[lbo-talk] Vegetarianism

Miles Jackson cqmv at pdx.edu
Thu Sep 1 11:21:25 PDT 2005


ravi wrote:
> Miles Jackson wrote:
>> Okay, I'm getting it: the fundamental axiom is that suffering is bad.
>> Why is it bad? It just is, according to Luke's "common intuition". I
>> agree that you and Singer make sense if we accept that axiom; I see no
>> compelling reason to accept it, and no meaningful argument is given
>> other than "of course suffering is bad!"


> ok, dont use as axiomatic the notion that suffering is bad. how would
> _you_ decide the hypothetical scenario i outlined? not personally, but
> as part of a governing body that settles such matters. singer's point is
> that whatever rule you are going to use, to decide to provide the
> medicine to the non-comatose person, would, logically speaking, compel
> you to oppose primate testing (again ceteris paribus; see below).

Okay, my rule is that I don't like skinny people. The comatose person is skinny, so I don't give him the medicine. How does that compel me to oppose primate testing? (I know, you're trying to emphasize the preference for conscious life, but note that you can drive a triple-trailer through the logical hole in your argument!)

--How would I decide? Collaborative decision making among the affected parties. I see no need to impose arbitrary moral assumptions on the participants (e.g., suffering is bad, conscious life is more valuable than nonconscious life, etc.).


> i (personally) believe that the choice of testing on primates is driven
> more by profits and human callousness than the real hope of finding
> cures for mass disease. further, to answer the question, i will actually
> need to flesh out the set of applicable moral rules and their
> priorities: does one's survival come before that of another who
> qualifies in similar fashion? is survival in a healthy sense different
> from survival from illness? etc. yes, this is a biy of a cop-out on my
> part -- i do not know if i would support primate testing, even highly
> controlled, limited, and pain-free, even if it would save millions of
> human lives. i do think though that my inability to answer this question
> negates the arguments in favour of treating animals with kindness and
> consistency where there are no such connundrums to deal with (the
> majority case).

I think your careful response highlights my point in this thread: abstract moral principles cannot provide practical guidance about behavior in real life contexts, because real social life is far more interesting and complex than philosophers appreciate (I think of Wittgenstein: "back to rough ground"--the icy perfection of philosophers' scenarios is a fundamental distraction from the solutions to the practical problems we face).

I know I've pestered you in this thread; I was trying to see if there is some logically consistent, universal principle that guided your actions. In your last paragraph, you make it clear that you are not a principled utilitarian (to which I say, Huzzah!): your reasoning is contingent, based on the inherent complexities of specific social situations.

I am not bringing this up to undermine your position or your claims; if in fact, for various practical reasons, a consensus emerged in our society that animals have rights, or all people should be vegans, your position would be just a valid as the widely accepted idea that "people shouldn't steal and lie". However, note that the social acceptance of the moral "rightness" of your position must be based on social consensus; the fact that you justify your position by reference to an abstract moral philosophy is more or less irrelevant.

Miles



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