> You concluded: "Looking at the Bush administration's strategy since
> the invasion, designed to keep power in U.S. hands while marginalizing
> Islamist parties, the elections can only be considered a massive
> defeat for the administration. Yet the press has been all too willing
> to accept its disingenuous declarations of victory. As news reports
> roll in of autocrats from Cairo to Damascus to Teheran quaking in
> their boots at the prospect of democratization in the Middle East, one
> more capital should probably be added to that list -- but Washington
> will likely remain absent" (Seth Ackerman, "Defeated by Democracy,"
> <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2530>).
>
> I have several questions:
>
> Why did you think that Washington wouldn't be able to work with
> Islamist parties? Precedents from Afghanistan to Bosnia tell us that
> religion is hardly an obstacle when it comes to choosing allies and
> proxies.
In principle, there's nothing keeping the US from working with, or allying with, Islamists. To quote the Violent Femmes, they do it all the time. But in the case of Iraq, they did not want, under any circumstances, to be forced to work with these particular Islamists. SCIRI and Dawa are friends of Iran. US policy has always been based on preventing any one bloc from having preponderance in the Gulf. That's why we supported Saddam. (Not a very original analysis, I know, but it's true.) UIA dominance in Iraq raises the prospect of an Iraq-Iran Shiite bloc in the Gulf and that scares Washington. A lot.
>
> Since the elections, has the Iraqi government moved even one step
> toward independence? As you know, Washington scuttled the Iraqi
> government's amnesty and national reconciliation plan:
> <http://mailman.lbo-talk.org/pipermail/lbo-talk/Week-of-Mon-20060828/044907.html>.
>
> Can this government do anything that Washington doesn't really like?
The Iraqi government may occasionally be deterred from doing things Washington doesn't like. But the reverse it true, too. That's hugely important. Rumsfeld was reported to be very nervous about US support for Israel's attack on Hezbollah precisely because he feared a grassroots Iraqi rebellion. More importantly, the same fear is obviously a factor that tends to deter the US from attacking Iran. Shiite leaders in Iraq are playing a double game. In Washington press conferences and in high-profile policy decisions, they sometimes defer to Washington. But on the ground, where they have neighborhood-level control, they can do anything they want, whether Washington likes it or not.
On the reconciliation plan: I'm not sure of this, but my sense is that the Bush admin. wasn't necessarily monolithically opposed to it. They got out-demogogued by the Dems. For obvious political reasons they could hardly come out swinging for a plan to amnesty people who killed Americans.
> This February, the United Iraqi Alliance chose Ibrahim al-Jaafari as
> its candidate for Prime Minister, but the choice was nixed by
> Washington, who had Sistani persuade Jaafari to withdraw: "U.S.
> officials sent a message this week to Iraq's senior religious cleric
> asking that he help end the impasse over forming a new Iraqi
> government and strongly implying that the prime minister, Ibrahim
> al-Jafaari, should withdraw his candidacy for re-election, according
> to American officials" (Nancy A. Youssef and Warren P. Strobel, "U.S.
> Appeals to Iraq's Top Cleric to Help End Political Impasse," 28 March
> 2006,
> <http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/14208086.htm>). It looks
> like the makeup of the Iraqi government is not at all up to Iraqis.
> Does it not to you?
"Not at all"? That's an exaggeration. If they hadn't had Sistani on their side, they would have failed in this particular case. Sistani is not always on their side, as my piece showed. And let's not forget that for a year the Iraqis had a Chomsky-quoting prime minister who had called Clinton's bombing of Iraq "terrorism." It's not like US pressure is the only reason Jaafari was dumped. Some of those who want reconciliation with the Sunnis, like Sistani, judged it best to have a PM less objectionable to them.
>
> Why would the victory of the United Iraqi Alliance, which includes
> SCIRI, Dawa, and Badr among others, make Tehran unhappy? I can
> understand an argument that it should make Tehran fear a backlash from
> those who suspect an increase in its influence in Iraq, but the
> popularity of Islamist parties in Iraq in itself is no challenge to
> Tehran, the capital of an Islamic republic, though it may be to Cairo
> and Damascus, the capitals of (still officially) secular
> dictatorships.
You misunderstood me. My reference to Teheran and Damascus and Cairo was sardonic. I think Teheran is thrilled to have the UIA in power.
> Having read what you said, as well as what Achcar, Cole, Chomsky, etc.
> have said, I'd have to say that the Iraqi elections profoundly
> confused not only Iraqis but also liberals and leftists in the West.
I think you're the one who's confused. Your attitude seems to be: if you're an Iraqi and you're not shooting at US troops, you must be a US stooge. That's just not true. The US is terrified of the UIA's political dominance in Iraq. Certain individual UIA leaders (generally the ones in tailored suits) are dependent on the Americans because when the US leaves, their gravy train is over. But the UIA is more than those individuals - it's a collection of mass parties with deep roots in every Shiite neighborhood, as well as guns, money, and fighters. The fortunes of the tailored-suited politicians may ebb and flow but the UIA is an immovable mass that will still be there after the US leaves, whenever that happens.
Seth