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Excerpts from UN report on Iran nuclear program http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N28346140
Fri 28 Apr 2006
UNITED NATIONS, April 28 (Reuters) - Following are excerpts from a report by Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the U.N. Security Council and the Vienna-based IAEA Board of Governors on Iran's nuclear programs.
SUSPENSION
In a letter dated 3 January 2006, Iran informed the Agency that it had decided to resume, as from 9 January 2006, "those R&D on the peaceful nuclear energy program which had been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension"
In February 2006, Iran started enrichment tests at PFEP (Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant) by feeding UF6 gas into a single P-1 machine, and later into 10-machine and 20-machine cascades. During March 2006, a 164-machine cascade was completed, and tests of the cascade using UF6 were begun.
On 13 April 2006, Iran declared to the Agency that an enrichment level of 3.6% had been achieved. On 18 April 2006, the Agency took samples at PFEP, the results of which tend to confirm as of that date the enrichment level declared by Iran. On that day, UF6 gas was again being fed into the 164-machine cascade, and two additional 164-machine cascades were under construction. The enrichment process at PFEP, including the feed and withdrawal stations, is covered by Agency safeguards containment and surveillance measures.
The current uranium conversion campaign at UCF (URANIUM CONVERSION FACILITY), which was initiated in November 2005, is still ongoing and is expected to be finished in April 2006. Since September 2005, approximately 110 tons of UF6 has been produced at UCF, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance.
CURRENT OVERALL ASSESSMENT
All the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency is accounted for. Apart from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, the Agency has found no other undeclared nuclear material in Iran.
However, gaps remain in the Agency's knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iran's centrifuge program. Because of this, and other gaps in the Agency's knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran's nuclear program, the Agency is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear program, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern. Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active cooperation by Iran -- transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol (eds: allows unannounced inspections) -- if the Agency is to be able to understand fully the 20 years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran.
Iran continues to facilitate the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and had, until February 2006, acted on a voluntary basis as if the Additional Protocol were in force. Until February 2006, Iran had also agreed to some transparency measures requested by the Agency, including access to certain military sites.
Additional transparency measures, including access to documentation, dual use equipment and relevant individuals, are, however, still needed for the Agency to be able to verify the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment program, the purpose and use of the dual use equipment and materials purchased by the PHRC (Physics Research Center), and the alleged studies which could have a military nuclear dimension.
Regrettably, these transparency measures are not yet forthcoming. With Iran's decision to cease implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol, and to confine Agency verification to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agency's ability to make progress in clarifying these issues, and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, will be further limited, and Agency access to activities not involving nuclear material (such as research into laser isotope separation and the production of sensitive components of the nuclear fuel cycle) will be restricted.
While the results of Agency safeguards activities may influence the nature and scope of the confidence building measures that the Board requests Iran to take, it is important to note that safeguards obligations and confidence building measures are different, distinct and not interchangeable. The implementation of confidence building measures is no substitute for the full implementation at all times of safeguards obligations. In this context, it is also important to note that the Agency's safeguards judgments and conclusions in the case of Iran, as in all other cases, are based on verifiable information available to the Agency, and are therefore, of necessity, limited to past and present nuclear activities. The Agency cannot make a judgment about, or reach a conclusion on, future compliance or intentions.
The Agency will pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran's nuclear activities, and the Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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