I. The cost/benefit balance of war: what are Israel's war aims? The question of the profitability of war is as Woj suggests an empirical question, but not only an empirical question. It is also a question of what "Israel wants" and even a question of whether the aims of an entity as complex and heterogeneous as Israel can be meaningful for a serious measure of the possible-probable consequences of the current conflict.
The general impression I get from most of the commentary of Israel critics, is that they are discussing an Israel that has ceased to exist for over 10 or 15 years. An analysis of the aims of the Israeli body politic in the current war has to take into account that the secular nationalist Zionism of the founding fathers is hardly even a primary force in the determination of the political-military policy of contemporary Israel. The current national policy represents on the one hand a declining but still somewhat significant array of religious, ethnic, and class interests pulling apart the Israeli consensus, and on the other the popular adoption of a modern capitalist-industrial (or to some post-industrial) social organization as a new consensus.
Consistent with this popular refusal of mystical religious and secular maximilism Israel's current national policy is to shake off, by whatever means possible, the 50 -100 year heritage of political, social, and religious Zionism and to get on with the business of business and the enjoyment of its returns. The extreme military reaction of Israel to the linked kidnappings of IDF soldiers in North and South by forces emanating from regions from which Israel relinquished military control represents in part the deep frustration of nearly all sectors of Israeli society with the continued commitment of some of its neighbors to a state of war with it, even after Israel has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and even to unilaterally give up occupied territories.
Another related reason for the sharpness of Israel's response to what in the past was treated by her leaders as a nuisance act of irresponsible local high spirits is that an Israel committed to developing a fully capitalist industrial society is far more vulnerable to even the small irregular disruptions of non-accountable private armies. The crisis of popular confidence in the government produced by the delivery of mostly harmless homemade rockets from Gaza is instructive in this regard.
I would suggest that the highest priority of the current Israeli government regarding its relations with its neighbors is a cessation of hostilities on all its borders, and it is on the one hand willing to concede much more than has any previous Israeli government (for example the massive unconditional retreat from Gaza) and on the other, the employment of ferocious military force when negotiation appears to be impossible. The military ferocity of liberal capitalist states almost inevitably targets civilian populations and the economic bases of their antagonists. This pattern, by the way, is characteristic of the defensive international policies of most industrial democratic states from the Union in the American Civil War (note the Sherman citation I sent earlier) to the butcheries of World War I, and the American and British air campaigns against Germany). Does it work? and will it work here in the Eastern Mediterranean?
If the aim of Israel is as we propose, avoidance of threats of external disruption of its developing complex but delicate commercial-industrial economy either by the establishment of either regular relations with its neighbors or, where this is impossible, physical and organizational isolation from potential and real threats, then the outcome of the current conflict cannot be simply a result of military action no matter how extensive and destructive. However, a relatively short but maximally disruptive campaign that destroys the means of their antagonists to continue the war and that effectively engenders disaffection of public support for the perpetuation of his campaign coupled with obvious political and economic advantages for the defeated as a consequence of discontinuity of hostilities (whether through treaty or other relations, e.g. Marshall plan is a positive example while the post WWI handling of German reparations is its converse) has resulted in dramatic changes in international relations in a number of cases. The Lebanon as a fundamentally urban and much Europeanized commercial society, would seem to be an ideal partner for a capitalist industrial Israel. However, the integral disunity of the Lebanese central government, the volatility of the organization of its civil society, and the subsequent weakness of its executive branches have, at least up till now, made it a most unreliable "free partner" to any kind of international relation but one dictated by external military force (Israeli, Syrian, or International).
Whatever the outcome of the current conflict with Lebanon, Israel (and Lebanon) loses if the Israeli's are compelled to maintain a presence in Lebanon or to engage in a third or fourth round with Hezbollah in the not too distant future. The transformation of South Lebanon into a free fire zone though a massive defeat for Lebanon and Hezbollah would be only slightly less of a defeat for Israel since such zones are notoriously favourable to irregular military activity. Thus anything but a firm mutually agreed upon political settlement concerning border relations between the two states is a bad solution for both. Signoure's seven points proposal is at least verbally a basis for arriving at such a solution, but considering the lack of integrity of Lebanese national policy (sigh) and the intransigence of Israel regarding its real and imagined interests(another sigh), this plan can be realized if and only if execution of it points is guaranteed by some force external to both countries.
II. Nationalistic fervor: nationalism and current policy: Nationalistic fervor in contemporary Israel is almost entirely the domain of the widely unpopular but still politically influential religious Zionist movements and a pathetic remnant of the Likud (Beebus Natanyahu and friends). The anti-democratic (at least in our eyes) and brutal policies presented in the essentially secular Lieberman (the Israeli Knesset member and not the Connecticut politician) platform represents the perpetuation within Lieberman's constituency of largely Russian ethnicity of the typical Russian response to internal and external threats to national security, and does not embody anything like the Israeli consensus. While the potential of the religious Zionist movement to disrupt internal civil order is a still-potent threat to Israel's government, its focus is almost entirely on the fate of the occupied territories and it has up till now played an entirely passive role in the formation of Israel's policies regarding Lebanon and Gaza*.
