[lbo-talk] Vegetarianism

ravi lbo at kreise.org
Thu Sep 1 09:13:37 PDT 2005


Miles Jackson wrote:
> ravi wrote:
>> Miles Jackson wrote:
>> the fundamental question is: do we have a need for ethical rules or
>> morality? if you believe not, we need to restart this conversation.
>> assuming you do:
>
> Well, most ethical pronouncements in social life are justifications for
> prior behavior, not guidance for future behavior, but I'll let that pass.
>

why is that so? or why does it need to be so? i.e., even if it is so, that does not answer my question. do we proceed from some rules of ethics that we agree upon? if not, how else do we act?


>> singer's point is that if you were to apply such a set of rules
>> consistently, then you would be obliged to oppose experiments on
>> primates, and from there all the way to consumption of animals when
>> alternatives are available.
>
> Okay, I'm getting it: the fundamental axiom is that suffering is bad.
> Why is it bad? It just is, according to Luke's "common intuition". I
> agree that you and Singer make sense if we accept that axiom; I see no
> compelling reason to accept it, and no meaningful argument is given
> other than "of course suffering is bad!"

ok, dont use as axiomatic the notion that suffering is bad. how would _you_ decide the hypothetical scenario i outlined? not personally, but as part of a governing body that settles such matters. singer's point is that whatever rule you are going to use, to decide to provide the medicine to the non-comatose person, would, logically speaking, compel you to oppose primate testing (again ceteris paribus; see below).


> Leave that aside, consider this scenario: experiments on a few primates
> are crucial to the development of a medical intervention that will save
> the life of millions of ill people. By the principle of reducing
> suffering, wouldn't you and Singer be logically compelled to support the
> primate research?

i am not sure i ever said that 'reducing suffering' is a fundamental axiom for me, so i have to be careful not to be diverted into discussion that assumes that.

but w.r.t such calculations, especially as a utilitarian, singer does indeed examine and accept such an argument (when valid). a different application of such considerations is the cause of his infamy amidst the disability rights movement: such as when the hypothetical question is posed: why test on a healthy primate capable of enjoying a full life? why not instead on severely disabled humans who cannot comprehend or appreciate their life in any way? (of course this is terribly cruel ground to tread on, even theoretically -- my hope is that such kind considerations are extended when one speaks of animals, or if you wish plants, too).

[singer also uses a sort of indivudual rights/privacy argument in defending the right to abortion. despite the appearance, i believe here too that his argument is free of contradiction.]

i (personally) believe that the choice of testing on primates is driven more by profits and human callousness than the real hope of finding cures for mass disease. further, to answer the question, i will actually need to flesh out the set of applicable moral rules and their priorities: does one's survival come before that of another who qualifies in similar fashion? is survival in a healthy sense different from survival from illness? etc. yes, this is a biy of a cop-out on my part -- i do not know if i would support primate testing, even highly controlled, limited, and pain-free, even if it would save millions of human lives. i do think though that my inability to answer this question negates the arguments in favour of treating animals with kindness and consistency where there are no such connundrums to deal with (the majority case).

--ravi



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