed Jun 29 10:17:27 PDT 2005


I wrote:>>experience here in California has shown that referenda can be corrupt(ed).<<

JKS:>No shit. Like the Proposition 13 that has nearly ruined your state?<

1. FWIW, Prop. 13 [passed in 1978] wasn't totally a matter of the prop. system being corrupted. (In fact, big money like the Bank of America was against it.) It came about because of declining real living standards, some wild behavior by tax assessors, the CA government's budget surplus (at the time), and of course, demagoguery. Even some (or even many) working-class people voted for it, because it was a way to deal with the stagflation-driven declines in post-tax incomes (among home-owners).

[For people who don't remember, there was a time -- seemingly in a galaxy far, far away, but actually in CA -- when there were blue-collar jobs that paid enough for a worker to be able to purchase a house (bungalow).]

In any event, it wasn't Prop. 13 that ruined California as much as the general anti-tax movement (which the GOP ended up joining), which itself was an expression of the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. Several other propositions of the same sort were passed, which made the fiscal situation worse. But it's true that Prop. 13 played a key role in energizing the right-wing anti-tax movement. This movement, I'd say, was a relatively grass-roots expression of the neo-liberal movement that seems to have started on September 11, 1973, with the overthrow of Allende in Chile. Further, if Prop. 13 hadn't been passed, the right-wingers likely would have found another way to do their job. (Reagan and Bush2 have done so, for example, on the national level.)

Of course, other events (such as the popping of the dot-com bubble of the 1990s and the Enron & Dynegy et. al.-engineered "energy emergency") helped lay California low.

2. There's a basic contradiction between democracy and capitalism which shapes the experience of the props in California. I'd rather not get rid of one element of democracy (the proposition system). It should be reformed of course (since it was designed to depoliticize politics, following the Progressive Movement of the early 20th century). But I'd rather not throw the baby out with the waste-water.

Also, instead of simply dismissing the prop. system in California, it's important to think about it in context, i.e., in comparison to the way the Sacramento state government works. The latter doesn't look so hot either. (You may have heard that we recently elected a vainglorious weight-lifter cum actor using the standard representative government system.)

3. I should mention that there's an aspect of the California constitution that is closely related to the idea of subordinating eminent domain propositions to referenda. If the government borrows money to build a school or something like that, it must have a bond issue passed by the electorate. It's quite routine and most people vote for these bond measures.

These are very similar to the idea of referenda to okay use of eminent domain: both projects involve democratic okaying of public investment. This suggests that the idea of referenda for eminent domain is hardly radical or to be unthinkingly sneered at. Arnold's use of bonds to pay for the state government's deficit is truly radical, since it (strictly speaking) violates the state constitution.

me:>>But the referendum process represents a barrier to the business/government eminent domain "development" bloc bulldozer.<<

JKS:>How serious is the problem versus the costs that would be incurred by making takings (the legal term for what hapens when the power eminent domaion in exercised) more difficult?<

that's for the voters to decide.


>>After long experience, people in CA read their local newspapers --
including alternative rags such as the L.A. WEEKLY -- or listen to political parties and pundits to decide which referenda to vote for and against. There's currently a major predisposition among voters to vote "No" on all referenda.<<


>And this is rational because? And it is best to make often difficult
and fine-tuned ecomic decsions this awy because?<

it's rational because the state government (which puts a lot of props on the ballot) has allowed itself to become distant from the electorate and thus distrusted by them; and because a lot of propositions seem risky or vague or both (so that the presumption is that the props are guilty until proven otherwise).

As noted, for bond issues, this knee-jerk negativism is generally avoided.


>>That doesn't mean that people always make the right decision (far
from it). But the people are supposed to be sovereign, not the judges or politicians.<<


>The sovereignty of the people in a representative democracy is
normally exercised through elected officials, like legislators, governors, and judges (in CA state judges are elected). This is a problem because?<

in theory, we have a representative democracy; but in practice it's a representative plutocracy. We live in a capitalist society. The referendum system provides a potential way to build countervailing power.

JKS had said:>>>What unit decides the referundum? This is not aa question to which there is an obvious answer,

me:>>Obviously, the principle is that communities that are most affected by a project like that would get to vote.<<

JKS now:>OK, who are they, i reapewat:


>Here in Chicago the expansion of O'Hare airport is an issue and will
require condemnation of certain houses in nearby neighborhoods. Is the electorate Schaumberg and Rosemont -- the people some of whose houses are at stake? Is it Will County, where O'Hare is Located? Is it the Collar counties of Chicago, all of which use the airport? The state of Illinois? Etc.


>Who is "most affected"? How do you decide? The people near the
airport who may lose their homes and neighborhood, but be paid fair market value? The people in Chicagoland whose jobs are at stake if economic growth slows because the airportt in a chokepoint? The passengers whose delays make O'Hare a nightmare? It's a lot easier to state this principle than to flesh it out in a sensible way.<

I thought I answered this.>>Obviously, the principle is that communities that are most affected by a project like that would get to vote. If it were voted on the Illinois level, a lot of people down state wouldn't even bother to vote on such a referendum, so that generally only the up-staters would vote. Which fits with the idea that those most affected by the project should have the vote.


>>If there are no political units within Illinois which obviously
represent the areas affected, then the referendum should be at the state level.<<

1. Look, it's not up to me decide how the referendum would be organized. The basic principle is that people affected by the condemnation would get to vote. Then the lawyers (etc.) would have the job of putting this principle into practice (while the people keep an eye on the lawyers to make sure that they don't feather their nests).

2. In any event, there is a simple rule that could be applied. The smallest possible political jurisdiction that suffers all the external costs and garners all the external benefits would vote. Small projects would be voted at the Township level (a sub-unit of Counties in Illinois). Larger projects would be voted at the County level. Even larger ones at the State level. Some might have to involve more than one State.

me:>>so that generally only the up-staters would vote. Which fits with the idea that those most affected by the project should have the vote.<<


>So you'd go for the collar county idea? But people downstate depend
on Chicaholand's econbomic health, although they amy not like to admit it. Also since when do we get the principle "use it or lose it" with voting? So what if the downstaters are unlikely to vote?<

In practice, if people don't vote, they don't have any say. That's democracy. (Of course, if they vote for politicians, they don't really get much of a say either. At least with a referendum one is usually voting for something very specific.)


>>>Also, condemnations are quite common and routine.<<<

me:>>if so, maybe the developers should pay a 100% premium on the market value of houses condemned. That would make them less common and routine.<<

JKS:>Why is that desirable? If the gas company needs an easement in some farmland to provide gas to heat people's homes, whose pockets is that 100% premium going to come out of, and if it deters building the ipeline, why is that a benefit? Should we not have

people's homes heated cheaply?<

Yes, I like the referendum proposal better.

JD



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