III. The cost of victory: reaping whirlwinds. The Israeli government and IDF's high (and low) command are quite cognizant of the futility of military efforts (no matter how extreme) to bring order to Israel's borders**. Equally significant in this regard is the hesitancy of the government to commit serious ground forces to the reduction of Hezbollah strongholds just over its borders with Lebanon. Clearly, Israel does not regard a military solution as an effective option for border security, whether it be through reoccupation of Lebanon South of the Litani or through "salting the earth" North of the Israel-Lebanese border. Israeli military action appears to aim at the delegitimization of Hezbollah as an effective instrument for the realization of Shiah (or for that matter, anyone else's) interests through demonstration of its incapacity to realize its social and military objectives and through serious reduction of its capacity to wage war, and to accordingly weaken its influence in the region in general and in Gaza and Lebanon in particular. The determination of whether this strategy has been effective will have to wait until the dust has settled and the partisan enthusiasm of war-time has been replaced by the realistic necessities of post-war reconstruction.
Naturally, all these comments are predicated on the non-intervention of other states, namely Iran and Syria, in aid of Hezbollah. This would, of course, be an entirely different ball-game involving forces and interests far beyond those of Israel and Lebanon.
*A recent article in Yediot Aharonot on a Religious Zionist movement for resistance to military service in the current conflict indicates just how little this war interests Israel's largest population of radical nationalists. ** See Halutz on the limited capacity of the IDF to reduce Hezbollah rocket attacks
Victor Friedlander-Rakocz victor at kfar-hanassi.org.il ----- Original Message ----- From: "Wojtek Sokolowski" <sokol at jhu.edu> To: <lbo-talk at lbo-talk.org> Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 19:03 Subject: RE: [lbo-talk] Welcome to my parlor,says the Hezbollah spider to the Israeli fly.
> [WS:]
>
> I like your analysis a lot. It offers a healthy dose of realism as an
> antidote to idealistic wishful thinking. The force has always been with
> those with the material and organizational resources rather than with the
> occasionally enthusiastic but otherwise disorganized "streets." There is
> no
> reason to believe that this will change in the foreseeable future.
>
> Yet, there is a broader issue that such narrowly focused on strategy
> analyses often miss - the cost/benefit balance of war, as well as its
> opportunity cost. That is to say, the IDF will most likely prevail over
> their opponents in this (and for that matter future) engagement, but is
> that
> victory worth the price the Israeli society will pay for it, and can the
> same goal be achieved at a lower cost?
>
> I understand that nationalistically minded types would reply that no price
> is too high for national sovereignty and security - but such an answer is
> nothing but a right wing canard designed to obfuscate the basic fact that
> there almost always are alternative means of achieving the same end, and
> those different means carry very different sticker prices. So the real
> question is not whether the IDF is prevailing in the battlefield, but
> whether the society as a whole is gaining a real value from that battle,
> or
> it is simply being taken for a ride.
>
> I am not arguing that wars always produce disutility, and its objectives
> can
> be achieved by alternative peaceful means. I view it as an empirical
> question rather than a given. My argument is that the question of
> utility
> and efficiency of this particular means to an end is seldom if ever
> considered, let alone answered when the nationalistic fervor sets in.
>
> I also understand that the Bush administration gets quite a good value
> from
> the current hostilities at a real bargain - assaulting Iran by proxy is
> priceless, for all those extra jets, laser guided missiles, and military
> aid
> there is always Mastercard. I am not sure, however, what the Israeli
> society will get for what it pays for the war - or even whether that
> question is even seriously considered. I also have a feeling that the
> current hostilities in Lebanon will lead to a Pyrrhic victory for Israel
> (as
> it has in the past.)
>
> Wojtek
>
> ___________________________________
>
>
>Will Israel's offensive eliminate resistance? I
assume this is Tel Aviv's goal; can they succeed (in
the 'Roman peace' sense) by destroying southern
Lebanon?
For me, the issue isn't whether or not Hezbollah can fight set-piece or 4GW style battles (or any variation thereof) - of course the Israelis enjoy a materiel advantage so a guerrilla or light infantry force's best option in the face of the sort of metal storm the IDF can conjure is to stage a series of orderly retreats (unless there are strategic considerations I'm unaware of - which is, of course, a certainty).
What whirlwinds, I wonder, will be reaped from Israel's actions?
.d. The most important isotope of plutonium is 239Pu, with a half-life of 24,110 years.
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