I can't believe he got an op-ed in the MT.
The Moscow Times
Tuesday, August 8, 2006. Issue 3470. Page 10. Dissecting Ukraine By Alexander Dugin
The inclusion within one state of two absolutely heterogeneous geopolitical fragments was doomed to disintegration from the start. The bankruptcy of Ukraine as a political idea had already become a fact in 1991, but that it was a failed state only became clear with the Orange Revolution. Two years ago we discovered that Ukraine's population was divided not in its political but its geopolitical orientation. The western part of the country wants to join NATO, the EU and the greater Atlantic community, while the eastern part looks toward Russia. After the third round of presidential elections, in December 2004, it became clear that there was no longer one, united Ukraine. Only the Ukrainians' docile nature prevented civil war.
The very heart of former President Leonid Kuchma's policy was a balance between Ukraine's eastern and western identities. But the changing of the guard introduced people who were ready to call things as they were, including former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Two absolutely unrealizable projects for Ukraine -- two utopias that have no chance of becoming reality -- are at odds today in the country. The first is an Orange utopia looking to bring all of Ukraine, including both the western and the pro-Russia eastern parts, into NATO and the EU. The second, no less utopian, idea is that of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych to incorporate all of Ukraine, including the Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk regions and the entire Eastern Rite Catholic population, into Russia. Yanukovych's utopia might seem more attractive for Russians but stands little chance. So what other options are left?
The remaining option is the breakup of Ukraine. Part will go to NATO and part will return to the Russian geopolitical pole. This doesn't mean that Ukraine, except the western regions, should be incorporated into Russia. It means the creation of two autonomous political units -- a Eurasian eastern Ukrainian state and a western Ukrainian state. That the difference in their geopolitical outlooks identifies them as two separate nations is already absolutely clear. Until Ukraine addresses the question of splitting apart, it will continue to be the stage for the clash Yanukovych's eastern and Tymoshenko's western utopias.
A more precise examination reveals not two, but four Ukraine's: the western part trying to move in the direction of Europe; the Crimea, which has followed its own particular historical path; the most eastern regions, which are ethnically Russian; and Ukraine proper, lying between the Russia-Ukraine border drawn by Stalin in 1921 and the Dnepr River. This last area should be the birthplace of the project for the creation of a Ukrainian nation state. Those living farther east are ethnic Russians, and those in the Crimea are Russians and Tatars. But those living between the Russia-Ukraine border drawn by Stalin and the Dnepr River are authentic Ukrainians who should cherish the eastern Ukrainian political idea. Those living in former Galicia or the Ivano-Frankovsk regions can go wherever they want, although Volyn, historically an outpost of Russian Orthodoxy, would also be included in the east.
When talking about a separate eastern Ukraine, the idea is not to make it part of Russia, but as an independent eastern Ukrainian state. This highlights the most basic difference between the concept of "Great Russia" and "Greater Russia." Greater Russia is not a unified state but is related to the idea of "Eurasia," a strategic unit of separate polities with a common geopolitical orientation. The eastern Ukraine that would be formed by a break with the western part would to some degree resemble Belarus, with a large degree of national and political autonomy and in which the Ukrainian language would be preserved -- not in its artificial colonial version, but in all of its different dialects. A new, eastern Ukraine would be a much more nationally oriented state than the current Ukrainian chimera. The result would be independent not only from the West, but also to a significant degree from Russia.
Ukraine is already divided, and the Orange Revolution made this division inevitable. Many people in Russia today want a neutral, thriving Ukraine that is friendly toward Russia and Westernizing according to a European model. But this Ukraine will never come to be. What will come is civil conflict.
The vast part of the country that falls within the eastern Ukrainian zone is not part of Russia but is a separate geopolitical enclave. The challenge for Russia is to demonstrate that it favors the creation of an independent sovereign Ukrainian state as an organic entity. It would not be an obstacle as it is today but, instead, a bridge between Russia and Europe.
Alexander Dugin is the head of the Center for Geopolitical Investigation. This comment was published in Vedomosti.
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2006/08/08/006.html
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ËÞÁÎ, ÁÐÀÒÖÛ, ËÞÁÎ, ËÞÁÎ, ÁÐÀÒÖÛ, ÆÈÒÜ!
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