Jeffrey Fisher wrote:
> sorry. that should have read:
>
> that's the right question, but i would ask it a different way: why is
> some god or other existing (whatever the f--- that actually means) any
> less probable (or if you prefer, more improbable) than some god or
> other *not* existing? according to what criteria of probability and
> according to what understanding of "god"?
>
> j
>
It reminds me somewhat of a review I read recently in Skeptic about the book: “The Probability of God, A Simple Calculation that Prove the Ultimate Truth.” The author of the book gives the probability of God as 67% (which also reminds me of 42 being the answer to life the universe and everything). I will quote some from the review now:
“The author attempts to begin from a position of ignorance to prove the existence of a god, yet he arbitrarily limits consideration only to his concept of the Judeo-Christian god. On what bases ae all the other god concepts excluded? Special pleading leads to a fatal skewing of the numbers towards the author’s pet concept. This forms the core of Unwin’s book. Through special pleading, Unwin begins by invoking an a priori 50% probability towards his god’s existence by arguing that 50% is an expression of maximum ignorance. I found this position astounding. What of other speculations? Are we merely brains in vats hooked to computers? Do magic elves steal socks from the dryer? Do Space-Penguins live in the center of the Moon? To be consistent, the author would also have to assign an a priori 50% probability that each of these claims is true.”
“If we begin with the acknowledgement that we are ignorant as to which, if any, of the potential god concepts might actually be true, then there is no basis to favor one concept to the exclusion of all others. Thus ALL potential god concepts must be taken into account, of which the Judeo-Christian concept is but one among an almost inexhaustible number. So the proper a priori probability, given a position of total ignorance, is a figure so small as to border on zero, and certainly provides no rational grounds for belief. The 50% figure is purely gratuitous, subverts the burden of proof, and simply dismisses every other potential god concept.”
“The author points out that there is some small quantum probability of a giant kangaroo rat spontaneously materializing in your microwave. This raises another important point. While we can at least know that the set of “possible things” includes kangaroo rat materializations, we have no way of knowing if “gods” fall within the set of “possible things.” Is it even possible for a god-like “being”—which is all-powerful, all-knowing, dwells in a nonmaterial “spiritual” realm, and which is transcendent to the laws and essence of the natural universe we know—to exist? Perhaps not. Such things cannot be established through assertion.”
“This suggests that the a priori probability to be assigned to things that may be impossible, given maximum ignorance, must be less than that assigned to things that are improbable.”...